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Abstract 
Inherent safety is that which is intrinsic to a chemical plant. Chemical plants should be 
designed to be acceptably safe and it is better if this can be achieved through inherent 
safety, which cannot be compromised, rather than added - on engineered safety. The earlier 
that inherent safety is considered, the greater are the benefits. 
The aim of this project is to develop a method which can be used to assess the inherent 
safety of a chemical plant, by estimating the potential number of fatalities in the event of a 
catastrophic accident. This method is intended for use in the early phases of design when 
the major decisions on the chemical process are made. In the early stages, only limited 
information about equipment and plant layout exist as well as the reaction chemistry and 
the physical, chemical and toxicity properties of the chemicals involved. 
Historical accident data for fire, explosion and toxic release accidents has been collected 
from all over the world. A number of statistical tests were conducted on this data in order 
to investigate the possibility of developing relationships predicting the number of fatalities 
caused by a chemical accident. 
A number of relationships have been obtained from applying the mortality index (MI) 
approach. These relationships could predicte the potential number of fatalities in case of 
chemical accident. However, other factors have to be taken into consideration in order to 
improve the prediction accuracy. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Inherent safety 
Inherent safety is that which is intrinsic to something. A good example, used by Kletz, is 
the bungalow, which is inherently safer than a house. This is because the majority of 
accidents in the home are caused by stairs. Stairs are inherently unsafe but can be made 
safe by adding on safety features, for example hand rails, child-gates or non-slip carpets. 
The inherently safer choice is to remove the stairs that is to live in a bungalow. The 
inherent safety philosophy is to avoid or remove hazards rather than try to control them. 
In the context of a chemical process, according to Hendershot (1996), a chemical 
manufacturing process could be described as inherently safer if it reduces or eliminates one 
or more hazards associated with the materials and operations used in the process, when 
compared to some alternative process, and this reduction or elimination is accomplished by 
characteristics which are permanent and inseparable parts of the process. 
The traditional plant design philosophy and practice identifies hazards and then adds 
protective measures to control them. This method of secondary prevention reduces the 
probability of accidents. However, there is an alternative philosophy of Inherent Safety or 
primary prevention, where the possibility of accidents is removed, by the use of safer 
chemicals and operations. In the practical approach to Inherent Safety, called Inherently 
Safer Design (ISD), hazards are identified early and then avoided or at least minimised, 
rather than controlled so that accidents either cannot happen or their effects are minimal. 
ISD as a general concept was first introduced by Kletz (1976) after the Flixborough, UK 
accident in 1974. It has attracted global interest since the early nineties after several major 
disasters occurred during the eighties, for example, Bophal, Mexico city, and Piper Alpha. 
Kletz (1991) sets out major strategies in which the approaches to the design of inherently 
safer processes and plants can be achieved: 
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• Intensification - using less of hazardous material, 
• Attenuation - using a hazardous material in a less hazardous form, 
• Substitution - using a safer material instead, 
• Limitation - minimising the effect of an incident, 
• Simplification - reducing the opportunities for error and malfunction. 
It is widely recognized that the timely and effective use of the above principles can make a 
process and plant cheaper to build and operate as well as improve safety. This is because 
conventional plant design often relies on extensive "add-on" engineered safety systems 
which are expensive to provide and maintain, and do little to improve the performance or 
operation of the plant. Therefore, if the basic process or plant design can be developed 
such that any hazards are avoided, eliminated or minimised at source, the need for these 
"add-on" systems or facilities may be removed or reduced and a plant can improve its 
inherent safety performance and lower capital and operating costs. 
In spite of the attractive and the cost-effective approach of inherent safety, it has not been 
used as widely as other techniques such as HAZOP and risk assessment. Gupta and 
Edwards (2002) cited some reasons that are responsible for the limited adoption of inherent 
safety. The key reason is the non-availability of a systematic methodology and tools for 
measuring inherent safety. 
Academic and industrial research personnel have worked on how to measure the inherent 
safety of the processes. A number of methods have been proposed but are too complicated 
for easy adoption by the industry which needs simple methods to measure ISO, Gupta and 
Edwards (2002) and (2003). 
1.2. Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this project is to develop a method which can be used to assess the inherent 
safety of a chemical plant. This model is intended to use in the early phases of design when 
the major decisions on the chemical process are made. In the early stages, only limited 
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information on equipment and plant layout exist as well as the main reaction chemistry and 
the physical, chemical and toxicity properties of the chemicals involved. 
The method is based on statistical analysis of historical accidents which have happened in 
the process industries. Analysing historical data can lead to a number of observations 
which help in hazard assessment, identifying the main sources of hazards, establishing 
which accidents are more prone to happen, showing the activities or operations in which 
effort is required to improve safety and estimating the probable number of fatalities from 
such accidents. 
The method can be used in association with other hazard assessments to help process 
designers to apply good judgment in selecting the safest process. On the other hand, it is 
not vital that the assessment is quantitatively accurate, because the aim is an aid for 
decision-making in design. The method takes into consideration the three main classes of 
hazards with which process engineering is concerned, fire, explosion, and toxic release. 
Brief summaries of the topics of the remaining chapters of this thesis are as follows: 
Chapter 2: introduces the concept of inherent safety and inherently safer design. It 
describes how the design can be made more inherently safe by applying the principles of 
inherently safer design. It describes some available tools for measuring inherent safety. It 
also covers the reasons for the limited adoption of inherently safer design. 
Chapter 3: is a case study that has been applied to the inherent safety index which was 
developed by Edwards and Lawrence (1993). The case study is for testing two routes for 
manufacturing Adiponitrile in order to determine the safer route. 
Chapter 4: presents the dust explosion which poses a major hazard in handling solid 
materials. The chapter describes the dust explosion phenomena, the factors that influence 
dust explosibility and reviews some tests used worldwide for measuring explosion 
properties. It also suggests a method to assess the hazards posed by dusts. 
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Chapter 5: is the major chapter in this thesis. This chapter starts with a survey of the fire 
and explosion accidents published in the literature and their analysis where available. It 
then illustrates the statistical tests which have been conducted on the fire and explosion 
accidents in order to develop a method which will be used to measure the inherent hazard 
of a chemical plant or the impact of a chemical or a process operation on people. 
Chapter 6: summanses the main findings of the research and makes some 
recommendations for future work. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Inherent Safety and Inherently Safer Design 
The term inherent means "belonging by nature" or the "essential character" of some thing. 
An inherently safer plant is safe by its nature and by the way it is constituted, Scheffler 
(1996). In the typical approach to design and operation, safety measures are engineered 
near the end of the design process, leaving added-on control measures to be the only option 
available. Control measures added late in design require continual staffing and 
maintenance throughout the life of the plant, greatly adding to the lifetime costs as well as 
repetitive training and documentation upkeep, Khan and Amyotte (2003). Inherently safer 
design represents a fundamentally different approach. Firstly avoiding the hazard and if 
this is not possible, reducing the size of the hazard as much as possible. 
The best known measure for safety is risk, which is defined as a measure of human injury, 
environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the 
magnitude ofthe injury, damage or loss, Hendershot (1997). Thus, any effort to reduce the 
risk arising from the operation of a chemical processing facility should be directed towards 
reducing the likelihood of incidents (incident frequency), reducing the magnitude of the 
injury, damage, or loss should an incident occur (incident consequences) or some 
combination of both. Traditional plant designs try to reduce the risk by adding protective 
equipment and following safe working methods, Kletz (1998). 
A hazard is a condition with a potential for causing an injury or damage, Heikkila (1999). 
A chemical process normally has a number of potential hazards, for example raw material 
and intermediate toxicity and reactivity, energy release from chemical reactions, high 
temperatures, high pressures, quantity of material used. Each of these hazards impacts the 
overall process risk. 
The concept of inherent safety can be incorporated at any stage of design and operation. 
However, its application at the earliest stages of process design when a process is being 
chosen or developed yields the best results, Khan and Amyotte (2003). At that time, the 
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designer still has considerable freedom in technology selection. For a chemical process, the 
greatest opportunities lie in the selection of the chemical synthesis route to be used, 
including the raw materials, solvents, chemical intermediates, reaction steps, and other 
physical and chemical operations to be used. However, it is never too late to consider 
inherent safety. 
The term "Inherently Safer Design" (ISD) was coined by Trevor Kletz three decades ago. 
Since the early nineties, this term has been recognized as the most worthwhile approach by 
the chemical process industry, regulators and researchers as is evident from the large 
number of papers published and presented at conferences, Gupta (2000). 
Hazards can be reduced or eliminated by changing the materials, chemistry, and the 
process variables such that the reduced hazard is characteristic of the new conditions. The 
process with reduced hazards is described as inherently safer, that is a process is safer 
because of its very nature and not because equipment has been added to make it safer, 
Kletz (l998a). This terminology recognises that there can be no chemical process that is 
without risk, but that all chemical processes can be made safer by applying inherently safer 
concepts. The term "inherent safety" does not mean absolute safety. 
2.2 The advantages of Inherently Safer Design (ISD) 
Adopting an "inherent safety" approach offers several advantages. Minimizing the inherent 
hazards in the plant offers savings by reducing the need for expensive safety systems and 
instrumentation, which increase the plant complexity and provides opportunities for human 
error. 
Reducing complexity reduces the need for instrumentation and operator supervision and 
decreases maintenance cost. Decrease the amount of material in the plant (inventory) 
means smaller plant and storage facilities, possibly lowering equipment costs together with 
costs related to the site size. Substitution for less harmful chemicals or processes could 
reduce the enviroumental impact of any wastes produced and the cost of dealing with the 
wastes. 
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It has been shown that, considering the lifetime costs of a process and its operation, an 
inherently safer approach is a cost optimal option, Khan et al (2004). Lifetime costs 
include the fixed cost of the facility, as well as the costs due to operations, maintenance, 
and safety measures. Conventional systems may be cheaper in terms of fixed and 
operational costs; however, considering maintenance and safety measure costs, these 
systems may turn out to be costlier than those based on the principles of inherent safety 
(which may well have higher fixed costs). 
2.3 Strategy for reducing risks in the Chemical Industry 
The strategy for reducing risk, whether directed toward reducing frequency or consequence 
of potential incidents, can be classified into four categories. These categories, in decreasing 
order of reliability and robustness, are, Bollinger et al (1996): 
• Inherent: Eliminating the hazard by using materials and process conditions, which 
are non-hazardous. 
• Passive: Minimizing the hazard by process and equipment design features, which 
reduce either the frequency or consequence of the hazard without the active 
functioning of any device. 
• Active: Using controls, safety interlocks, and emergency shutdown systems to 
detect and correct process deviations. These systems are commonly referred to as 
engineering controls. 
• Procedural: Using operating procedures, administrative checks, emergency 
response, and other management approaches to prevent incidents, or minimize the 
effects of an incident. 
Risk control strategies in the first two categories, inherent and passive, are more reliable 
because they depend on the physical and chemical properties of the system rather than the 
successful operation of instruments, devices, procedures, and people. Table 2.1 gives 
examples of the four risk management strategies. 
2.4 Inherent Safety Principles 
Kletz (1998a) has defined the term "friendly plants" as plants designed such that any 
departures from ideal performance by operators, maintenance people, or equipment can be 
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tolerated without serious effects on safety, output, or efficiency. He recommended some 
principles by which friendliness in plant design can be achieved. These are now described. 
Table 2.1: Examples of Process Risk Management Strategies 
Risk Example Comments 
Management 
Strategy 
Category 
1. Inherent An atmospheric pressure reaction There IS no potential for 
using non-volatile solvents, which overpressure of the reactor 
is incapable of generating any because of the chemistry 
pressure in the event of a runaway and physical properties of 
reaction. the materials. 
2. Passive A reaction capable of generating The reactor can contain the 
150 psig pressure in case of a runaway reaction. However, 
runaway, done III a 250 pSlg if 150-psig pressure is 
reactor generated, the reactor could 
fail due to a defect, 
corrosion, physical damage 
or other cause. 
3. Active A reaction capable of generating The interlock could fail to 
150 psig pressure in case of a stop the reaction in time, 
runaway, done in a 15 psig reactor and the rupture disk could 
with a 5 psig high pressure be plugged or improperly 
interlock to stop reactant feeds installed, resulting in 
and a properly sized 15 psig reactor failure in case of a 
rupture disk discharging to an runaway reaction. The 
effluent treatment system. effluent treatment system 
could fail to prevent a 
hazardous release. 
4. Procedural The same reactor described in Ex. There IS a potential for 
3 above, but without the 5 psig human error, the operator 
high pressure interlock. Instead, failing to monitor the 
the operator IS instructed to reactor pressure, or failing 
monitor the reactor pressure and to stop the reactant feeds in 
stop the reactant feeds if the time to prevent a runaway 
pressure exceeds 5 psig. reaction. 
2.4.1 Intensification 
Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances. This could be achieved through efficient 
continuous reactors (loop reactors, or tubular reactors) in place of batch reactors, reduced 
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inventory of raw materials and in-process intermediates, and efficient process equipment. 
Friendly plants contain low inventories of hazardous materials so that they do not cause 
harm in case of a leak. 
Application examples 
A good example of an intensified process, mentioned by Kletz (1998a), is that of 
Nitroglycerine production. The product was originally made in ton batches in a mass 
transfer limited reactor. However, studies of the reaction rate revealed that the two-to-three 
hour batches needed only two minutes to go to satisfactory completion. This chemical 
discovery drove processing changes towards a small continuous reaction process where if 
the reactor exploded, very little damage resulted and a spare gram-size reactor would be 
ready to insert into the unit operation. Whereas, loss of the ton-capacity reactor was always 
disastrous for both production and life. 
Khan and Amyotte (2003) cited a continuous process for phosgene manufacture on 
demand, that eliminating the need for storage of liquid phosgene. Various important issues 
such as quality control, understanding of transient reactor operation, and process control 
were successfully resolved by a fundamental understanding of the chemical reaction. This 
enabled the design of a system which met all of the user's requirements in an inherently 
safer way. 
It is understood that mixing and gas-liquid phase mass transfer controls the rate and 
efficiency of chlorination reactions. Replacing a stirred tank reactor with a loop reactor, 
specifically designed to optimize mixing and gas-liquid phase transfer, has been shown to 
significantly reduce reactor size, processing time, and chlorine usage. 
2.4.2 Substitution 
This practice aims to replace the hazardous material with a less hazardous one. This could 
be achieved through water based paints and coatings, alternative chemistry using less 
hazardous materials, and less flammable or toxic solvents. 
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Application examples 
The following two examples were described by Khan and Amyotte (2003) for the 
applications of substitution. Manufacture of acrylic esters by oxidation of propylene to 
produce acrylic acid, followed by esterification to manufacture the various esters is 
inherently safer than the older Reppe process, which used acetylene, carbon monoxide, and 
nickel carbonyl. 
Disodium iminodiacetate (DSIDA), an intermediate used for agricultural chemicals, was 
traditionally manufactured using a process requiring ammonia, formaldehyde, hydrogen 
cyanide, and hydrogen chloride. Monsanto developed a new process for DSIDA which 
eliminates the use of hydrogen cyanide and formaldehyde, has a higher yield, is simpler, 
and produces a product of sufficiently high purity that purification is not required. Many 
cleaning and de-greasing operations have eliminated the use of organic solvents by 
substituting water based systems, Hendershot et al. (1999). 
A polymerization process was conducted using a gradual addition batch process, with a 
large quantity of organic solvent being required to keep the system viscosity low enough 
for effective mixing and heat transfer. In the event of an uncontrolled (runaway) 
polymerization, a large quantity of flammable and toxic material would be ejected through 
the reactor rupture disk. Instead of relying on an expensive and elaborate emergency relief 
discharge system to control the potential hazard, the basic process chemistry was re-
considered. It was found that it was possible to make the product using a suspension 
polymerization process in water. Because of the significantly lower amount of solvent 
required in the new process, in the case of a runaway reaction most of the material released 
would be water (with a small amount of solvent and unreacted monomer). Reaction 
runaway was also less likely because of the higher heat capacity of water, allowing it to 
absorb more of the heat of reaction during a process upset, Khan and Amyotte (2003). 
2.4.3 Attenuation or moderation 
Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous form of a material, or facilities which 
minimize the impact of a release of hazardous material or energy. This could be 
implemented through dilution, refrigeration of volatile hazardous materials, and granular 
product formulations in place of powders. 
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Application example 
In the 1930s, ammonia plants typically operated at pressures up to 600 bar. Over the years, 
improved understanding of the chemistry has resulted in a downward trend in the operating 
pressure of ammonia plants; in the 1980s, plants operating in the range of 100-150 bar 
were common. The newer, low-pressure plants are inherently safer, cheaper, and more 
efficient than their high-pressure counterparts. 
Some other examples of attenuation described by Khan and Amyotte (2003) are storing 
liquefied chlorine and ammonia as refrigerated liquids at atmospheric pressure instead of 
storing them under pressure at ambient temperature and handling powdered dyestuffs that 
might cause dust explosions as slurries. 
2.4.4 Simplification 
Design features that eliminate unnecessary complexity make operating errors less likely. 
Design teams engineer very complex processing systems to accommodate a variety of 
products that make the plant complex. Complex processing facilities provide many 
opportunities for error and create more expense since there is a great deal of cleanup and 
retool time consumed. Therefore, focusing just on the product at hand should be 
considered. 
Application examples 
An understanding of basic process chemistry allows process chemists and engineers to 
design simpler reaction systems and facilities. One pot and in-situ processes permit the 
generation of a hazardous intermediate in the vessel where it will be used, eliminating the 
need to store it, or to move it around the plant in piping systems. The inventory of 
hazardous material is thus limited to a maximum of one batch. This example illustrates the 
beneficial overlap that can occur with inherent safety principles (in this case, simplification 
and minimization). 
On the other hand, simplification sometimes involves a trade off between the complexity 
of an overall plant and complexity within one particular piece of equipment. For example, 
a reactive distillation process for producing methyl acetate requires only three columns and 
the associated support equipment. The older process required a reactor, an extractor, and 
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eight other columns, along with the associated support equipment. The new process is 
simpler, safer, and more economical, but the successful operation of the reactive 
distillation component is itself more complex and knowledge intensive, Bollinger et al. 
(1996). 
2.4.5 Limitation of effects 
The idea is to minimize the effect of an incident as much as possible. These are not 
planned exercises in design failure, but are careful use of technology to limit potential 
system losses. A good example is the use of gasket systems that only leak small amounts 
when they fail instead of gaskets that can totally blow-out. Another example mentioned by 
Kletz (1998) is the reactor type. A tubular reactor is better than a pot reactor because the 
leak rate is limited by the cross-section of one tube and can be stopped by closing a valve 
in the pipe. 
2.4.6 Avoiding Knock-On Effects 
This is to prevent any knock-on or un planned effect which might happen when incidents 
occur. For example, provide firebreaks between plants sections to restrict the spread of fire, 
or, if flammable materials are handled, the plants are built out-of-doors so that leaks can be 
dispersed by natural ventilation. 
2.4.7 Making Incorrect Assembly Impossible (or at least difficult) 
Friendly plants are designed so that incorrect assembly is difficult or impossible. For 
example, compressor valves should be designed so that inlet and exit valves cannot be 
interchanged. To prevent relief valves from being installed the wrong way round, their 
inlet and exit lines should have flanges of different sizes. 
2.4.8 Make Status Clear 
With friendly equipment it is easy to notice any wrong assembly and to find out whether it 
is in the open or shut position. Check valves should be marked so that installation the 
wrong way round is obvious. It should not be necessary to look for a faint arrow hardly 
visible beneath the dirt. 
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2.4.9 Tolerance 
This is the ability of equipments to tolerate poor installation or operation without failure. 
Material of construction (MOC) evaluations early in the development of a chemical route 
is essential to provide greatest degree of inherent safety. 
Good engineering design is also considered in tolerance. Piping stress analysis can lead to 
provision of expansion loops to compensate for thermal expansion of piping rather than 
using special fittings of convenience like bellows or hoses. Quality of the original 
equipment specification, likewise, has a potential effect on tolerance. If the equipment or 
control system is critical, its design should be made more fault-tolerant. 
2.4.10 Ease of Control 
Is the use of the known physical principles, when possible, to achieve the operating 
conditions rather than adding control equipment. For example, one flow can be made 
proportional to another by using flow ratio controllers, which may fail or be neglected, or, 
a better way, by letting one fluid flow through an orifice and suck in the other through a 
sidearm. 
2.4.11 Administrative ControlslProcedure 
Human error is the most frequent cause of loss of containment. Training and certification 
of personnel on critical procedures are permanent considerations. Also some other inherent 
safety principles, like ease of control, making status clear, tolerance and making incorrect 
assembly impossible, play a vital role. 
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Figure 2.1: Opportunity to Implement and Cost oflgnoring Inherent Safety. 
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2.5 Inherent safety in preliminary process design 
As a process goes through the stages of the project, such as conceptual design, process 
flow sheet, construction and finally operation, opportunity of implementing inherent safety 
principles and cost of design changes have a varying trends. While the major decisions on 
process principle are done on the conceptual design phase, this phase gives the best 
opportunity of implementing inherent safety. In terms of cost, in the early stages of plant 
design the changes for safety will be most profitable, since nothing has been built or 
ordered yet and thus no expensive modifications are needed. 
Figure 2.1 shows that the cost of any design/process changes are easier and cheaper early 
in the process life cycle (conceptual design) and any re-design done after the detailed 
design stage is extremely expensive. Table 2.2 shows the stages at which each feature of 
friendly design should be considered. 
Table 2.2: Project stages at which each feature of friendly design should be discussed, 
(Kletz, 1998a) 
Feature 
l. Intensification 
2. Substitution 
of chemistry 
of auxiliary materials 
3. Attenuation 
4. Limitation of effects 
by equipment design 
by chan~ing reaction conditions 
5. Simplification 
6. Avoiding knock-on effects 
by layout 
in other ways 
7. Making incorrect assemble impossible 
8. Making status clear 
9. Tolerance 
10. Ease of control 
11. Computer control 
12. Passive features 
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2.6 The Constraints on Inherently Safer Design 
Despite the clear benefits of adopting the concept of the inherently safer plant from both 
sides, process safety and cost, a number of reasons have been found that hinder the wider 
spread of the inherent safety principles. In order to know these reasons and the low profile 
of inherent safety, the European joint Industry-government Inside Project (for INherent 
Safety InDEsign) assessed the true extent of use of inherent safety in the process 
industries, Mansfield (1996). 
The Inside team has surveyed more than 20 large, medium and small companies across 
Europe, representing a wide-range of the chemical process industries (CPI). A number of 
major design and engineering contractors and a process licensors were interviewed. These 
interviews provide insight into the way Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) issues are 
addressed in process development and design. The findings were as follows: 
• Companies consider a lack of awareness and a conservatism in the design to be the 
main hurdles to adopting inherent SHE, Figure 2.2. Lack of awareness is attributed 
to the education that chemists and engineers receive. SHE management principles 
simply do not get sufficient attention in their studies and even when SHE topics are 
taught, they are treated as a separate subject rather than as an integral part of 
development and design. 
• Governmental regulation can be either a hurdle or a stimulus to inherent safety. On 
the one hand, prescriptive regulatory requirement can hinder its attainment. On the 
other hand, an appropriate educational approach by the regulators can help raise 
awareness of SHE and how to attain it. Some companies have realised the benefits 
which can be gained by adopting the principles of inherent safety. In the U.K. 
under the COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards) legislation, there is a 
requirement to demonstrate that a hierarchical approach to process design, 
including SHE, has been taken. 
• The relationship between client and contractor can have a key influence on SHE. A 
more-open relationships may be needed to encourage dialogue between the 
contract engineers and clients, and to ensure that the contractor takes steps to 
evaluate and optimise SHE-related design options. Pressure to reduce the cost and 
time of a project can likewise be a problem. 
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• The emphasis on modifying and expanding existing plants rather than building new 
ones places constraints on the design, which can inhibit the adoption of inherent 
SHE. However, such modifications and revamps often provide the opportunity to 
take into account the latest advances in production and SHE performance. Some 
speciality chemical manufacturer uses the same plant to make a wide variety of 
products. Such an activity requires special attention to SHE. 
Legislation 
requirerrrnts 
15% 
Others 
20% 
Conservatismin 
design managetrent 
20% 
Cost & tiIrn pressure 
onprojert 
15% 
Lack of awareress 1---- 30% 
Figure 2. 2: The hurdles preventing the adoption ofinherent safety 
Kletz (1998) added some reasons to the Inside Project's fIndings such as the tendency of 
people to follow the procedures in plant design and to use tested designs rather than use 
new processes because the new designs might produce unforeseen problems which will 
delay the start -up or the achievement of flowsheet output. 
Khan and Amyotte (2002) have proposed some suggestions by which inherently safer 
approaches to design can be promoted: 
Regulatory agencies must take the initiative in raising awareness and promoting 
discussion of inherently safer approaches to design. 
Researchers should be encouraged to work on the demonstration of inherent 
safety applications and these fmdings should be made available to all interested 
industries. 
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Regulatory agencIes must encourage the use of inherent safety by providing 
various incentives for collaborative research opportunities. 
A structured discussion paper needs to be developed on the use of inherent safety 
and its advantages. This could be achieved through collaboration among 
industries, regulatory agencies, and researchers. 
Efforts must be made to develop easier to use methodologies and tools for 
inherent safety application. The reality at present is that there are few systematic 
methodologies or tools available to evaluate inherent safety. 
Regulatory agencies and industry should encourage the inclusion of inherent 
safety principles and their application in training programs for safety specialists 
and designers. Such training would also be appropriate for senior managers and 
project managers so they are made aware of the principles and benefits of inherent 
safety. 
Research and development programs should be funded to address or encourage 
inherently safer teclmology, design and operation. Perhaps greater priority could 
be given to joint programs to develop and test new teclmologies that could 
provide inherently safer alternatives. 
Consideration should be given to practical ways of encouraging innovation and 
the search for inherently safer design solutions in projects. This might include 
providing more time or resources at the early stages of projects for these activities 
and by having more open and flexible contractual and working relationships. 
Universities should be encouraged to include more emphasis on safety in general, 
and inherently safer design of processes and plant in particular, as part of the 
curriculum for their engineering graduates. 
In order to know whether there is a progress in the status of use of ISD in industry in the 
recent years and to discover the reasons for slow adoption, Gupta and Edwards (2002) 
carried out a survey amongst industrialists, academics and regulators. Questionnaires were 
sent to different sets of responders: industries and consultants; academics and R&D 
organizations; and regulators. 63 completed responses were received from 11 countries 
represent a whole spectrum, from those who have only recently heard of ISD to those who 
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have practised it successfully for over two decades. The responding companies covered a 
very wide range of industrial activities. Amongst the reasons cited for limited adoption 
were: lack of case studies dealing with economic benefits; lack of a tried and tested yet 
simple methodology of application; lack of desire to change; lack of knowledge about ISD 
amongst research chemists, engineers, managers and regulators; no enforcing regulation; 
lack of specific research funds for academics in this area. 
However, the results of this survey showed that awareness of inherent safety is progressing 
since almost all the responders were familiar with ISD. This is a significant and favourable 
development compared to the results of the Inside team survey (1997) in which lack of 
awareness was cited as the major hurdles to the ISD. 
Though, many of the responders were not familiar with the current inherent safety indices. 
Those familiar have used them sparingly. Companies stated that the current indices are too 
elaborate, required a lot of process data and could not be used in early development stage. 
They recommended the need for quick, simple, well tested methods with enough examples 
to instill confidence in them. 
2.7 Inherent Safety and reliability in process design 
As mentioned before inherent safety principles can be applied at all stages in a process life 
cycle. In fact, there are many opportunities for enhancing the inherent safety and reliability 
of a plant at the detailed design stage. Hendershot and Post (2000) gave some specific 
examples for more reliable chemical plant design in the following sub - sections. 
2.7.1 Pumps 
When specifying a pump, the design should be robust enough to allow the pump to deliver 
the required flow rate over a wide range of operating conditions. In particular, the pump 
should be insensitive to variation in the downstream pressure, perhaps caused by fouling or 
plugging of pipes, valves stuck in a partially open position, failure of control valves, or 
operator error in setting manual valves. Figure 2.3 (A) shows a pump, which is very 
sensitive to an increase in downstream pressure. A better pump selection is shown in 
Figure 2.3 (B) - this pump will deliver the required flow rate with a much larger increase 
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in downstream pressure. If the flow drops below the critical value, the plant will probably 
have to be shut down because of product quality or safety problems. 
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Figure 2. 3: Pressure drop profile against flow rate for (A) Sensitive Pump Design, (8) 
More Robust Pump Design, Hendershot and Post (2000). 
2.7.2 Compressors 
Similar attention to perfonnance curves can improve the reliability of a compressor design 
also. The vendors do provide this information for a good reason, and it is up to the plant 
designer to use the available data to specify a robust design which will provide acceptable 
perfonnance over a wide range of operating conditions which may be encountered in plant 
operation. Figure 2.4 shows a sensitive compressor design, which can easily go into a 
surge condition with a slight variation in operating conditions. Figure 2.5 shows a much 
more robust design, which is much more tolerant of variation in operating conditions. 
Again, perhaps this compressor is a critical piece of equipment for plant operability or 
safety - for example, it might be the refrigeration compressor for the brine supply to a 
reactor with a highly exothermic reaction. 
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Figure 2. 4: A Sensitive Compressor Design, Hendershot and Post (2000). 
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Figure 2. 5: A More Robust Compressor Design, Hendershot and Post (2000). 
2.7.3 Fans 
The selection of fan type can impact the robustness of a design, and the potential for the 
fan to trip out due to high power draw for the fan motor. The power draw for a radial blade 
fan increases as downstream dampers are opened, and it could reach a point where the 
motor would trip due to high power (Figure 2.6(A». A fan with backward curved blades 
has a maximum possible power draw, and it is possible to design the system so the fan 
cannot trip due to high power (Figure 2.6 (B» . 
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Figure 2. 6: Power Characteristics for (A) radial blade fan, (B) Backward Curved 
Blade Fans, Hendershot and Post (2000). 
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Figure 2.7: A Complex Emergency Relief System for a Batch Reactor with a 
Potential Exothermic Runaway Reaction, Hendershot and Post (2000). 
2.7.4 Vessel Design 
Many years ago, emergency relief systems from reactors and other vessels discharged 
directly to the atmosphere, usually through a stack or to a building roof where potential 
exposure to people could be minimized. This is no longer acceptable for many vessels 
today because of environmental concerns, and a better understanding of the potential 
health and safety issues arising from an emergency relief system release. Therefore, it is 
often necessary to provide a complex system to treat the effluent from an emergency relief 
device. This might include equipment such as catch tanks, quench tanks, scrubbers, 
absorbers, or flare systems. Figure 2.7 shows an example system. 
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Figure 2. 8: A Reactor with a Higher Design Pressure May Eliminate the Need for the 
Complex Emergency Relief System, Hendershot and Post (2000). 
Such systems are expensive to build and operate, and they can never be 100% reliable. 
Because they are emergency systems, which do not normally operate when the plant is 
functioning properly, failures may be hidden, detectable only by testing and other 
preventive maintenance programs. In many cases it may be possible to eliminate the need 
for complex emergency relief and effluent treatment systems by building a stronger 
reaction vessel, as shown in Figure 2.8. If the vessel can be designed to be strong enough 
to contain the maximum pressure from the worst credible runaway reaction event, the 
emergency relief system might be eliminated or greatly simplified while still complying 
with code and regulatory requirements. Of course, if this strategy is adopted, it is 
absolutely essential that the design engineers fully understand all chemical reactions, 
which can occur at the extreme conditions of temperature and pressure, which will result 
from a runaway reaction. Experimental data for all credible runaway scenarios must be 
available to confirm the ma;'(imum runaway pressure and temperature. It is essential that 
the chemistry, kinetics, thermodynamics, maximum temperature, and maximum pressure 
for the runaway reaction are thoroughly understood to properly design the reactor. 
2.7.5 A Piping Design Example 
To avoid over pressurization due to gas and heat generation from solid packing material, 
the column in Figure 2.9 must always be lined up either to the process flow (which will 
carry the gas and heat away) or vented to a collection and treatment system if the column is 
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taken off line. Use of a three way valve which is designed to always be open to at least one 
of the flow paths (either to the process flow or to the vent system) will ensure that the 
column cannot be blocked in by closing the process feed valve without opening the vent 
valve. 
Oullet 
Column 
Vent 
j 
('1 
3-Way 
Valve 
Inlet 
(allows f'wo\y only in the directions 
indicated by the arrows, 
intermediate vatve position.s al~ow 
vlow in both dfrec1fions) 
Figure 2. 9: A Three Way Valve Ensures that the Column Is Always either On Line 
or Vented, Hendershot and Post (2000). 
2.8 Offshore Inherent Safety Potential 
Khan et al (2004) and Khan and Amyotte (2002) discussed the applications of inherent 
safety in offshore oil and gas operations. They claimed that the main hazards on offshore 
installations are the process fluids and processing operations, the sea environment, and the 
process links between the reservoir and other installations. The following is some 
examples of inherent safety applications in offshore oil and gas fields. 
2.8.1 Process facility layout 
One of the most inherently safe means of managing risk to personnel associated with 
process facilities is to maximize the distance between the highest risk components of the 
processing facilities and the personnel. This methodology can be as fundamental as 
ensuring proper layout of the process facilities. Due to the high pressures involved, and 
relative ease of igniting the gas if released inadvertently, gas compression facilities are a 
significant risk contributor. It is therefore essential to maximize the distance between these 
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facilities. Separation facilities also pose risks to personnel, and it is appropriate for these 
facilities to be located at the maximum reasonable distance from the accommodation 
module. The fuel gas system (relatively low pressure) can be located near the compression 
and separation facilities, while still maintaining a reasonable distance between the system 
and the facilities (including accommodation). Less hazardous systems such as power 
generation, utilities, etc. can be located closer to personnel quarters. 
Incidents associated with gas compression and separation facilities are the most likely ones 
to impair escape routes back to the accommodation module. It is therefore critical that 
escape routes are designed to minimize these impairment risks. 
There are two fundamental philosophies applied to the provision of escape routes: (i) fully 
enclosed tunnels and (ii) protected open Walkways. Past studies have indicated that both 
philosophies can be applied successfully; however, protected open walkways are 
considered to be the more inherently safe option because there is no reliance on mechanical 
systems. The provision of two protected open walkways can be considered to achieve 
inherent safety through simplification of the design. A fully enclosed tunnel requires a 
pressurization system to achieve a similar performance level as that mentioned above for 
protected walkways. This reliance on an active system cannot be considered as inherently 
safe as a system reliant on only passive components. However, in certain scenarios a fully 
enclosed pressurized tunnel may be a more appropriate alternative. Therefore, as with all 
proposed risk reduction methodologies, there is a need for a case by case evaluation. 
2.8.2 Offshore Process Operation 
The sources of major hazards in offshore processing are the inventories of flammable 
materials in the associated pipelines of the reservoir, slug catchers, separators, contactors, 
heat exchangers, and high speed rotating equipment such as turbines, compressors, export 
pumps, and re injection pumps. Therefore, these items should be the main targets for 
inherently safer approaches. 
Some inherent safety approaches can make a compromise in which safety enhancements 
are achieved as well as cost savings or improvements in process/structural performance. 
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For example, the elimination or reduction in size of equipment can lead to the use of 
simpler, smaller, more compact equipment which offers the promise of reduced hazard and 
risks, reduced weight and space requirements, and less maintenance. In this way inherent 
safety approaches can provide the most cost effective route to safety. 
2.8.3 Separation processes 
The use of static hydrocyclones is now an accepted technology for the treatment of oily 
water. These devices can reduce inventories and space and weight requirements by an 
order of magnitude compared to conventional technologies. They are very simple devices, 
more like a length of pipe than a separator; they need little maintenance and are also far 
less prone to leaks than older style flotation units. British Petroleum has carried out 
successful trials using hydrocyclones for well fluid dewatering. This study included the use 
of rotary as well as static hydrocyclones. The technology has cut residence times from 
minutes to seconds. Centrifuges potentially offer the best separation performance per unit 
volume, but maintenance requirements of the seal and the use of high speed rotating 
equipment are matters of concern. Alfa-Laval is reported to have developed a disk-stacked 
centrifuge that can be used to separate oil from water; this device is intended to replace 
existing coalescers for oily water treatment and recovery. 
Power fluidics has also been used to develop a vortex choke valve for flow control, 
designed to reduce erosion and corrosion problems at chokes, and reduce maintenance 
requirements. The design, which requires no seal or gland for the main well stream flow, is 
said to last five times longer than a conventional choke valve. 
Power fluidics is currently used mainly for oily water treatment. It is possible, however, 
that the technology could find wider application offshore for main stream separation, sand 
and solids separation, and glycol contacting, thus offering size and inventory reductions to 
about one-fifth that of conventional equipment. 
2.8.4 Heat exchangers 
It may also be possible to achieve further intensification by combining unit operations. 
Many fluidic devices can generate intense mixing, providing the basis for good heat 
transfer. In the future, heat exchangers could possibly be located within or around 
separators or contactors. In fact, the combining of unit operations/functions is a classic 
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route to intensification, and should be given serious consideration in process development 
design. In recent years compact heat exchangers, especially plate-fin exchangers, have 
been specified for offshore duty. These are an order of magnitude smaller and lighter than 
conventional shell and tube designs, and hence have lower process inventories. They are, 
however, prone to fouling and are not as robust as other designs. 'Printed Circuit' heat 
exchangers (PCHEs) are an alternative compact design that has been used for compressor 
after-cooling, and has been claimed to offer a five-fold reduction in size and weight. The 
space and weight savings of the PCHE led to a cost saving of $1.50M compared to a 
conventional upgrade in a particular application. 
Other developments have tried to improve the design of conventional shell and tube units; 
a Norwegian company claims to have developed a spiral baffle system which can enhance 
shell side performance leading to 25% weight and size savings. 
2.8.5 Compressors 
A study of compressor systems for offshore gas re-injection compared several alternatives 
using a simulation program. This work showed that a simpler system gave the best safety 
and process performance. The optimum design combined the inter-stage cooler and recycle 
coolers for stages I and 2 in the same unit, and also led to a reduction in the number of 
valves needed for recycle and surge control. This provides an example of how careful 
consideration of design alternatives can lead to inherently simpler and safer plant. The 
design eliminated the need for several valves and reduced the number of coolers from three 
to one, and probably reduced capital and operating costs accordingly. 
2.9 Available Tools for Inherent Safety Evaluation 
2.9.1 Hazard Indices 
Several hazard indices have been developed as tools for chemical process loss prevention 
and risk management. These indices measure one or more aspects of inherent safety, 
usually implicitly (e.g. fire, explosion and/or toxic hazards), and it is generally necessary to 
use several indices to obtain a full understanding of the overall process characteristics. 
These indices can be calculated fairly quickly for a number of process options and design 
variations. Each gives a dimensionless index value that is defined relatively and may be 
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combined with a decision analysis tool for setting priorities. Available indices include: 
• Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI), Dow (1994): Fire and explosion hazards. 
An interesting article by Gupta (1997) provides guidance on use of the Dow F&EI 
for process plants in developing countries. This may be regarded as an inherently 
safer application of an inherent safety tool, in that the premise of Gupta (1997) is 
that one should avoid a false sense of security by applying a tool based on V.S. 
experiences which may not transcribe exactly to other countries. 
• Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) Dow (1993): Acute chemical exposure 
hazards. 
• Safety Weighted Hazard Index (SWeHI), Khan et al. (2001): Fire, explosion, and 
toxic release hazards. Provision is also made in the calculation procedure for 
evaluation of safety control measures. 
• Environmental Risk Management Screening Tool (ERMST@) ERMST (1996): 
Environmental hazards, including air, ground water, surface water (human), surface 
water (ecological), and waste water. 
• Transportation Risk Screening Model (ADLTRS®) ADLTRS (1994): Risk to 
people and the environment from chemical transportation operations. 
• Hazardous Waste Index (HWI), Gupta and Babu (1999): Flammability, reactivity, 
toxicity and corrosivity hazards of waste materials. 
• Mond Index, Tyler (1985): Fire, explosion and toxicity hazards. 
• Toxicity Hazard Index, Tyler et al. (1996). 
Most of these methods focus on existing plants and therefore required detailed information 
about equipment and plant layout. Other detailed methods developed for hazard evaluation 
(e.g., HAZOP, fault Tree Analysis (FTA), failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)) can not 
be applied during early process design due to the huge amount of data required. Only a 
number of simplified methods exists (e.g., Inherent Safety Index (ISI), Inherent Safety 
Evaluation Toolkit (INSET), Environment, Health & Safety Index (EHS)) which are in 
principle applicable in early process design phases. Safety aspects are most effectively 
being considered early in chemical process development. However at early stages, only 
limited information on equipment and plant layout are exists. Thus, most existing methods 
cannot be applied directly in early process design. 
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2.9.2 The Mortality Index 
Another way of quantifying hazards is to use potential loss of life as the primary measure 
of the size of hazard, Marshall (1987). This approach has been studied by Marshall (1977) 
who derived a relation between the number of deaths caused by a hazard, and the mass of 
material (explosive, toxic or flammable) causing the hazard. This relation is called the 
mortality index and is defined as the number of fatalities per tonne of hazardous material. 
Marshall examined historical records and from it he developed empirical relationships for 
fires and explosives. 
The concept of the mortality index was first applied during the Second World War, to 
assess the success of bombing Germany. Marshall (1977) was the first to apply it to 
assessing chemical hazards. The idea is to derive a relation between the number of deaths 
caused by a hazard, and the mass of material (explosive, toxic or flammable) causing the 
hazard. The mortality index is defined as the number of fatalities per tonne of hazardous 
material. 
Marshall examined historical records from the first and second world wars, covering 
bombings and the use of early chemical weapons. He developed the following empirical 
relationships from this data. 
For explosives: 
Where, 
M] = mortality index, fatalities per tonne of explosive 
PD = population density in thousands per sq. km. 
Q = mass of explosive, tonnes 
For vapour cloud explosions and fireballs: 
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Where, 
Q = mass of flammable material, tonnes 
For toxics, Marshall's research concluded that the mortality index was invariant with mass 
released. Therefore he gives the mortality index directly for four chemicals (in fatalities per 
tonne): 
Chlorine M] = 0.5 
Mustard gas (bis-2-chloroethyl sulphide) M] = 0.8 
Ammonia M] = 0.02-0.052 
Methyl isocyanate M] = 12.5 
Vilchez et al. (2001) have applied the relationships proposed by Marshall to 352 
explosions recorded in the Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDAS). They obtained 
relationships that as they claimed have little predictive value. They attributed the weakness 
to some reasons such as the variation in population density and the difficulty of getting the 
real amount of material involved in the accidents as the amount listed in the databases does 
not necessarily coincide with the amount which was really involved in the explosion. 
However, they proposed new relations that enabled the estimation of the maximum number 
of fatalities which could be expected in an accidental explosion at a fixed installation by 
knowing the quantity of material involved as well as the probability of certain range of 
fatalities. 
2.9.3 The INSIDE project Toolkit 
The INSIDE (INherent SHE In DEsign) project was a European govemrnentlindustry 
project sponsored by the Commission of the European Community to encourage and 
promote inherently safer chemical processes and plants. The project has developed a set of 
tools, the INSET Toolkit, to identify inherently safer design options throughout the life of a 
process and to evaluate the options. These tools are described in more detail by the 
INSIDE (1997) Project. 
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The tools of particular interest with respect to measuring the inherent safety of chemical 
processes are the ISHE Performance. The inherent safety performance indices intentionally 
involve relatively simple computations. This enables a large number of process options to 
be rapidly evaluated. The various inherent safety, health, and environmental aspects of a 
process are evaluated using separate indices; no attempt is made to combine the indices 
into a single overall measure. 
The INSET Toolkit instead recommends a multi-attribute decision analysis technique to 
evaluate the overall inherent safety aspects of the various process options. The INSET 
Toolkit is particularly interesting as an inherent safety measurement tool for two reasons, 
Mansfield (1996) and INSIDE (1997). First, it represents the consensus and combined 
expertise of a number of companies and organizations. Additionally, it is intended to 
consider safety, health, and environmental factors in one set of tools, an approach 
consistent with the recommendations ofCCPS/CWRT (2001). 
2.9.4 Inherent Safety Index 
Heikkila (1996), of the Helsinki University of Technology, have proposed a new index for 
inherent safety evaluation. The index is relatively simple and is designed to consider a 
range of factors affecting the inherent safety of a process. These factors are grouped into 
two main categories: chemical and process inherent safety. The chemical inherent safety 
index describes the effect of the choice of raw materials and other chemicals on the 
inherent safety of the process through consideration of heats of reaction, flammability, 
explosiveness, toxicity, corrosiveness, and incompatibility of chemicals. The process 
inherent safety index describes the effect of the type of process equipment and process 
conditions on inherent safety. The parameters considered here are: inventory of chemicals, 
process temperature and pressure, the type of processing equipment, and the structure of 
the process. The separate chemical and process indices are summed to yield a total inherent 
safety index. 
It appears that this work attempts to build on the prototype index of inherent safety of 
Edwards and Lawrence (1993) by extending beyond the choice of raw materials and the 
sequence of reaction steps. In a series of subsequent publications the group at the Helsinki 
University of Technology have described their use of: 
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• Case-based reasoning (using a design case database) to determine a process 
structure subindex Heikkila et al. (1998), 
• A genetic algorithm for optimization of a process synthesis model, Heikkila and 
Hurme (1998), and 
• Accident statistics and layout data to determine an equipment safety subindex 
Heikkila and Hunne (1998). Heikkila (2000) provides a summary of the progress to 
that date. 
Palaniappan et al. (2001) have presented a new inherent safety index for ranking process 
routes and a graphical method for analysing reaction networks. The index consists of two 
parts, the first part is a systematic methodology for inherent safety analysis during process 
route selection stage and the second part is a methodology for inherent safety analysis 
during flowsheet development stage. They implemented the methodology by using an 
expert system called iSafe. They used the index to compare three routes for phenol 
manufacture. 
2.9.5 Fuzzy Based Inherent Safety Index 
Gentile et al. (2003), of the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Centre at Texas A&M 
University, have attempted to improve on some of the subjective factors in the inherent 
safety index of Heikkila et al. (1996) by using fuzzy set theory. The modifications were 
essentially aimed at improving the sensitivity (either excessive or insufficient) in the 
ranges selected for each of the various index parameters. 
The fuzzy logic system was used to calculate a proposed inherent safety index based on if-
then rules that describe knowledge related to inherent safety. In this approach each factor is 
described by a linguistic variable whose range of interest is divided into fuzzy sets. For 
each set, a membership function is defined which has a specific shape describing the 
physical behaviour of the set, Gentile et al. (2003). 
As noted by Gentile et al. (2003), the fuzzy based approach eliminates the problems 
presented by a traditional interval approach for parameter ranges, and is seen as a first step 
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toward a more reliable and simple methodology for inherent safety evaluation. Further 
work identified by the authors, Gentile et al. (2003) includes: parameterization of inherent 
safety, unified membership functions, development of if-then rules, and reliable and robust 
methods of quantification. 
2.9.6 Expert System for Inherently Safer Processes 
Palaniappan and co-workers (2002a, b) have developed a systematic methodology and 
automated tools for inherently safer route selection and flowsheet development. 
Palaniappan et at. (2002a) describe the knowledge required for inherent safety analysis 
during route selection and how it can be formalized in the form of expert rules. The authors 
illustrate a new inherent safety index for ranking process routes and a graphical method for 
analyzing reaction networks. In the second part of their work Palaniappan et al. (2002b), 
they have proposed a methodology for implementing inherent safety during flowsheeting. 
The methodology is based on ranking flow sheets using indices that are based on ranking 
patterns proposed by Heikkila (2000). 
2.9.7 Integrated Inherent Safety Index (12SI) 
Khan and Amyotte (2004) have developed a new indexing procedure: Integrated Inherent 
Safety Index (I2SI). The conceptual framework of the I2SI is shown in Figure 2.1 O. As 
illustrated, the I2SI is comprised of two main sub-indices: a Hazard Index (HI) and an 
Inherent Safety Potential (ISPI) Index. The hazard index is intended to be a measure of the 
damage potential of the process after taking into account the process and hazard control 
measures. 
The inherent safety potential index, on the other hand, accounts for the applicability of the 
inherent safety principles (or guidewords) to the process. The HI is calculated for the base 
process (anyone process option or process setting will be considered as the base operation 
or setting), and remains the same for all other possible options. The HI and ISPI for each 
option are combined to yield a value of the integrated index as shown in Equation 2.3. 
12SI= ISPI 
HI 
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Both the ISPI and HI range from 1 to 200; the range has been fixed considering the 
maximum and minimum likely values of the impacting parameters. This range gives 
enough flexibility to quantify the index. As evident, an I2SI value greater than unity 
denotes a positive response of the inherent safety guideword application (inherently safer 
option). The higher the value of the I2SI, the more pronounced the inherent safety impact. 
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The conceptual framework and sequence of steps involved in the computations of the HI 
and ISPI are shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.12 respectively. The details are available in Khan 
and Amyotte (2004). 
2.9.8 Regulations and Legislation 
Legal regulations are designed to ensure the safety and health of people. The first 
European Cotllcil directive concerned with controlling major accident hazards involving 
dangerous substances was adopted in 1982. Known as the 'Seveso' directive, 
(82/S01lEEC), it was incorporated into UK law by means of the Control of Industrial 
Major Accidents Hazards Regulations 1984 (CIMAH). The regulations were primarily 
aimed at protecting people, and enforcing them was the responsibility of the Health and 
Safety Executive. In 1996, 'Seveso' was superseded by the 'Seveso H' directive 
(96/82/EC). The principal changes were a broadening of scope to include a wider range of 
dangerous substances and enhanced requirements to protect the environment. Most of the 
requirements of 'Seveso H' have been implemented by the UK Control of Major Accident 
hazards COMAH regulations 1999. 
The general duty of the COMAH regulations is that 'Every operator shall take all measures 
necessary to prevent major accidents and limit their consequences to persons and the 
environment'. The regulations are implemented by a Competent Authority (CA), 
comprising the Health and Safety Executive working jointly with the Environment Agency 
and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. This arrangement reflects the 
requirements to ensure the protection of both persons and the environment. The COMAH 
regulations apply to establishments that have the potential to cause major accidents 
because they use, or store, significant quantities of dangerous substances, such as oil 
products, natural gas, chemicals or explosives. 
The requirement of the regulation operates at two levels defined in terms of a threshold 
quantity. At the first level, any activities that involve a quantity of a hazardous substance 
that is between 10% of the threshold quantity and the threshold quantity, are classified as a 
Lower-tier installation. Operators are required to produce documentation to demonstrate 
that the activity is being operated safely and also prepare an on-site Emergency Response 
Plan. 
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At the second level, any activities that involve quantities of hazardous substances that are 
above the threshold limit are classified as a major hazard installation, which require the 
operator to prepare a safety report called "COMAH Report" by a competent person and 
also prepare an Emergency Response Plan covering both on-site and off-site emergency 
services. The schedule of hazardous substances and threshold quantities can be found on 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) website. 
2.9.9 Historical analysis of accidents 
Historical analysis of accidents is one of the most frequently utilized auxiliary techniques 
in risk analysis. Its usefulness has essentially centred on its application to the identification 
of hazards in specific installations or operations and also because it offers promising 
possibilities for application in the estimation of human fatalities and property damage 
likely in specific accident. 
Another interesting approach is that analyzing historical accidents such as fire and 
explosion or toxic releases lead to the identification of a number of features (origin of the 
accident, type of installation in which it has occurred most frequently, consequences, etc.) 
and to the reaching of conclusions which can be very helpful in risk assessment. The 
results of such an analysis can be used to identify the main sources of risk, to establish 
which accidents are more prone to happen, to show the activities or installations in which 
an effort is required to improve safety, to specify the order of magnitude of the probable 
consequences and to define safer operating procedures, Planas-cuchi et al. (1997). 
2.10 Design and operate plants for inherent safety 
Englund (1991) added some techniques to those suggested by Kletz, although some of the 
examples are already mentioned by Kletz, that can be used to design and operate plants so 
that they are inherently safer and to reduce the possibility of catastrophic incidents. 
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2.10.1 Clear responsibility 
Competent and experienced people are responsible for decisions made from the start of 
plant design. Also it is the responsibility of the operations management to make certain 
that responsibility for safe design is clearly understood. 
2.10.2 Critically review alternatives early in design 
Identification of the hazards and alternatives available to remove or reduce them should be 
made early in the design. The alternatives may include adding protective equipment at the 
end of the design or after the plant is operating, both of which can be expensive and not 
entirely satisfactory. 
Hazard and operability studies and other safety studies and reviews normally take place 
late in the design. At this stage it is usually too late to increase the design pressure of 
vessels, relocate electrical equipment and revise the layout or the process extensively. 
Critical reviews and evaluation of alternatives are needed in the early stages of design. 
This would involve an early hazard and operability (HAZOP) study using flow sheet 
before the final design begins. 
2.10.3 Incorporate emergency planning into the original design 
Emergency planning is often done after the plant is nearly complete and ready for start-up. 
At this point, it is necessary to live with the plant as built because it is not easy to make 
some of the desired changes for accommodating emergency planning. Emergency planning 
should cover items such as possible vapour releases from the proposed plant, nearby 
plants, proximity to public areas, accessibility of fire protection equipment to the plant, 
safe exit routes, etc. 
2.10.4 Provide adequate spacing for process plants, tanks, and roads 
Also it is not a good idea to have tank-car and tank-truck loading and unloading facilities 
close to the process area when hazardous materials are involved. Process and storage areas 
must be sited away from residential areas. 
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2.10.5 Storage 
Another aspect which needs to be taken into consideration is the storage tanks. Process 
designers must question the need for all intermediate hazardous material storage and 
minimize quantities where storage is really needed, with grater attention to "just in time" 
supply. 
Inventory in transfer lines can be a major factor in overall facility risk. Their length should 
be minimized by careful attention to pipe routing. Pipe size should be sufficient to handle 
the required amount of material and no more. It is desirable to design dikes that will not 
allow flammable or combustible materials to accumulate around the bottom of tanks or 
equipment in case of a spill. If liquid is spilled and ignites inside a dike where there are 
storage tanks or process equipment, the fire may be continuously supplied with fuel and 
the results can be severe. It is usually much better to direct possible spills and leaks to an 
area away from the tank or equipment and provide a fire wall to protect the equipment 
from most of the flames if a fire occurs. Figure 2.13 (A) shows schematically a traditional 
way to design diking and Figure 2.13 (B) shows a better design that has met with success. 
Dike 
Storage 
tank 
(A) 
Dike 
Storage tank 
Firewall 
Dike 
Slope to pit 
Fire pit 
(B) 
Figure 2. 13:(A) Traditional diking design method, (B) More desirable diking method. 
2.11 Summary and conclusion 
It can be seen from the above sections that the concept of inherent safety is very important. 
The inherently safer process avoids or reduces hazards instead of controlling them. It relies 
on naturally occurring phenomena and robust design and eliminates or greatly reduces the 
need for instrumentation or administrative controls, thereby reducing the costs related to 
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safety and environment. This is normally accomplished by application of inherent safety 
principles throughout the design process, from conception until completion. 
Major decisions on process principles are done in the process development and conceptual 
design phases. Therefore, the preliminary design phases give the best opportunities of 
implementing the inherent safety principles. In fact the possibility of implementing 
inherent safety decreases as the design proceeds. Thus, the inherent safety characteristics 
should be evaluated systematically as early as possible. 
Despite the obvious importance of inherently safer design, there is limited adoption of its 
principles in the industry. Constraints such as lack of knowledge and inadequate inherent 
safety analysis tools are often cited as obstacles to application of inherent safety principles 
during process design. 
A number of tools/indices were developed to evaluate inherent safety in the early design 
phases. These tools/indices are used in ranking process at the route selection stage. Other 
methods such as Dow and Mond indices and Marshall's mortality index have been 
suggested as measurements of inherent safety though not originally developed for that 
purpose, Rahman et al. (2005). In addition, analysing historical accident provide a great 
benefit since it can help in learning from past mistakes, make design improvements, and 
quantify the hazards associated with chemical and process industries. 
As a conclusion, inherent safety is an exciting field that has caught the attention of 
researchers, plant designers, management and regulators worldwide. An inherent safety 
measurement method is needed to compare different processes for an end product. This 
method should work at the research stage itself and not require too much process data that 
can not be available in early design stages. 
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Chapter 3: Inherent Safety Index 
3.1 Introduction 
Edwards and Lawrence (1993) have proposed an index for ranking the inherent safety of 
chemical process routes. One of the recommendations suggested by Edwards and 
Lawerence (1993) is to try the index on more test data in order to examine the performance 
of it as well as to give more evidence of the benefits of inherent safety. This chapter 
presents a case study applied to the index in order to examine the performance of it as well 
as to give more evidence of the benefits of inherent safety. The case study is for the 
production of Adiponitrile. 
3.2 Inherent safety index details 
The inherent safety index serves three functions: 
• It scores chemical routes allowing them to be compared against each other by 
inherent safeness. 
• It is an additional method to compare chemical routes to a common product, rather 
than just looking at economic evaluations. 
• It allows for the impact of changes to the route to be assessed. 
The index is based on seven factors: inventory, flammability, width of explosive range, 
toxicity (threshold limit value), reaction temperature, reaction pressure, and reaction yield. 
Edwards and Lawrence used the index to compare six methods for the manufacture of 
methyl methacrylate (MMA) and have compared the results with assessments made by 
eight experts. The agreement was good. They have also compared the index values with 
the costs of making MMA by the six routes to see if the costs (capital and operating) of the 
inherently safer processes are less. They pointed out that inherently safer plants are cheaper 
because they require less added protective equipment, but this is not accounted for in the 
cost estimates. When alternative processes are compared, the total capital cost is usually 
estimated by factorial cost accounting, that is, by multiplying the cost of main plant items 
by a factor, and no allowance is made for different levels of protective equipment. 
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Each parameter was assigned a scoring table. Some tables are based upon tables and charts 
from the Dow and Mond indices. The steps are scored by summing the scores from the 
table for each parameter and finally the scores for all the steps are added together to score 
the route. 
The score for a reaction step is divided into two parts. The first part is the process score. 
This is the score for the reaction parameters, that is temperature, pressure and yield. The 
scores for the three parameters are summed to give the process score. 
The second part is the chemical score. This is the score for the hazard due to properties of 
the chemicals, that is inventory, toxicity, explosiveness and flammability. The scores for 
the four parameters are summed to give a score for each chemical in the step. The chemical 
score for the step is taken as the highest score out of the chemicals in the step, that is the 
scores for the most hazardous chemical, in a similar manner to the Dow and Mond indices. 
The process score and the chemical score are summed to give the step score. The Inherent 
Safety Index for the route is the sum of the step scores. A high score means an inherently 
unsafe process. 
3.3 Case Study 
Adiponitrile is a nitrile, with formula NC(CH2)4CN, is manufactured principally for use as 
an intermediate to make hexamethylenediamine, which is a principle precursor of the 
polymer Nylon-6,6. 
A literature survey has been made on the manufacture of Adiponitrile. The results showed 
that Adiponitrile is made by at least three different processes, and each is based on a 
different hydrocarbon. Data for only two routes could be found. The chemical and process 
details of the routes were taken from a report by Chem Systems International Ltd. (1983) 
for adipic acid and acrylonitrile routes. A process description of each route, including the 
main chemicals and reaction steps is given below. 
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3.3.1 Adiponitrile from adipic acid 
A flow sheet is presented in Figure 3.1 for the vapour phase reaction of adipic acid with 
ammonia to form adiponitrile. Purification units for the adiponitrile include both 
distillation and chemical treatment. In this method solid adipic acid, with greater than 99.7 
% purity is fed by a star feeder to a tank in which the acid melts and is kept in the liquid 
form at 200° C under an ammonia atmosphere. The heat of fusion is supplied by a heating 
coil. Fertiliser grade anhydrous ammonia is vaporised at 21°C and 8.9 bar in an evaporator, 
superheated to 27SoC and passed to the bottom of the reactor. The reactor is a multi-tubular 
vessel made of stainless steel and packed with catalyst. 
The liquid adipic acid from the melt tank is heated to 27SoC and fed to the bottom of the 
reactor. The liquid enters the reactor mixing section through a series of nozzles specially 
designed to ensure atomisation of the liquid and minimum contact between the molten acid 
and the walls of the vessel. The vaporised acid, mixed with ammonia in a molar ratio of 
I: 1 0 is fed to the reactor tubes packed with a sintered mixture of boric and phosphoric acid 
particles. The reaction is strongly endothermic and the heat necessary to keep the reaction 
temperature around 275°C is supplied by condensing Dowtherm. The reaction is one of 
ammoniation followed by dehydration to the acid amide, and then to the nitrile. 
The vapours leaving the top of the reactor are cooled down to 230°C and separated into a 
vapour and a liquid phase. The liquid phase contains adiponitrile and by-products while the 
vapour phase is composed primarily of ammonia, water, and small amounts of adiponitrile 
and partially converted adipic acid compounds. 
The gas phase is sent to a column where water and ammonia are taken overhead, crude 
adiponitrile is removed as a side stream and a mixture of adiponitrile and partially 
converted acid is taken off as bottoms. The ammonia and water overhead is partially 
condensed, some of the aqueous layer is discarded while the rest is used as a reflux for the 
column. The non-condensed ammonia is purged in order to remove possible traces of 
carbone oxide and hydrogen cyanide that might be generated in the reactor. 
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The bottoms from the column, containing partially converted acid, are recycled back to the 
reactor. The liquid phase from the gas-liquid separator in the reactor section contains 
adipic acid, partially converted acid, adiponitrile and by-products of the reaction. This 
material is fed to a second reactor to complete the reaction of the partially converted acid. 
Ammonia at 275°C enters the bottom of the second reactor and contacts the liquid entering 
at the top. Dowtherm vapours condensing at 345°C provide the energy necessary to 
produce adiponitrile and water vapour by the reaction of the partially converted acid and 
the ammonia. The vapours leaving at the top of the film evaporator type reactor, containing 
ammonia, water and adiponitrile, are fed to the distillation column which is also fed by the 
vapours from the gas-liquid separator of the reactor unit. The reactor is purged in order to 
remove heavy impurities that collect at the bottom. 
The adiponitrile side stream of the ammonia recovery column contains a wide assortment 
of organic contaminants and some water which must be removed prior to using the 
adiponitrile as a raw material for hexamethylenediamine production. The crude adiponitrile 
is sent to a dehydration column in which water is removed at the top and heavy by-
products and solid residues are taken out at the bottom. A solid-free and dry adiponitrile 
side stream is taken off at a point substantially lower than the feed point. This is a 
provision necessary to obtain a water-free adiponitrile. The next step in the purification of 
adiponitrile is the removal of the light components in a vacuum distillation still. The 
adiponitrile withdrawn at the bottom is sent to the heavies vacuum still where the 
adiponitrile is removed at the top and the heavies are taken off as bottoms. In a subsequent 
distillation, refined hexamethylenediamine-grade adiponitrile is removed as the distillate 
stream. In this distillation unit, a substantial amount of adiponitrile is removed with the 
heavies components at the bottom of the column. A better separation is not attempted, in 
order to ensure that the purity of the adiponitrile withdrawn at the top of the column 
satisfies the requirements for hexamethylenediamine production. The bottoms of the 
adiponitrile refining still are subjected to chemical treatment with sodium biSUlphate. 
Treating crude adiponitrile streams with either acids or bases is used widely throughout the 
chemical industry as a convenient way to remove the by-product impurities. The specific 
treatment proposed in this processing scheme consists of mixing the adiponitrile-organic 
by-products bottoms from the refining column with a 10% weight sodium bisulphate 
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aqueous mixture. An in-line mixer should be used to achieve rapid and complete mixing of 
the two streams. The in-line mixer is connected to a stirred tank with a residence time of 
approximately thirty minutes. The effluent from the agitated vessel is sent to a settling tank 
where solids overflow is recycled back to the purification section where it is mixed with 
the feed to the dehydration column. The aqueous phase is sent to the water disposal 
system. 
3.3.2 Adiponitrile Production - Electrolytic Process From Acrylonitrile 
The second process to produce Adiponitrile is the electrohydrodimerization of 
acrylonitrile. The electrolytic cells are the heart of the processing facility for the production 
of adiponitrile via electrohydrodimerisation of acrylonitrile. Figure 3.2 is a schematic 
diagram of the process. The reactions taking place at the electrodes are given below: 
Anode: 
The reaction is carried out to about 50 percent molar conversion of the acrylonitrile with a 
selectivity close to 92 percent. The most important by-products are propionitrile and high 
boilers (oligomers of acrylonitrile). All impurities present with the adiponitrile are 
removed by distillation. Propionitrile is taken off at atmospheric pressure while the others 
are distilled under vacuum. 
The catholyte mixture is prepared in an agitated blending tank where fresh acrylonitrile 
and water are mixed with recycle streams of these two components. An organic salt 
solution and make up salt are also fed into this tank. The catholyte solution is sent to a 
storage tank from which it goes to the tank of cells. The anolyte make-up, sulphuric acid 
and demineralised water, are mixed with recycled anolyte in a surge tank which also serves 
as the blending facility. 
Both the anolyte and the catholyte solutions flow in parallel through numerous 
compartments III a tank of cells. Electric current passes through the same cell 
compartments III series and provides the electrons necessary for the formation of 
adiponitrile. 
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The effluent catholyte from the cells is recycled through a cooler and back to the cells. A 
high rate of circulation through the cell keeps the temperature rise down to 3°C (5°F) and 
serves to keep the adiponitrile concentration low at the cathode surfaces. The anolyte 
effluent flows to the surge tank where the oxygen formed at the anodes is vented into the 
atmosphere. Prior to being recycled back to the cells, the anolyte is cooled down to 50°C 
(122°F). 
A small quantity of the liquid circulating through the catholyte side of the cells is 
continously removed and sent to the purification-recovery section of the plant. The product 
stream is cooled down to 37°C (lOO°F) and sent to the top of the adiponitrile extractor. The 
adiponitrile is extracted with concentrated acrylonitrile. The aqueous phase leaving at the 
bottom of the extractor unit contains the salt used as solubiliser for the acrylonitrile. 
The overhead effluent from the adiponitrile extractor contain the solvent, acrylonitrile, the 
extracted compound, adiponitrile, and relatively small amounts of salt and organic by-
products. This mixture is sent to a second extractor where it is contacted with a 7.4 % by 
weight acrylonitrile solution in water. The remaining salt is extracted with this aqueous 
stream. 
The aqueous bottoms from the second extractor containing the extracted salt are fed to the 
top of the first extractor unit. The overhead stream from the second extraction column, 
consisting of a mixture of acrylonitrile, adiponitrile, and organic by-products, is sent to the 
acrylonitrile recovery column. 
The bottoms from the first extraction unit are sent to the salt concentrator where water and 
acrylonitrile are distilled off while a concentrated salt solution is drawn off at the bottom 
and sent to the salt storage tank. The organic phase containing almost exclusively 
acrylonitrile is sent to the acrylonitrile storage tank. The aqueous phase is sent to the water 
storage units with the exception of a small portion which is used as recycle for the 
concentrator. 
The organic mixture of reactants and feed to the acrylonitrile recovery column is separated 
into crude adiponitrile bottoms and a two phase overhead distillate containing water, 
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acrylonitrile and small amounts of propionitrile. A portion of the aqueous layer is used as a 
reflux to the column and the rest is sent to the water storage tanks. The organic phase is 
sent to the propionitrile removal column. In this unit propionitrile is removed as a bottoms 
while a two phase mixture is distilled overhead. The organic phase containing acrylonitrile 
and approximately 5 % by weight propionitrile is returned to the acrylonitrile storage units 
and recycled back to the cells. The aqueous phase amounts to only a negligible quantity 
and is also returned to the water storage area. The propionitrile bottoms are burned in an 
incinerator. 
The crude adiponitrile leaving the acrylonitrile recovery still is sent to the adiponitrile 
purification section. The product purification train consists of three vacuum distillation 
columns and a small evaporator. In the first column, high boilers and some adiponitrile are 
withdrawn at the bottom of the still. The adiponitrile is separated from the high boiler 
removal column. The overhead from the first still is sent to the medium boilers column 
where these compounds are distilled off while adiponitrile and heavies are withdrawn at 
the bottom. The last purification unit, referred to as the refining column, separates 
adiponitrile from higher boiling compounds which are periodically purged. 
3.4 Applying the Inherent Safety Index to the adiponitrile routes 
In this section the index was tested on two routes to produce adiponitrile. Full details of the 
chemicals present including physical and chemical properties, are given in Table 3.1. 
Adiponitrile is used as an intermediate for manufacture of Hexamethylenediamine 
(HMDA). A production of 75,000 ton/year of Hexamethylenediamine has been taken as a 
basis for the two routes and a backward calculation has been done in order to calculate the 
amount of chemicals involved in the reactions. 
Table 3. 1: Adiponitrile (ADN) route details 
Route Reactants Products 
Adipic acid Adipic acid Adiponitrile 
Ammonia water 
Acrylonitrile Acrylonitrile Adiponitrile 
water propionitrile 
• kirk othmer - Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology 
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3.4.1 Adipic acid route 
Basis: 
Capacity: 75,000 tonnes per year of (HMDA). 
The process consists of two reaction steps, the first is to produce adiponitrile starting from 
adipic acid and the second is to produce HMDA. The reactions are as follows: 
3. 1 
Adipic acid + ammonia -+ adiponitrile + water 
3.2 
Adiponitrile + hydrogen -+ HMDA 
Chemical Molecular weight 
(Mwt.) 
Adipic acid 146.16 
Ammonia 17.04 
Adiponitrile 108.16 
Water 18 
HMDA 116 
Number of moles ofHMDA = 75,0001116 = 646.5 tonne moles 
From reaction No. (2): 
Moles of adiponitrile required to produce 75,000 ton of HMDA = 
= 646.5 x ){ = 646.5 tonne of moles 
=646.5xl08.l6=69,925 tonne 
From reaction No. (1): 
Moles of adipic acid required to produce 75,000 ton ofHMDA 
= 646.5 x){ = 646.5 tonne of moles 
= 646.5 x 146.16 = 94,492 tonne 
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Inventory of chemical (X), tonne = flow rate of the chemical, tonnelhr x hold-up time, 
hours. If the hold-up in the reactor is not known, a hold-up of I hour has been assumed 
here, working hours are assumed to be 8000 hr/yr. 
Ad' "1' (69,925) I 874 lpomtn e mventory = x = . 
8000 
tonne 
Adipic acid inventory = 94,492 x (_1_) = 11.81 tonne 
8000 
The molar ratio of the adipic acid to the ammonia is I: I 0 
So, the amount of ammonia fed to the reactor per year = 
= 646.5 x (\0) = 6,465 tonne moles 
= 6465 x 17.04 = IlO,163.6 tonne 
. . (110,163.6) I 13 Ammoma mventory = x = .77 
8000 
tonne 
From reaction No. 1: 
Actual moles of ammonia reacted = 646.5 x (T) = 1,293 tonne moles 
= 1,293 x 17.04 = 22,032.72 tonne 
The amount ofunreacted ammonia = 6,465 - 1293 = 5,172 tonne moles 
Moles of water produced = 646.5 x 4 = 2,586 tonne moles 
Water inventory 
Taking reaction No. 1: 
= 2,586 x 18 = 46,548 tonne 
= (46,548)XI = 5.82 tonne 
8000 
Adipic acid + ammonia ~ adiponitrile + water 
The scores for adipic acid are: 
Inventory: 11.81 tonne scores I on the inventory table. 
Toxicity: TL V = 0.005 ppm scores 7 on the toxicity table. 
Explosiveness:U.E.L. = 5.04 -1.37 = 3.67 scores I on the explosiveness table 
Flammability: FP = 385 OF > 140 OF scores I on the flammability table. 
So, the step score for adipic acid = I + 7 + I + I = 10 
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Using the same method, the scores for the other chemicals in reaction I are: 
Ammonia =6 
Adiponitrile = 7 
Water = I 
Adipic acid chemical score is larger than the other chemicals, so it is used as the chemical 
score. Table 3.3 shows the process scores for the reaction. Again for each step, the 
parameters for the process are scored, for reaction No. I 
Temperature: 275°C scores 3 on the scoring table. 
Pressure: 1 atm. Scores 1 on the scoring table. 
Yield: 95% scores 1 on the yield table. 
Process score = Temperature + Pressure + Yield 
Process score for the step = 3 + 1 + 1 = 5 
So, the step score = chemical score + process score 
=10+5=15 
recycle ammonia 5.172 tonne mole 
Adipic acid 94,492 tonne ---~ Reactor 
I-_+-_:~Adiponitrile 69,925 tonne 
Ammonia 1,293 tonne mole 
Figure 3. 3: Adiapic acid material balance 
3.4.2 Acrylonitrile route 
Basis: 
Capacity: 75,000 tonnes per year of (HMDA). 
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The process consists of two steps reaction, the first is to produce adiponitrile starting from 
acrylonitrile and the second is to produce HMDA. The reactions are as follows: 
3.3 
acrylonitrile + water ~ adiponitrile+ oxygen 
3.4 
Adiponitrile + hydrogen ~ HMDA 
Chemical Molecular weight 
(Mwt.) 
Acrylonitrile 53.07 
Water 18 
Adiponitrile 108.16 
Oxygen 32 
HMDA 116 
Number of moles ofHMDA = 75,0001116 = 646.5 tonne moles 
From reaction No. (4): 
Mole of adiponitrile required to produce 75,000 ton ofHMDA 
= 646.5 x }{ = 646.5 tonne of moles 
= 646.5xl08.16 = 69,925 tonne I yr 
Inventory of chemical (X), tonne = flow rate of the chemical, tonnelhr x hold-up time, 
hours. Assume 1 hour hold-up time and 8000 hr/yr operation. 
Ad' "1' (69,925) 1 8 74 lpomtn e mventory = x = . 
8000 
tonne 
From reaction NoJ3): 
Moles of acrylonitrile required to produce 75,000 tonne ofHMDA 
= 646.5 x 2 = 1,293 tonne moles 
= 1293 x 53.07 = 68,619.5 tonne I yr 
Acrylonitrile inventory = (68619.5) x 1 = 8.58 tonne 
8000 
Moles of water required = 646.5 x }{ = 646.5 tonne moles 
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Water inventory 
= 646.5 x 18 = 11,637 tonne 
= (11,637) x 1= 1.45 tonne 
8000 
Moles of oxygen produced = 646.55 x li = 323.3 tonne moles 
Oxygen inventory 
Taking reaction No. 3 
= 323.3 x 32 = 10,346 tonne 
= (10346) x 1= 1.29 tonne 
8000 
acrylonitrile + water -+ adiponitrile + oxygen 
The scores for acrylonitrile are: 
Inventory: 8.58 tonne scores 1 on the inventory table. 
Toxicity: TL V = 1 ppm scores 5 on the toxicity table. 
Explosiveness:U.E.L. = 17 - 3.1 = 13.9 scores 2 on the explosiveness table 
Flammability: FP = -117.4 OF < 100 OF 
PB = 170.96> 100 OF scores 3 on the flammability table. 
So, the step score for acrylonitrile = 1 + 5 + 2 + 3 = 11 
Using the same method, the scores for the other chemicals in reaction 3 are: 
adiponitrile = 7 
oxygen = 1 
Water = 1 
Oxygen 323.3 tonne mole 
acrylonitrile 
Electrolytic cell adiponitrile 
1,293 tonne mole 646.5 tonne male 
Figure 3. 4: Acrylonitrile material balance 
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Acrylonitrile has the highest chemical scores 
Process score: 
The step temperature: 55°C scores I on the temperature scoring table. 
The step pressure: 
The step yield: 
I atm. Scores I on the pressure scoring table. 
90% scores I on the yield scoring table. 
Process score = Temperature + Pressure + Yield 
Process score for the step = I + 1 + 1 = 3 
So, the step score = chemical score + process score = II + 3 = 14 
Table 3. 2: Summary of components chemical scores. 
Chemical Inventory Toxicity Flammability Explosiveness 
Adipic acid route{} .. ~i:~;; Az.c' .··;·z . ,; •.... . . A;; 
c' ....•• ". ··zA oz'zzz 
Adipic acid 1 7 1 1 
Ammonia 1 3 1 I 
Adiponitrile 1 4 I I 
water 1 - - -
Acrylonitrile route z . . 
·z· .. ' 
Acrylonitrile I 5 3 2 
Adiponitrile I 4 I I 
Oxygen I - - -
water I - - -
Table 3. 3: Summary of routes process scores. 
Chemical 
Score 
z· 
z z.: 
10 
6 
7 
I 
11 
7 
I 
I 
Chemical Route Temperature Pressure Yield Process Score 
Adipic acid 
Step no. 1 3 
Acrylonitrile 
Step no. 1 1 
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The results obtained show that the adipic acid route and the acrylonitrite ro ute have a ~110st 
the same score values, ]5 and 14 respectively. 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
The graph below shows the chemical and process scores 1;-om Tables 3.2 and 3.3 and the 
Inherent Safety Index for Adiponitrile production. The Adipic acid ro ute has a higher 
process score than tIle Acrylonitrile route and converse ly, Acrylonitrile ro ute has a higher 
chemical score than the Adipic acid ro ute. 
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Figure 3. 5: Inherent Safety Index for Adiponitrile Production 
By making an analogy between the two routes, it is noticed that botb routes work at the 
same pressw'e and thns they have the same pressure scores. On the other hand, there is a 
significant difference between the ro utes temperature. Tbe Adipic acid and Acrylonitrile 
routes temperature are 275°C and 55°C respectively. However their temperature scores are 
only 3 and 1 respectively. This might gives some doubts to the re liability of the 
temperatw'e scores as tbey are not giving a fair equivalent to the large gap between the 
temperature values. 
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Looking at the chemical scores, the three chemicals involved in the Adipic acid route have 
the same explosiveness scores of I. Following Gupta and Edwards (2003) explanation, and 
from explosiveness point of view, Ammonia is safer than Adipic acid and Adiponitrile, it 
requires a richer mixture of 16% in air before it will ignite, while both Adipic acid and 
Adiponitrile will need only 1.37% & 1.7% respectively of them in air to ignite. On the 
other hand, in the Acrylonitrile route the explosiveness score for Acrylonitrile is higher 
than the Adiponitrile one although the risk of ignition is anticipated to be first in the case 
of Adponitrile. This point might emphasize the need to reconsider the method of measuring 
explosiveness of a step route. Using the lower explosive limit as the criterion for 
explosiveness, since it is the more important parameter instead of using the difference 
between upper and lower explosiveness limits as Gupta and Edwards (2003) suggested 
might be a good trial. 
A first attempt to computerize the index is presented using Visual Basic Editor (VBE), and 
Microsoft excel spreadsheet is used for running VBE. A copy of the program print out is 
shown in Appendix B. 
3.6 Conclusion 
It can be seen from the results of the case study that the adipic acid and the acrylonitrile 
routes have almost the same inherent safety index of 15 and 14 respectively which make it 
difficult to distinguish between them. Theses results were obtained even though the 
temperature difference between the two routes was significant. The index does not account 
for the large gap between the temperature values which might give some doubts about the 
realibility of the temperature scoring table. In addition, using the difference between the 
upper and lower explosive limits might not be a good representative of the explosiveness 
of a step route. Reconsideration of the method of measuring explosiveness as well as the 
temperature scoring table is needed in order to get more reliable results. 
The above case study also showed that some chemicals can be present as solids causing 
different hazards known as dust explosion. A dust explosion results when divided 
combustible substance is dispersed into an atmosphere containing oxygen to permit 
combustion and a source of ignition of appropriate energy. The inherent safety index has 
not taken this type of hazard into consideration. The next chapter illustrates the dust 
explosion hazard in more details. 
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Chapter 4: Dust Explosion 
4.1 Introdnction 
During the application of the inherent safety index to the manufacture of Adiponitrile in 
the last chapter, it was found that adipic acid presents as a solid. Handling solid materials 
pose a dust explosion hazard. The Edwards and Lawrence (1993) index does not cover the 
explosion of dusts. Therefore, it was imperative to extend the index to cover this new 
finding. This chapter introduces dust explosion hazards. 
4.2 Historical view of dust explosions 
Dust explosions have been recognized as a threat to humans and property since the time 
that man developed the windmill for grinding grain. Actually, the first known report of 
dust explosion dates back to the eighteenth century, the violent explosion of flour dust at 
TUrin mill, Italy in 1785, Field (1982). It was thought at that time, that the dispersed dust 
had producedaIrinflammable gas, which had subsequently ignited. 
Explosion in coal mines were also common during that period, but again it was assumed 
that flammable gas was the cause. No thought has been given to the possible effects of 
airborne coal dust, till the latter part of the nineteenth century when it was realised that 
coal dust could ignite and explode in the absence of gas, or that flour dust alone was 
responsible for the explosions in mills. 
During the twentieth century, the frequency of dust explosions increased and a wider 
variety of materials became involved as industry developed. Galloway (1898) estimated 
that no fewer than 645 explosions occurred between 1835 and 1898 in the UK alone. Field 
(1982) described the starch factory explosion which took place in Iowa, USA at 1919, and 
in which 43 people were killed, as the most devastating dust explosion, in terms of loss of 
life, outside of the coal industry. 
4.3 Dust explosions in USA 1900-1956 
The National Fire Protection Association published a report of important dust explosions in 
the USA from 1900 to 1956 (NFPA 1957). The report gives details of a selection of 75 of 
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the most serious and recent of the 1123 explosions recorded. The selection covers a wide 
range of dusts from all the categories wood, food and feed, metals, plastics, coal, paper and 
chemicals. In addition, each of the 1123 explosions is mentioned briefly by specifying the 
date, location, dust involved, probable ignition source, number of fatalities and injuries, 
and material losses. 
Table 4.1 gives an overall summary of the consequences of explosions involving various 
dust categories. The table illustrates some interesting differences. For example, half of the 
dust explosions in the shows period involved food and feed dusts. They also give the 
highest percentage of fatalities and injuries. On the other hand, the metal dust explosions, 
representing 7.1 % of the total number of explosions, were responsible for 16% of all the 
fatalities and 11.2% of all the injuries than food & feed dusts. However, metal dust gives 
the highest number of fatalities and injuries per explosion. The pulverized coal dust 
explosions (not mining), on the contrary, gave lower percentages of fatalities, injuries and 
material losses than their share of the total number of explosions. It has been also reported 
that between 1958 and 1977 the American grain industry experienced 220 explosions, 
which resulted in 48 deaths and 500 injuries. 
Table 4. 1: Dust explosions in USA 1900-1956: fatalities, injuries and material losses 
in a sample of 1123 accidental explosions 
Explosions Fatalities 
Types 
Number % number % 
of dust 
wood 162 14.5 38 5.6 
& bark 
Food 577 51.4 409 60.5 
& feed 
Metals 80 7.1 108 16.0 
Plastics 61 5.4 44 6.5 
Coal 63 5.6 30 4.4 
(not 
mines) 
Paper 9 0.8 0 0.0 
others 171 15.2 47 7.0 
all 1123 100 676 100 
From Eckhoff (1977) 
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Per 
explosion 
0.23 
0.71 
1.35 
0.72 
0.48 
0.0 
0.27 
0.60 
Injuries Material losses 
Number % Per Million Per 
explosion US$ explosion 
160 9.0 0.99 11.4 0.070 
1061 60.0 1.84 75.8 0.131 
198 11.2 2.48 3.2 0.040 
121 6.8 1.98 3.7 0.061 
37 2.1 0.59 1.6 0.025 
0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.056 
193 10.9 1.13 4.3 0.025 
1770 100 1.58 100.5 0.089 
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4.4 Dust explosions in F. R. Germany 1965-1985 
The Institute of Safety at Work of the Trade Unions in F. R. Germany has conducted a 
programme of recording dust explosion accidents in F. R. Germany since the beginning of 
the 1960s. The first comprehensive report, covering 1965-1980 was published by Beck and 
Jeske in 1982. A condensed version of the findings was given by Beck in 1982. The 
comprehensive report contains a brief description of each explosion accident specifying the 
type of plant, the specific plant item, the type of dust, the likely ignition source, numbers of 
fatalities and injuries, and material losses. A further comprehensive report covering the 
explosions recorded from 1981 to 1985 was published by Jeske and Beck in 1987, and the 
corresponding short version by Beck and Jeske in 1988. Finally Jeske and Beck published 
in 1989 an informative overview covering the whole span 1965-1985, Eckhoff (1997). 
The total numbers of explosions recorded were 357 for 1965-1980 and 69 for 1981-1985. 
It has been estimated by Beck and Jeske that the recorded explosions from 1965 to 1980 is 
about 15% of'the total number of explosions that had actually occurred. The estimated 
number of actual dust explosions in F. R. Germany from 1965 to 1980 was therefore about 
2400, i.e. about 160 per year. The number of explosions recorded per year for 1981-1985 
was somewhat lower than for 1965-1980. Eckhoff (1997) claimed that, because of the low 
percentage of recorded explosions it might not be justified to conclude that the annual 
number of accidental explosions dropped significantly after 1980. 
Table 4.2 gives some data from F. R. Germany which covers the period from 1965-1980. 
Eckhoff (1997) has compared the Germany data with the older data from USA in Table 
4.1. He found some differences in the distribution of the number of explosion accidents on 
the various dust categories from the first to the second part of the century, and differences 
between the structure of the industry in USA and in the F. R. Germany. The food and feed 
dust for example represent 25% of all the explosions in F. R. Germany, whereas in USA 
the percentage was more than 50. However, the percentages of both fatalities and injuries 
for this dust group both in F. R. Germany and USA was higher than the percentage of 
explosions. On the other hand, the percentage of the explosions involving metal dusts was 
about twice as high in F. R. Germany as in USA. The higher percentage of both fatalities 
and injuries for metal dust explosions than the percentage of the number of explosions 
corresponded in both countries. He attributed that to the violence and temperatures of 
flames of metals like magnesium, aluminium and silicon. 
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Table 4. 2: Dust explosions in F. R. Germany 1965-1980: fatalities, injuries in a 
sample of 357 explosions. 
Explosions Fatalities Injuries 
Types Number % number % Per Number % Per 
of dust 
explosion explosion 
Wood 113 31.6 12 11.7 0.11 124 25 1.10 
Food 88 24.7 38 36.8 0.43 127 26 1.44 
& reed 
Metals 47 13.2 18 17.5 0.38 91 18.5 1.94 
Plastics 46 12.9 18 17.5 0.39 98 20 2.13 
Coal / 33 9.2 7 6.8 0.21 39 8 1.18 
peat 
Paper 7 2.0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
others 23 6.4 10 9.7 0.43 13 2.5 0.56 
all 357 100.0 103 100.0 0.29 492 100.0 1.38 
From Eckhoff (1977) 
4.5 . Recent statistics on grain dust explosions in USA 
.-, -..... .1 
Eckhoff (1997) presented some data for grain dust explosions in the USA as shown in 
Table 4.3. The data for the period 1900-1956 are from the same source as in Table 4.1. As 
Eckhoff stated, the trend is disturbing, as the annual number of explosions seems to 
increase rather than decrease. The annual number of fatalities is also higher for the last 
period 1979-1988 than for the previous one 1957-1975. The annual number of injuries for 
the last period is higher than for both previous periods. However, the deaths per explosion 
have gone down. 
The above statistics indicate that dust explosions remain a persistent threat to human life 
and to property. However, if a dust explosion hazard can be recognised at the early stage 
when industrial plant is being designed, precautionary measures can be installed without 
difficulty and at much less cost and inconvenience than in an established plant. 
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Table 4. 3: Grain dust explosions in USA 
1900 - 1956 1957 - 1975 1979 - 1988 
Loss category Total Per year Total Per year Total Per year 
Number of explosions 490 8.6 192 10.1 202 20.2 
Fatalities 381 6.8 68 3.6 54 5.4 
Fatalities per explosion 0.78 0.35 0.27 
Injuries 991 17.4 346 18.2 267 26.7 
Estimated damage to 
facility, Million US$, not 70 1.3 55 2.9 169 16.9 
inflated 
From Eckhoff(1977) 
4.6 Dust explosion phenomenon 
A dust explosion results when divided combustible substance is dispersed into an 
atmosphere containing oxygen to permit combustion and a source of ignition of 
appropriate energy. The violence and the speed of explosion increase with increasing 
degree of sub-division of the material. Figure 4.1 from Eckhoff (1997) illustrates how a 
piece of wood, once ignited, burns slowly, releasing its heat over a long period of time. 
When cut in small pieces, as illustrated in Figure 4.1 (b), the combustion rate increases 
because the total contact surface area between wood and air has been increased. Also, the 
ignition of the wood has become easier. If the sub-division is continued right down to the 
level of small particles of sizes of the order of 0.1 mm or less, and the particles are 
suspended in a sufficiently large volume of air to give each particle enough space for its 
unrestricted burning, the combustion rate will be very fast, and the energy required for 
ignition very small. Such a burning dust cloud is a dust explosion. 
1 .. 1 SLOW COt1BUSTIOM (bJ fAST COMBUSTION Id EXPlOSION 
Figure 4. 1: Illustration of how the combustion rate of a given mass of combustible 
solid increases with increasing sub-division. 
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4.7 Combustion of dusts 
Many solid materials are combustible, that is they can be made to burn if a source of 
ignition is applied. The ease with which ignition occurs, or the size of the source required 
to initiate burning, depends on the nature and dimensions of the solids. Generally solids are 
ignited and bum more readily as their size decreases, and when reduced to powders or 
dusts the conditions are most favourable. Not only are dusts and powders relatively readily 
ignited, but they also bum more rapidly. Two of the reasons are that air, or oxygen, gains 
easier access to the whole mass if it is in powder form, and heat cannot be drained from the 
burning surfaces into the interior of the solid material when this is in the form of small 
particles. 
A favourable arrangement for the rapid burning of dust is when the particles are separated 
from each other by relatively large distances, so that the air has ready access to each 
particle, as when the dust particles are dispersed as a cloud in the air. The optimum 
condition is when the particles are separated far enough to have sufficient air for complete 
combustion, but they are close enough for the heat release to support the burning of 
adjacent particles. 
A number of conditions must be satisfied simultaneously for a dust explosion to occur: 
• The dust must be combustible. 
• The dust must be in suspension in an atmosphere which must contain sufficient 
oxygen to support combustion. 
• The dust must have a particle size distribution that will propagate a flame. 
• The dust concentration in the suspension must be within the explosible range. 
• The dust suspension must be in contact with an ignition source of sufficient energy. 
If these conditions are satisfied the hazard from a dust explosion depends upon the 
explosibility of the dust, the volume and characteristics of the vessel or chamber containing 
the dust suspension the dispersion and concentration of the dust suspension and the degree 
of turbulence in the vessel. 
The explosibility of a combustible dust is greater if the particle size is reduced. The 
minimum ignition energy is reduced and the maximum explosion pressure and rate of 
pressure rise are increased with a decrease in particle size. In addition fine particles more 
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readily stay in suspenSIOn than coarse particles so the probability of producing an 
explosible concentration is enhanced. Particles greater than about 500 ~ diameter are 
unlikely to cause dust explosions, although the possibility of coarser materials producing 
fine dust by attrition during handling must be anticipated. 
Minimum explosible concentrations III alf are typically in the range 1O-500g/m3. 
Explosible concentrations are much higher than those associated with toxic hazards or 
nuisance problems (which might range from about 1-10 mg/m3) and such explosible 
concentrations would most likely occur very close to a dust source or within an enclosed 
space where the dust cloud cannot spread. 
4.8 Factors influencing dust explosibility 
The explosibility of a dust may be regarded as increasing as the minimum explosible 
concentration, the minimum ignition temperature and the minimum ignition energy 
decrease and the burning velocity and the minimum rate of pressure rise increase. 
The characterization of particles is a complex matter, but in general, characteristics which 
affect the behaviour of particles include those of the individual particle itself such as 
particle composition, density, size, shape, surface properties and moisture content and 
those of the bulk powder such as bulk density and flow properties. Some factors, which 
influence dust explosibility, are: 
» Chemical composition. 
» Particle size. 
» Moisture content. 
» Oxygen concentration 
» Inert gas 
» Admixed inert dust concentration. 
Nagy and Verakis (1983) give a large number of plots showing the effect of these factors 
on the dust explosibility parameters, mainly for particular dusts. 
There are certain chemical groups such as COOH, OH, NH2, N02, C :: N, C = Nand N=N, 
which tend to be associated with higher dust explosibility and certain others such as Cl, Br 
and F with lower explosibility. Dusts of pure metals generally react with air to form 
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metallic oxides. In this case the explosive increase pressure is due to expansion of the 
nitrogen of the air caused by the heat release. In some cases metals actually react violently 
with the nitrogen itself to fonn a metallic nitride. 
Volatile matter in the dust tends to enhance the explosibility, although there is generally 
little increase for volatile contents below 10%. Coal dust in particular can contain a high 
proportion of volatile matter. Interestingly, according to Nagy and Verakis (1983), pure 
carbon dust does not explode. They speculate that the reaction rate of pure carbon with 
oxygen is too low. But carbon dust containing 8% volatile matter is explosive. If the dust 
contains inert material this reduces its explosibility. 
Dust explosibility is strongly affected by particle size. Particle size is usually defined in 
tenns of an equivalent particle diameter. Generally, a dust with a particle diameter greater 
than 500 ~m is unlikely to initiate an explosion, though it may undergo combustion in one 
already occurring. At the other end of the range, reduction in particle size below about 50-
74 ~m does not nonnally result in any significant increase in explosibility. The particle 
diameter of dusts used in dust explosibility testing nonnally does not exceed 75 ~m. 
A dust usually contains a range of particle sizes. A relatively small proportion of fine 
particles enhance the explosibility of a dust. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that 
attrition caused by handling the dust tends to generate fine particles. 
Moisture content has a strong effect on dust explosibility, although the effect is generally 
weak for moisture contents below 10%. At the other end of the range, dust with moisture 
content greater than 30% is unlikely to be responsible for initiation of an explosion. 
The oxygen concentration in the surrounding atmosphere has strong effect on dust 
explosibility, which increases as the oxygen concentration increases and visa versa 
especially in the inert gas environment. Dust explosibility is affected by the concentration 
of any admixed inert dust, although the effect is generally weak for inert dust 
concentrations below 10-20%. 
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4.9 Explosibility tests in the UK 
The tests described in the following sections are those currently being used, the methods 
being agreed with the Health and Safety Executive's Factory Inspectorate, who have the 
responsibility of ensuring industry's compliance with the relevant safety standards, Field 
(1982). The available tests are as following 
4.9.1 Explosihility classification 
This test determines whether a dust cloud will explode when exposed to an ignition source. 
It results in a material being classified as either combustible or non-combustible. In the UK 
the dust explosibility classification used over a number of years is: 
• Group A - Dusts which ignite and propagate a flame in the test apparatus. 
• Group B - Dust which do not propagate flame in the test apparatus. 
Tests are made using the Modified Hartmann Tube apparatus, Figure 4.2. The apparatus 
consists of a 1.2-liter vertical tube mounted onto a dust dispersion system. Powder or dust 
samples of various sizes are dispersed in the tube and attempts are made to ignite the 
resultant dust cloud using a 10 J constant arC ignition source. If the material fails to ignite 
in the Modified Hartmann Tube apparatus, AIB testing is continued in the 20-litre sphere 
apparatus. Powder or dust samples of various sizes are dispersed inside the sphere and are 
exposed to a 10,000 J ignition source (chemical igniters). 
'Perspex' combustion 
tube 30.5 cm lOng!:., '1====::;;'" 
6.4 cm inside "'" 
diameter 
Brass tube 1 cm 
inside dJameter ?rt;~,d!~ 
Electrode 
insulatiOn 
~. I Air resetvolr 
Full port solenoid 
operated valve 
Figure 4. 2: Hartmann Tube apparatus, from Lees (1996). 
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Field (1982) claimed that, the classification test does not afford a means of quantitatively 
assessing the severity of an explosion hazard. Consequently, it is not possible to specify 
explosion protection methods from the results of a classification test alone. 
4.9.2 Minimum ignition temperature 
The minimum ignition temperature (MIT) test determines the lowest temperature at which 
dust dispersed in the form of a cloud can ignite. The MIT is an important factor in 
evaluating the ignition sensitivity of dusts to ignition sources, such as heated environments, 
hot surfaces, electrical apparatus and friction sparks. 
MIT testing is performed using the Godbert-Greenwald Furnace shown in Figure 4.3. 
Powder or dust samples of various sizes are dispersed into the furnace and the minimum 
wall temperature capable of igniting the dust cloud is determined. 
Glass tube 
with heating 
s,ernint 
~ 
Thermocouple 
Outer glass 
tube I 
!" 2 .. •• 
/ 
Sample Preheat area 
Air 
supply 
I 
Figure 4. 3: Godbert-Greenwald Furnace, from Lees (1996). 
4.9.3 Minimum explosible concentration 
The minimum explosible concentration (MEC) test determines the smallest concentration, 
in glm3 of material in air that can give rise to flame propagation upon ignition when in the 
form of a dust cloud. It gives an indication of the hazardous concentration in the plant. The 
test involves dispersing powder or dust samples in a vertical tube apparatus and attempting 
to ignite the resulting dust cloud with an electric spark as a source of ignition. Trials are 
repeated for decreasing sample sizes until no explosion occurs. The mass of the smallest 
quantity of dust giving an explosion is divided by the volume in which the explosion 
occurred to give the MEC in air. 
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4.9.4 Minimum ignition energy 
The minimum ignition energy (MIE) test determines the lowest spark energy capable of 
igniting a sample when dispersed in the form of a dust cloud. The test is used primarily to 
assess the potential vulnerability of powders and dusts to electrostatic discharges, but is 
also relevaut to frictional sparks. Powder or dust samples of various sizes are dispersed in 
the vertical tube apparatus. Attempts are made to ignite the resultaut dust cloud with 
discrete capacitive sparks of known energy. 
4.9.5 Maximum permissible oxygen concentration to prevent ignition 
This is the maximum amount of oxygen that cau be tolerated before a dust suspension 
explodes. The test carried out in the open Hartmann vertical tube using spark ignition. A 
weighed quautity of the dust is placed in the dispersion cup. The dust is dispersed and the 
criterion for indicating au explosion is propagation of flame away from the igniting source. 
When an explosion occurs the amount of dust is reduced aud the testing continued until no 
explosion is observed in at least ten tests at the same dust concentration. The mass of the 
minimum quautity of dust with which au explosion occurs, divided by the total volume of 
the tube, is taken as the minimum explosible concentration in air. 
4.9.6 Maximum explosion pressure and maximum rate of pressure rise 
The maximum explosion pressure aud the maximum rate of pressure rise are obtained by 
measuring the pressure-time profile in a stronger form of the vertical tube apparatus. A 
typical pressure-time curve is shown in Figure 4.3. The maximum explosion pressure Pmax 
is normally calculated as 
4. I 
Where, P max is the maximum explosion pressure, PI is the initial pressure caused by the 
entry of dispersing air into the vessel, aud P2 is the pressure defined in Figure 4.4. The 
maximum rate of pressure rise (dP/dt)max is determined from the maximum slope pressure 
rise curve a/b aud the average rate of pressure rise (:1',.) is calculated as r' -IV . 
QV t - t 
, I 
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Figure 4. 4: Determination of P max and (dPlDt)max from pressure - time curve in test 
apparatus 
4.10 Relative explosion hazard rating 
An empirical index of explosibility was developed by the US Bureau of Mines to facilitate 
the evaluation of the dust explosion. It is not based on theoretical considerations but on 
research findings which suggested that the explosion hazard of a dust is related to its ease 
of ignition and the severity of the explosion. It is considered that the ease of ignition is 
dependent upon the minimum ignition temperature, the minimum explosible concentration, 
and the minimum ignition energy, while the severity of an explosion can be thought in 
terms of the maximum explosion pressure and the maximum rate of pressure rise. 
A numerical rating and a relative hazard are obtained by comparing the experimental data 
to those of a standard material. The US Bureau of Mines selected a specific grade of 
Pittsburgh coal dust as the standard due to the availability of its information from both the 
laboratory scale and the experimental coal mines. Based on the above concept two terms 
the ignition sensitivity and the explosion severity were developed as follows: 
. .. ... (Min. 19n. Temp. x Min.lgn. Eng.x Min. Expl. Conc')Pillsb"rghCoaIDlm 4 2 
Ingmlllon SensitIVity = . 
Explosion Severity 
(Min. Ign. Temp. x Min. Ign. Eng.x Min. Expl. Conc.)s"mp/, '''''' 
(Max. Expt. Pr essurex Max. Rate Pr essure rise)SampleDusl 
(Max. Expl. Pr essure xMax. Rate Pr essure rise}SPiI/"burghCoal Dust 
an over all index of explosibility is then determined such that 
Index of Explosibility = Ignition Sensitivity x Explosion Severity 
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The ignition sensitivity, explosion severity, and the explosibility index are dimensionless 
and numerical values greater than unity indicate a relative hazard greater than that of coal 
dust. The standard data used in these explosion hazard ratings and derived from Pittsburgh 
coal are given in Table 4.4. 
Table 4. 4: Pittsburgh coal dust explosion properties 
Cloud ignition temperature 610°C 
Minimum ignition energy 0.06 J 
Minimum explosive concentration 0.055 gll 
Maximum explosive pressure 83 psig 
Maximum rate of pressure 2300 psi/sec 
Table 4. 5: Relation between explosion hazard rating and index of explosibility 
Relative explosion hazard rating Ignition Sensitivity Explosion Severity Explosibility Index 
Weak <0.2 <0.5 < 0.1 
Moderate 0.2 -1.0 0.5 - 1.0 0.1-1.0 
Strong 1.0 -5.0 1.0 -2.0 1.0 -10 
Severe > 5.0 >2.0 >10 
A relative explosion hazard rating is obtained by the empirical correlations shown in Table 
4.5 and permits the type of explosion to be described as weak, moderate, strong, or severe. 
The index of explosibility is a relative one and is to this extent less independent on the 
apparatus used. The use of an explosibility index coupled with a relative explosion hazard 
rating system provides a useful means for obtaining a general guide to the explosion hazard 
of a dust, particularly of novel materials. A dust having an explosibility index much greater 
than coal (unity) would be expected to present a major dust explosion hazard, while a dust 
having an explosibility index less than 0.1 probably presents no real explosion hazard, 
although a fire risk probably exists, Field (1982). 
4.11 Prevention and Mitigation Frameworks for Dust Explosion 
There are some existing prevention and mitigation frameworks described in the literature 
for explosions in general and dust explosions in particular. They provide a level of 
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guidance for reducing the potential explosion hazard. These include the following 
methodologies: 
» Fire triangle, 
» Fire triangle for dusts, 
» Explosion pentagon, 
» Guides and standards, and 
» Strategies suggested in established reference work; e.g. texts by Field (1982) & 
Eckhoff (1997). 
The most well-known scheme in this area is the fire triangle, Figure 4.5. It illustrates the 
three necessary elements which must occur simultaneously to cause a fire: fuel, oxidant 
and ignition source. These elements form the three legs of the fire triangle and by 
removing anyone of these elements, a fire becomes impossible. This simple concept 
provides industrial practitioners several approaches to explosion prevention. For example 
removal of fuel by good housekeeping and removal of electrostatic ignition sources by 
grounding will prevent fire from occurring. 
On the other hand, the explosion pentagon, Figure 4.5 shows the five necessary elements 
which must occur concurrently to cause an explosion. They are: fuel, oxidant, ignition 
source, suspension and confinement. Like the fire triangle, removing anyone of these 
requirements would prevent an explosion from propagating. Remembering the three sides 
of the fire triangle and the five sides of the explosion pentagon is important in preventing 
fires and explosions at any facility. By eliminating the possibility of either suspension or 
confinement, an explosion can not occur, but a fire may occur. By eliminating the fuel, the 
source of ignition, or the oxygen requirements, neither a fire nor an explosion can occur. 
The explosion pentagon, as described by Amyotte and Khan (2002) and illustrated in 
Figure 4.5, expands the basic fire triangle to include thorough mixing of the fuel and 
oxidant and confinement of the combustible mixture. This visualization of explosion 
requirements leads to identification of engineered safety measures for explosion mitigation 
such as venting. 
Figure 4.6 presented by Amyotte and Khan (2002) is the Institution of Chemical Engineers 
(IChemE) guidelines for dust explosion mitigation. It illustrates that in order for a dust to 
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be considered a fuel, it must be explosible, airborne, have a particle size distribution 
capable of propagating flame, and have concentration within the explosible range. 
Mixing Confinement 
Fuel Oxidant 
Fuel 
Ignition Source Ignition Source 
Figure 4. 5: Fire triangle and Explosion Pentagon 
In addition to the basic prevention measures indicated by the fire triangle, the modified 
triangle shown in Figure 4.6 begins to partially address the issue of inherent safety. For 
example, by incorporating particle size into the graphical representation, the suggestion is 
made that an increase in particle size can provide a non-explosible material. This is an 
application of one of the inherent safety principles, which is attenuation or moderation 
(using hazardous materials in their least hazardous forms). The same practice can be made 
for concentration. If the quantity of dust in suspension is less than the attainable range, 
explosion would still not be possible. 
Further advice on explosion prevention and protection can be found in a number of guides 
and standards available worldwide. In the USA, information documented by the National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is widely followed. For example, NFPA 654 provides 
guidance on where explosion protection is required, and NFP A 68 and 69 are helpful as, 
respectively, a guide on venting and a standard on engineered measures such as 
suppression and isolation. 
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Particle size 
Oxidant 
Fuel 
Concentration 
Ignition Source 
Figure 4. 6: Fire triangle for dusts. 
The strategy for dust explosion prevention and protection presented by Field (1982) is 
given in Figure 4.7. This graphical/text representation starts with the hazard identification 
step and proceeds through explosion prevention measures based on the fire triangle and 
protection measures that are primarily engineered and procedural in nature. There are also 
inherent safety features evident in Figure 4.7. The recommendation to control process and 
surface temperatures is an example of attenuation in the case of normal operation of a 
process below the minimum ignition temperature (dust cloud or layer as the situation 
warrants). Strengthening of plant, leading to pressure resistance with or without 
deformation, can be viewed as an application of error tolerance in that equipment is made 
more robust and able to withstand process upsets. 
In Figure 4.8 Eckhoff, (1997) has expanded on the scheme suggested by Field (1982) by 
making several significant modifications. Explosion prevention and mitigation measures 
and directly related to the measures such as the need for good housekeeping, that is by 
keeping the concentrations of dust down and possibly keeping the dust damp. and the use 
of hot work permits are explicitly identified. In addition to that mentioned before, Eckhoff 
provides a clear statement of the need for personnel training and the ultimate responsibility 
of management for process safety matters 
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Does dust present explosion hazard? 
Ignition 
temperature 
Control process 
and surface 
temperatures 
Explosible 
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Avoid ignition sources 
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Oxygen concentration 
to prevent ignition 
Explosion pressure 
Strengthen plant 
Explosion relief 
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Ignition energy 
Earth plant 
Consid£r antistatic 
materials and 
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Figure 4. 7:Field's framework. 
Amyotte and Khan, (2002) have proposed a framework for dust explosion prevention and 
mitigation, Figure 4.9. They built up their proposal on various heuristics available in the 
literature. 
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Does dust present explosion hazard? I 
f 
: Check available data : t t Dust is not explosible, 
Yes/No Classification test: i.e there is no dust 
t explosion hazard 
: Dust is expfosible 
'f 
Avoid dust Explosion prevention and /lnerting of plant accumulation 
outside process mitigation are necessary 
equipment. 
Good housekeeping! Maximum oxygen 
Obey rules for ~ /'" concentration to hot wor1< etc. Acquire technical prevent ;gnftion information about 
specffic plant and 
Maximum exploSion 
Ignition explosion hazard. 
T Take appropriate pressure and c-temperatures actions. I1 required, explosion rate 
Conlrol process 
determine ignitability 
and exp10sibility 
and surface parameters in Explosion containment 
temperatures 10 profeSSional 
.............. 
Explosion venting 
prevent ignition laboratory Explosion suppression 
of dust cloud and Explosion isolation 
dust deposits Partial inerting to 
reduce pressure and violence 
-
Minimum explosible Inform and Minimum dust concentration motivate all ign~ion energy -
levels of 
employees. 
Control concentration Top management Earth eiectrlcally conducting plant 
of suspended dust is responsible! Consider use 01 antistatic materials 
whenever feasible and clothing, where appropriate 
Figure 4. 8: Eckhofrs framework 
The proposal provides a hierarchy in which inherent safety principles are considered first, 
followed by engineered and procedural safeguards. They identified some requirements 
such as: 
~ A clear identification of responsibilities at all organizational levels, especially 
management. 
~ Mapping of existing engineered and procedural measures into the framework. 
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»- Applications of specific inherent safety principles to provide example-based 
guidance to framework users. In addition to the examples mentioned previously, 
intensification by waste/by-product removal. Substitution can also be applied to 
reduce the degree of hazard of some dusts. Amyotte et al. (2003) have investigated 
experimentally the dust explosion hazard in fossil fuel-fired power plants. They 
studied the substitution of petroleum coke for coal. They found that petroleum coke 
is an inherently safer fuel than either Columbian coal or Powder River Basin coal 
from the perspectives of explosion pressure and rate of pressure rise. 
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Figure 4. 9: A systematic approach to loss prevention. 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
potential fatalities due to chemical hazards. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
75 
Chapter 4 Dust Explosion 
4.12 Assessing dust explosion hazard 
The potential for a dust explosion exists in all industrial processes in which combustible 
material is either manufactured or handled. The material may be a final product or 
unwanted by-product. If a dust explosion hazard can be anticipated in the early stages of 
design, precautionary measures can be installed. 
In this section a method is proposed to assess the inherent hazard of dusts. It is developed 
by the US Bureau of Mines and it ranks dusts relative to Pittsburgh coal. The method has 
been described in details in section 4. I O. It based on a comprehensive data in which it has 
been experimentally approved their influence on dust explosion. The approach is an index 
of explosibility which is basically consists of two parameters, the dust Ignition Sensitivity 
(IS) or the dust ease of ignition which is dependent on the minimum ignition temperature, 
minimum explosible concentration, minimum ignition energy, and Explosion Severity (ES) 
of dusts which can be thought of in terms of the maximum explosion pressure and 
maximum rate of pressure rise. The index of explosibility can be obtained as follows: 
1. Calculate the Ignition Sensitivity (IS): 
. .. . .' (Min. Ign. Temp. x Min.lgn. Eng. x Min. Expl. Conc')PlIISbUrghcoaIDtlsl 4 5 
/ngmlllOn SenslIlVlty = . (Min. /gn. Temp. x Min. /gn. Eng.x Min. Expl. Cone')" .. pl,D." 
2. Calculate the Explosion Severity (ES): 
. . (Max. Expl. Pressure x Max. Rate Pressure rise)&mple Dus/ 4 6 
ExplOSion Severity = . (Max. Expt.Pr essure x Max. Rale Pr essure rise) PlIIsburgh Cool Dusl 
3. Calculate the Explosion Index (El): 
EI=ISxES 4. 7 
4. Obtain the explosion hazard rating as follows: 
• IfEI> 1 dust in question would be expected to present a major dust 
explosion hazard. 
• If El = 0.1 - 1.0 dusts with El in this range can still present explosion 
hazard. 
• IfEI<O.l dusts do not present explosion hazard. 
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4.13 Conclusion 
The above approach can give a general guide to the potential hazard of a particular 
material. It gives the scale of the severity of dust explosion. However, in order for this 
approach to be contributed to Edwards and Lawrence index and assess the dust hazard 
quantitatively, the explosion index values need to assign scores instead of ratings so it can 
be easily added to the scores resulted from assessing the hazard for gasses and liquids. This 
point needs more investigation and can be presented as a recommendation for future work. 
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Chapter 5: Data analysis for fire and explosion accidents 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this work is to develop a method for assessing the inherent safety of a chemical 
plant. This method is intended to be used in the early stages of plant design when the 
materials in process are known and their amount can be roughly estimated. This method is 
intended to predict the number of people that might be killed in case of a chemical accident 
involving a certain mass of specified chemicaL It is not vital that such a method is to be 
very accurate as it aims to help process designers to apply good judgment in selecting the 
safest process in a phase when limited design data are available. 
In order to do this, historical analysis of accidents, a technique utilizes in risk analysis is 
applied as a trial to derive a separate method for measuring the inherent safety of chemical 
plants. A number of statistical tests were conducted on historical accident data in order to 
investigate the possibility of developing relations predicting the number of fatalities caused 
by a chemical accident. These relations would be used to build a model which can predict 
the number of people that might be killed in case of a chemical accident per unit mass of a 
specified chemicaL 
The chapter starts by reviewing published accident data and its analysis where this is 
available. It then illustrates the statistical tests that were conducted on the fire and 
explosion accident data in order to develop a method which will be used to measure the 
inherent safety of a chemical plant. 
The major hazards with which the chemical industry is concerned are fire, explosion and 
toxic release. Of these three, fire is the most common but explosions are more significant 
in terms of damage potential, often leading to fatalities and damage to property. Toxic 
release has possibly the greatest potential to kill a large number of people. 
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5.2 Definition of accidents 
According to Lees (1996), an event can be classified as an accident if it is unexpected, 
unavoidable and unintended. He proposed the following three characteristics with which to 
classifY an event as an accident: Cl) degree of expectedness, (2) degree of avoidability and 
(3) degree of intention. 
Secondary characteristics are: (I) degree of warning, (2) duration of occurrence, (3) degree 
of negligence and (4) degree of misjudgement. An event is an accident if it gives little 
warning, happens quickly, or if there is a large element of negligence and misjudgement 
leading to it. 
5.3 Review of accident statistics 
The purpose of publishing accident statistics is to emphasise the hazards of flammable 
materials and highlight common accident scenarios in the hope that relevant people may 
recognize particular situations and react before an accident occurs. In order to understand 
the mechanisms of accidents and to develop accident prevention and control strategies, it is 
essential to know about and learn from past accidents. Several researchers have published 
papers dealing with accident data. The following reviews published accident data and its 
analysis where this is available. 
A study of worldwide industrial accidents has been conducted by Khan and Abbasi 
(l999b) covering the period 1926 to 1997. They listed reports of3222 accidents relating to 
handlingitransportationiprocessing/storage of chemicals. They stated that the actual 
number may be higher as reports of all accidents are not available in the literature. Of the 
3222 accidents, 1744 (54%) occurred during different stages of operations in fixed 
installations, 1320 (41%) were transportation accidents and the remaining 160 (5%) 
happened during loading or unloading of chemicals, Figure 5.1. 
Of the 1744 fixed installation accidents, 441 (25%) involved fires and explosions, and 
1247 (71%) involved toxic release. The remaining accidents (4%) featured a combination 
of fire, explosion and toxic release. 
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LoodingI 
unI00diq, 
160(5%) 
T~oor-----~------
1320(41%) 
Figure 5. 1: Accident classification 
Fixed 1nstaI1:.tk 
1744(54%) 
The 1320 transportation accidents were classified according to the different mode of 
transportation. Such classification indicates that 37% occurred during rail transport, 29% 
during road transport, 6% during marine transport, 18% during pipeline transport, 4% 
during inland wateTWay transport, and the remainder during loading and unloading of 
chemicals. 
Khan and Abbasi (1999b) have cited a study carried out by Norstorm (1982) in which he 
analys;(r-frre and explosion accidents separately as shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. He found 
that about 18% of fires are due to release and overflow of flartnnable gases and/or liquids. 
Fires contributed about 20% of the total number of accidents; in comparison, explosions 
contributed about 75% to the total loss. His analysis concluded that failure to control 
chemical reactions is the most frequent cause leading to accidents; it contributed 35% to 
the total number of accidents. He also found that the processing area is the most 
susceptible location for accidents; it composed 47% to the total number of accidents. 
Table 5. 1: Main causes oflarge fires in the chemical and allied industries (Khan & 
Abbasi) 
Causes 
Flammable liquid or gas (release, overflow) 
Overheating, hot surfaces, etc. 
Pipe or fitting failure 
Electrical breakdowa 
Cutting aad welding 
Arson 
Others 
Total 
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17.9 
15.7 
11.1 
11.1 
11.1 
4.4 
28.7 
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Table 5. 2: Information related to explosions in the chemical and allied industries 
(Khan & Abbasi) 
Main cause 
Chemical reaction uncontrolled 
Chemical reaction accidental 
Combustion explosion in equipment 
Unconfined vapour cloud 
Overpressure 
Decomposition 
Combustion sparks 
Pressure vessel failure 
Improper operation 
Others 
Total 
Location of occurrence 
Enclosed process or manufacturing buildings 
Outdoor structures 
Yard 
Tank farm 
Boiler house 
Others 
Total 
Occupancy 
Chemical reaction process, batch 
Storage tank 
Boiler 
Chemical reaction process, continuous 
Compressor 
Evaporation 
Recovery 
Transfer 
Liquefaction 
Others 
Total 
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Proportion (%) 
20.0 
15.0 
13.3 
10.0 
8.3 
5.0 
5.0 
3.3 
3.3 
16.8 
lOO 
46.7 
31.7 
6.7 
3.3 
3.3 
8.3 
lOO 
27.3 
10.2 
8.4 
7.3 
5.4 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
25.4 
lOO 
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Table 5. 3: UK fires, explosions and related incidents in 1998/1999 
Type of event No. of incidents No. of injuries 
Fatal major minor total 
Incident involving: 
Fire alone 322 4 67 109 180 
Explosion alone 104 3 28 58 89 
Fire and explosion 67 30 28 59 
Near miss 472 0 0 12 12 
other 22 0 4 8 12 
not classified 13 0 2 
total 1010 8 130 216 354 
Table 5. 4: UK fires, explosions and related incidents in 1999/2000 
Type of event 
Incident involving: 
Fire alone 
Explosion alone 
Fire and explosion 
Near miss 
other 
not classified 
total 
No. of incidents 
371 
87 
90 
529 
39 
94 
1210 
Fatal 
6 
0 
3 
0 
2 
0 
11 
major 
73 
17 
21 
3 
20 
2 
136 
No. of injuries 
minor total 
137 216 
36 53 
36 60 
9 12 
8 30 
2 4 
228 375 
A review of incidents in the UK reported to the Health and Safety Executive during 
1998/1999 and 1999/2000 involving fires, explosions, runaway chemical reactions and 
releases of flammable materials was conducted by Bradley and Baxter (2002). Tables 5.3 
and 5.4 give the number of incidents and injuries as a function of the type of event. 
During the 2-year periods, 354 injuries (including 8 fatalities), which resulted from fire and 
explosion related incidents were reported in 1998/1999 and 375 injuries (including II 
fatalities) in 1999/2000. Bradley and Baxter (2002) mentioned that the accidents which 
were classified as (not coded) are known to have occurred but could not be analysed due to 
the lack of information. The overall numbers for the 2-year reported accidents are 
compared to the preceding 8 years, from 1990 to 1997, in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Fires and explosions incidents statistics 
Category 90/91 91192 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 
Flammable solids Incidents 
Injuries 
Fatalities 
Flammable liquids Incidents 
Injuries 
Fatalities 
LPG 
Flammable gases 
and oxygen 
Exothermic 
Incidents 
Injuries 
Fatalities 
Incidents 
Injuries 
Fatalities 
chemical reaction Incidents 
Miscellaneous 
Not coded 
Injuries 
Fatalities 
Incidents 
Injuries 
Fatalities 
Incidents 
Injuries 
Fatalities 
223 
158 
1 
447 
232 
12 
90 
92 
106 
101 
5 
411 
217 
8 
75 
66 
3 
277 • 299 
194 
4 
60 
24 
o 
230 
183 
o 
o 
o 
o 
209 
50 
25 
251 
179 
5 
o 
o 
o 
200 
113 
5 
359 
172 
7 
61 
46 
o 
251 
139 
37 
23 
5 
153 
156 
2 
o 
o 
o 
213 
132 
7 
318 
151 
10 
62 
45 
o 
241 
171 
o 
61 
38 
97 
74 
o 
o 
o 
Totals Incidents 
Injuries 
Fatalities 
1327 1192 1061 992 
883 
18 
797 
23 
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649 
20 
620 
19 
169 
96 
5 
299 
156 
3 
66 
48 
4 
246 
135 
69 
28 
o 
143 
140 
o 
o 
o 
992 
603 
14 
169 
107 
5 
225 
132 
3 
45 
40 
189 
124 
o 
49 
24 
o 
107 
106 
o 
o 
o 
784 
533 
10 
153 
121 
3 
245 
139 
6 
46 
26 
2 
372 
163 
o 
53 
50 
o 
29 
23 
o 
o 
o 
898 
522 
12 
151 
91 
4 
211 
108 
3 
32 
24 
o 
367 
91 
2 
33 
20 
o 
22 
16 
o 
o 
o 
o 
816 
350 
9 
121 
57 
1 
252 
109 
5 
34 
27 
o 
536 
129 
29 
13 
o 
25 
17 
13 
2 
o 
156 
86 
3 
211 
91 
5 
36 
25 
o 
637 
120 
38 
17 
2 
38 
32 
o 
94 
4 
o 
1010 1210 
354 
8 
83 
375 
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Table 5. 6: Characteristics of accidental release from pipework and in-line 
equipment. 
No. of incidents % 
A Location type 
Chemical plant 278 30.3 
Unknown 232 25.3 
Factory 187 20.1 
Refinery 96 10.5 
Storage depot 47 5.1 
Other 38 4.14 
Tank yard 28 3.1 
Fuel station 15 1.63 
Total 921 100 
B Site status 
Nonnaloperations 343 38.8 
Maintenance 146 16.52 
Unknown 128 14.5 
Storage 103 11.65 
Start-up 42 4.75 
Other 40 4.53 
Loading/unloading 33 3.73 
Contractor work 18 2.03 
Shut-down 18 2.04 
Modification 8 0.90 
Testing 5 0.57 
Total 884 100 
C Materials released 
Ammonia 54 10.7 
Hydrocarbons (unspecified) 54 10.7 
Chlorine 50 9.86 
Hydrogen 37 7.3 
Benzene 33 6.5 
Crude oil 28 5.52 
Steam 25 4.93 
Natural gas 24 4.73 
Propane 20 3.94 
Butane 18 3.55 
Fuel oil 18 3.55 
Hydrochloric acid 16 3.16 
Sulphuric acid 16 3.16 
Ethylene 16 3.16 
Hydrogen sulphide 14 2.76 
Water 13 2.56 
Nitrogen 13 2.56 
Oxygen 13 2.56 
Vinyl chloride 12 2.37 
LPG 12 2.37 
Styrene II 2.17 
Naphtha petroleum 10 1.97 
Total 507 100 
Table continued next page ... 
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Continue Table 5.6 ... 
No. of incidents % 
D Material phase 
Liquid 393 49.25 
Gas 260 32.58 
Liquid + gas/vapour 120 15.04 
Vapour 13 1.63 
Solid 9 1.13 
Solid + gas/vapour 3 0.38 
Total 798 100 
E Unignited material dispersion 
Liquid 212 19.5 
Spill 186 17.11 
Vapour cloud 180 16.56 
Flammable 127 11.68 
Toxic 123 11.78 
Corrosive 97 8.92 
Unignited gas 96 8.83 
Flammable/toxic 47 4.32 
Spray 10 0.92 
Jet/spurt 8 0.74 
Irritant I 0.09 
Total 1087 100 
F Fire or explosion event 
Fire 145 46.2 
Explosion followed by fire 77 24.5 
Explosion 63 20.1 
Flash fire 11 3.50 
Fireball 7 2.23 
Pool fire 4 1.27 
BLEVE 4 1.27 
Explosion followed by flash fire 2 0.64 
Jet fire I 0.32 
Total 314 100 
Note: BLEVE stands for boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion. 
Marshall (1977); Bellamy et al (1989) have reported data for various release accidents, 
Table 5.6, in which the accidents are ranked in terms of the amount of vapour released. 
Their report suggested that large releases often result in explosions rather than fires. 
Vilchez et al. (1995) have compiled data for 5325 accidents from the MHIDAS database 
starting from 1900 until 1992. The survey includes accidents from 95 countries, 
particularly the USA, the UK, Canada, France and India. 
Kirchsteiger (1999) has analysed data on major industrial accidents involving dangerous 
substances from the Member States of the European Union. 
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5.4 Data sources and description 
Infonnation on the accidents surveyed was gathered from a number of published sources in 
the literature. The majority of the data was from the comprehensive accident data lists in 
MarshaII (1987), King (I990), Marsh & McLenan (I985), Lenoir and Davenport (1993) 
and Lees (1996). They have compiled data related to chemical and petrochemical plants 
and oil refineries. 
Accident data are also quoted in a number of papers such as by Khan and Abbasi (I 999a, 
b), Bradley and Baxter (2002). However, these papers are quoting data from the above 
mentioned sources. 
Furthennore, there are a number of databases specifically dealing with accident histories. 
They include the following: 
;.> Major Hazards Incident Data System (MHIDAS) and the corresponding explosives 
data system EIDAS. These are operated by SRD (Safety and Reliability 
Directorate), UK Atomic Energy Authority. 
;.> The FACTS incident database. 
;.> The Major Accident Reporting System (MARS). 
;.> The Process Safety Incident Database. 
;.> The FIRE incident database for chemical warehouse fires. 
;.> The offshore Hydrocarbon Release (HCR) database. 
;.> The ICHEME Database. 
Tables 1 and 2 in appendix A are a comprehensive chemical accidents list covering the 
period from 1911 to 2000. The following is an explanation of the infonnation contained in 
the various columns of Table 1: 
• Date and location of the accident. Knowing these two factors was useful not only 
for identifying individual events but also for identifying other aspects. For example, 
accidents which occurred a very long time ago with a high number of fatalities 
could be due to a lesser regard for safety which was prevalent at that time. Also, 
accidents with high number of casualties in poorer or underdeveloped countries 
may be due to a similar lack of priority for safety and inferior technology. 
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• The type of accidents in terms of fire, explosion or toxic release has to be known. 
This can help in classifying the accidents according to the type of accident. 
• The chemical involved in the accident and its quantity is major pieces of data. In 
fact getting the quantity of the chemical involved in the accident was the most 
difficult task. This information was available for only a few of the numerous 
accidents published in the literature. In some cases where the release was from a 
vessel or a container, the entire vessel capacity is considered as the amount 
released. Other accidents quoted an estimate or range; in this case an average figure 
was assumed. It was the lack of this particular figure that caused a lot of data to be 
unusable. 
• Another important piece of data is the number of fatalities. The number used is the 
fatalities which were immediately attributable to the fire, explosion or toxic release. 
, 
Fatality figures which occurred some time after the accident were ignored. The 
number of injuries was not used in the analysis although it is another indicator of 
the severity of the accident. 
• The equipment indicates the unit operation in which the accident took place. This 
can help in classifying the accidents according to the unit operation in order to 
determine the most hazardous unit. 
Accident data have been collected from the various sources mentioned above covering the 
period from 1911 to 2000. The accidents relate to handling, transportation, processing and 
storage of chemicals. Accidents were not included where no ignition occurred. On the 
other hand, no accident was excluded because some information on it was lacking. In the 
data, accidents are classified into two types: toxic releases and fire and explosion. During 
that period a total of 631 of these classes of accidents happened. The number of fire and 
explosion accidents was 512, whilst there were 119 toxic accidents. The fire and explosion 
accidents involved numerous chemicals from a large number of industries. Tables 1 and 2 
in Appendix A list all the fire and explosion, and the toxic release accidents respectively. 
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Some accidents involving highly explosive chemicals such as, TNf, munitions and 
explosives are reported in historical accident data base. Those chemicals have been 
discarded from the data since they have a potential for serious accidents which is 
significantly greater than the rest. 
S.S Fire and explosion accidents 
5.5.1 Classification of accidents over time 
The distribution of fire and explosion accidents over time measured in decades is presented 
in Figure 5.2. As can be seen, there is a significant difference between the number of 
accidents that took place before and after the 1950s. During the early period, most of the 
accidents were due to dust explosions, in particular explosions in the windmills which were 
commonly used for grinding grain into flour. After the 1950s, the considerable increase in 
the number of accidents was due to the appearance of hydrocarbon accidents. The fire and 
explosion accidents have increased dramatically to the end of the eighties. This might be 
attributed to the start of developments, which resulted in great changes in the chemical, oil 
and petrochemical industries in that period. These changes involved a severe increase in 
the process operating conditions such as pressure and temperature, an increase in the size 
of plants, which resulted in large equipment items, such as compressors and distillation 
columns. Consequently, this gave rise to an increase in the potential for major accidents, 
usually arising from loss of containment and taking the form of serious fire, explosion or 
toxic release, Lees (1996). The late nineties exhibited a decline in the number of accidents. 
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Figure S. 2: Distribution of fire and explosion accidents as a function of time. 
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Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the total number of fatalities resulting from the fIre and 
ex.plosion accidents. The fIgure shows a fluctuation in the number of fatalities during the 
early decades until the late fIfties. The number of fatalities increased exponentially during 
the 60s, 70s and 80s. Actually, the number of fatalities which were reported in the period 
1971 to 1980 was about four times the number in the previous decade, from 345 to 1270. A 
considerable number of accidents resulting in lOs and even lOOs of fatalities happened in 
that decade. For example two accidents occurred in Spain. One was a propylene road 
tanker fITe in 1978 causing the death of 216 persons and the other was a propane storage 
vessel explosion in 1980 causing 51 fatalities. 
The number of fatalities continued to rise and peaked in the period 1981 to 1990. The 
reason for this peak is the two catastrophic accidents which were in 1984. The fITst one 
was the fITe and explosion that took place in a petrol pipeline in Brazil. The pipeline was 
passing through a shanty town and a fITe devastated the houses killing 508 people. The 
second was the LPG terminal fITe in Mexico City which happened in a residential area and 
caused the death of 650 persons. 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate that there is a rough correspondence in the trend of the 
number of accidents and the number of fatalities during the period. Both decline during the 
last decade of the twentieth century. 
4000 
3344 
'" ..
-= 3000 ~ 
<l! 
... 
2000 <= 
.. 
.. 
.Q 1270 
El 
= 1000 Z 
0 
486 
156 216 345 54 107 ,I 11 1 
Det:ades 
Figure 5. 3: Fire and explosion fatalities as a function oftime 
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5.5.2 Classification of accidents by origin 
The accident data are classified according to the unit operation in which the accidents took 
place. The accidents are categorised as follows: 
> Process accidents are accidents which happened during processing or transfonnation 
of chemicals from one form to another. In some accidents the origin was named as 
plant without mentioning in which specific operation the accident took place, for 
example ethylene plant or propylene plant. These accidents were considered to have 
a process origin. 
> Storage accidents are accidents which happened in storage tanks holding the [mal 
product or raw lintermediate materials waiting to be used, or accidents that happened 
in warehouses involving stored raw materials or products. 
> Utility accidents are accidents that took place in equipment that supports the 
operating plant, such as pumps, compressors, heat exchangers and boilers. 
> Transportation accidents are accidents that happened during the transport of 
chemic!lls, including transport by car, rail, ship and pipelines. 
Of the 512 fife and explosion accidents reported, only 60 about (12%) are of unknown 
origin. For the rest 452 (88%), the distribution according to origin is presented in Figure 
5.4. It can be seen that the principle origin of fire and explosion accidents is process, with 
(44%) of cases. Then, come in descending order, transport, storage and utilities accidents. 
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In contrast, Figure 5.5 shows the rank of accidents in terms of the total number of people 
killed. As can be seen, accidents that happened during transporting materials have the 
highest number of deaths of 3088 people. 
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Figure 5. 5: Classification of accidents according to the number of fatalities 
The initial step in the exploration of a data set is to examine the distribution of every 
variable in the data set. The starting point of this process is most typically the examination 
of the frequency distributions. This section aims to examine the distribution of the 
variables in question in order to detect asymmetry of distribution and thus to know the 
ability of each variable to approximate to a normal distribution. 
Table 5.7 gives a summary of the two variables in question, the mass of chemicals 
involved in the accidents and the resulting number of fatalities. The table shows the 101 
accidents (N) out of the 501 in which the mass of the chemicals involved is available. The 
table also shows the minimum and the maximum values for every variable, the mean, the 
median and the standard deviation. It can be seen that for both variables there is a wide 
range between the minimum and the maximum values. The standard deviation values are 
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large which also indicates that data has a large spread. Table 5.7 also shows that the data 
are not normal because the mean and the median values are far apart and they are away 
from the centre of the distribution. This raises a concern about the validity of the tests that 
are only applicable in the case of a normal distribution. Table 3 in appendix A lists the 101 
accident. 
Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics 
Standard 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Deviation 
Number of 101 0 650 18.57 2 73 fatalities 
Mass of 
chemicals (tonne) 101 0.002 95,000 2043 18 10,704 
N IS the number of accidents 
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the frequency distribution for the mass of chemicals involved in 
the accidents and the number of fatalities that resulted respectively. Figure 5.6 shows only 
the 88 accidents from the total of 10 I, the accidents which involved more than 500 tonnes 
were left out of the graph in order to show the distribution of the accidents with small mass 
of chemicals. It can be noticed that a large number of the accidents, 63, involve a small 
mass of chemical, in the range (0.002-33.33 tonnes) where as accidents involving large 
quantities of chemicals occurred less frequently. 
Figure 5.7 shows the 88 accidents which yielded fewer than 100 fatalities. It can be seen 
that accidents with no fatalities or with a low number of fatalities happened much more 
often than accidents that yielded high number of fatalities. In fact 25 accidents out of 88 
did not result in any fatalities. 
It can be seen that in both cases the high number of accidents with small masses and the 
accidents that did not cause fatalities yielded patterns that are very different from a normal 
distribution. This distribution can be said to be positively skewed. That is, the tails of the 
curves or the extreme values are on the right side. 
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Figure 5.6: Frequency distribution for mass of chemicals 
For the purposes of statistical testing, the original data can be transfonned to make the 
distribution more symmetrical. There are great varieties of possible data transformations, 
from adding constants to multiplying, squaring or raising to a power, converting to 
logarithmic scales, and taking the square root of the values. 
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Figure 5.7: Frequency distribution for number of fatalities 
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The most commonly used transfonnation that is appropriate for data which are skewed to 
the right is the log transfonnation. However, if a data set contains values of zero, a 
constant must be added to move the minimum value of the distribution in order to take the 
log. 
TIlls solution cannot be applied in this case as it will change the consequence of an 
accident from an accident with no fatalities to an accident with one fatality. Therefore, the 
accidents which caused no fatalities are excluded from the distribution graph in order to 
take the logs. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show the histograms of the logs of the original data. 
The transformation has clearly reduced the skewness of the mass of chemicals distribution 
but the number of fatalities distribution is still skewed. TIlls suggests that parametric tests 
or tests which can be used when the data is normally distributed are not applicable and so 
non parametric tests that do not make assumptions about population distributions will be 
used. The following section describes the nonparametric statistics. 
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Figure 5.8: Frequency distribution for mass of chemicals 
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5.6 Nonparametric statistics 
As mentioned above, sometimes data is not normally distributed. That is, the distribution 
would not look like a symmetrical bell-shaped or normal curve, with most subjects having 
values in the mid range and with similar small numbers of participants with both high and 
low scores. A distribution that is asymmetrical with more high than low scores (or vice 
versa) is skewed. Nonpararnetric tests are tests which can be used in cases where the 
normal distribution in data is not fulfilled. 
5.6.1 Correlations between the nnmber of fatalities and the amount of chemicals 
In this section the Spearman's rank correlation is calculated to examine if there is any 
relationship between the number of fatalities and measurable characteristics of the 
chemicals involved in the accidents. This has been calculated for all the accidents and 
separately for the three different types of accidents: process, storage and transport. 
5.6.1.1 Speannan's rank correlation 
Spearman's rank correlation measures the strength of association between quantitative 
variables. The Spearman correlation performs the analysis on the ranks of the values 
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instead of an actual data values. It is applied to the values after they have been ranked from 
the smallest to the largest on the two variables separately. It is used when the values are 
markedly asymmetrical (skewed) on a variable. It ranges in size from a maximum of + 1.00 
through 0.00 to -1.00. The Spearman correlation can still be used even when the 
relationship between two variables is non-linear. 
Spearman's correlation has been calculated in order to investigate if any correlation exists 
between the number of fatalities and the mass (in tonnes) of chemicals involved in the 
accidents. Table 5.8 shows the correlation coefficient for all accidents. 
Table 5.8: Spearman's rank Correlation for all accidents 
Correlation Coefficient 0.3 
Significance, p value 0.012 
N (number of accidents) 101 
It can be seen from Table 5.8 that the correlation coefficient is 0.3. The significance (p-
value) is used to assess the significance of the correlation. If the p-value is less than 0.05, 
the results can be considered as statistically significant. In this case p is less than 0.05 
which indicates that there is statistical evidence for a correlation between the number of 
fatalities and the amount of chemicals involved in the accidents. The correlation is positive 
which suggests that on the whole the two variables increase together. However, the value is 
quite low, suggesting that there are other factors that may be important. 
Figure 5.10 shows the scatter plot of the number of fatalities and the amonnt of chemicals. 
When the data was plotted on a linear-linear scale, it showed clustering close to the origin 
which obscured examination of any relationship. Therefore the data was all log-
transformed. As can be seen, there is rough increase in the trend of the number of fatalities 
as the mass increases. The amount of variability between the data points is very high which 
suggests that any relationship obtained from this graph would not predict accurately the 
number of fatalities from knowing the mass of chemicals. 
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Figure 5.10: An fire and explosion accidents 
The same analysis has been conducted between the number of fatalities and the mass of 
chemicals for each type of accident. Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 show the outputs of these 
analyses. 
Table 5.9: Speannan's rank correlations for process accidents 
Correlation coefficient 0.312 
Significance, p value 0.042 
N (number of accidents) 43 
Table 5.10: Speannan's rank correlations for storage accidents 
Correlation coefficient 0.343 
Significance, p value 0.164 
N (number of accidents) 18 
Table 5.11: Speannan's rank correlations for transport accidents 
Correlation coefficient 
Significance, p value 
N (number of accidents) 
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Table 5.9 shows that the Spearman's correlation (r, = 0.312) and p < 0.05, which indicates 
that there is a significant correlation between the number of fatalities and the mass of 
chemicals in case of process accidents. However, the Iow value of the correlation 
coefficient suggests that on the whole the two variables are going up together but as for all 
accidents, the relationship is not strong. 
The results from tables 5.1 0 and 5.11 show that there is no significant correlations between 
the number of fatalities and the amount of chemicals in the cases of storage and transport. 
This might be attributed to the lack of storage accidents with a known amount of chemicals 
(18 accidents) since the smaller the size of the sample the less significant the correlation. 
The non significant transport correlation might be due to the different types of 
transportation included in the data. It includes rail tank cars, road tankers and oil tankers. 
Also the circumstances of the accidents vary widely for example happening in the middle 
of a built-up area or where there are no people. 
The correlation coefficients for process and storage accidents are very similar in contrast to 
transport where there was no correlation. This suggested eliminating the transport 
accidents as they might weaken any potential correlation that might exist between the mass 
of the chemicals and the number of fatalities. In addition, the transport accidents are of 
minor concern in this study since the main aim is to estimate the hazard of process plants. 
However, eliminating the transport accidents did not make a big difference in the value of 
the correlation coefficients. Table 5.12 shows Spearman's correlation excluding the 
transport accidents. 
Table 5.12: Spearman's rank correlation for accidents without transport 
Correlation coefficient 0.237 
Significance, p value 0.055 
N (number of accidents) 66 
5.6.2 Box Plots 
The type of accidents data was graphically represented using box and whisker plots as 
shown in Figure 5.11. Boxplots are particularly useful for identifying outHers and extreme 
cases in data sets. 
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Figure 5.11 shows the three types of accidents. The box itself represents that portion of the 
distribution falling between the 25th and 75th percentiles, i.e. the lower and upper quartiles. 
The thick horizontal line across the interior of the box represents the median. The vertical 
lines outside the box, which are known as whiskers, connect the largest and smallest values 
that are not outliers or extreme cases. An outlier (0) is defIned as the value more than 1.5 
box-lengths away from the box, and extreme case (*) as more than 3 box-lengths away 
from the box. 
The 0 87 above the storage boxplot indicates the existence of an outlier and that it is the 
value for accident number 87. This accident is the LPG vapour cloud fIre which took place 
in Mexico City in 1984 and in which 650 people were killed. This value is well above the 
average fatalities and it therefore responsible for skewing the distribution of the data. 
The other two outliers are the points above the transport type. They are for the Dimethyl 
ether rail tank car vapour cloud explosion which happened in Germany in 1948 and in 
which 245 people lost their lives and for the propylene road tanker vapour cloud fIre that 
took place in Spain in 1978 and in which 216 people were killed. In general Figure 5.11 
shows that there is not much difference in the median number of fatalities between the 
three accidents types. It should point out that Figure 5.11 shows only the accidents ill 
which the mass of chemicals involved was available. 
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Figure 5.12: Box plot for amount of chemicals 
Figure 5.12 shows the median number of fatalities when the accidents are grouped by mass 
of materials. It can be seen that there are neither outliers nor extremes in the data, though, 
the long whiskers indicate that there are some points which are away from the median. The 
eccentric positions of the median lines in all the amount of material categories, however, 
indicate that the number of fatalities in those groups have skewed distributions. 
Figure 5.13 shows the boxplots for the chemicals when they are categorized by risk 
phrases (R). Risk phrases are approved phrases for describing the risks involved in the use 
of hazardous chemicals and have validity in the United Kingdom and throughout the 
countries of the European Community. These phrases should be used to describe the 
hazards of chemicals on data sheets for use and supply; for labelling of containers, storage 
drums, tanks, etc, Royal Society of Chemistry (1989). Due to the small groups of 
chemicals which have similar risk phrases (R), the chemicals were divided into two 
groups. The first group consists of extremely flammable liquefied gas R13, and the second 
group contains RlO, Rll and R12 which represent flammable, highly flammable and 
extremely flammable chemicals respectively. 
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There are two outliers in the extremely flammable liquefied gas group. One of them is the 
LPG vapour cloud fire which took place in Mexico City causing 650 fatalities and the 
other one is the Propylene road tanker vapour cloud fire that took place in Spain in 1978 
and caused the death of 216 people. There is only one outlier in the flammable gas group, 
it is again the Dimethyl ether rail tank car vapour cloud explosion which happened in 
Germany in 1948 and in which 245 people lost their lives. Figure 5.13 shows that the 
median number of fatalities for the two chemical groups is almost the same. 
5.6.3 Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests 
This section aims to establish a ranking system for the accidents and to investigate whether 
there are any differences between the median number of fatalities for each type. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test is used to compare three or more groups while the Mann-Whitney test 
is used for comparing two groups. 
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5.6.3.1 Type of accidents 
The Kruskal-Wallis test was applied to the accidents grouped by type of operations in 
order to investigate any differences in the median number of fatalities. This can help to 
know if one type poses more hazards to people than the others. The test results are shown 
in Table 5.13. 
Table 5.13: Kruskal-Wallis test 
Operation type Median No. of Significance, p 
N fatalities value 
Process 43 4.0 0.131 
Storage 18 6.0 
Transport 34 7.0 
Total 95 
N IS the number of aCCidents 
The test shows that there are differences in the median number of fatalities for the three 
operation types. The lowest one is the process and the highest is the transport. However, 
since the p-value is greater than 0.05 it indicates that there is no statistical evidence for 
significant differences between the three types of operations. 
5.6.3.2 Amount of chemicals involved in the accidents 
The Kruskal-W allis test has been carried out for the amount of chemicals involved in the 
accidents in tonnes, subdivided into ranges. Table 5.14 shows the output from the test. 
Table 5.14 shows that there is fluctuation in the median number of fatalities between the 
five mass groups. The median was equal in three groups while it was relatively higher in 
the range of 200 to 100,000 and it gets very high in the range of 10 to 50 tonne. The high 
median in the range of 200 to 100,000 is due to the two storage accidents which resulted in 
128 and 650 fatalities while for masses between 10 and 50 tonnes it is due to the three 
transport accidents which resulted in 245, 216 and 100 fatalities. Since the p-value is less 
than 0.05 it suggests that there are significant differences in the median number of fatalities 
between the quantity ranges. This corresponds with the result of Figure 5.12 which shows 
the differences between the median numbers of fatalities for each amonnt of material 
groups. However, conducting the same test without the transport accidents resulted in p-
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value of 0.414 which indicates non significant differences in the median number of 
fatalities. 
Table 5.14: Kruskal-Wallis test 
Amount of Median number of Significance, 
material (tonne) N fatalities p value 
<=1 15 2 0.024 
1-10 25 2 
10-50 30 6 
50-200 18 2 
200-100000 13 3 
Total 101 
N IS the number of aCCidents 
5.6.3.3 Type of chemicals 
The Mann-Whitney U test has been carried out to assess whether there are differences in 
the median number of fatalities by type of chemicals. In this test the chemicals were 
classified according to their risk phrases (R). 
Table 5.15 is the output of the Mann-Whitney test. It shows that the median for the two 
chemical groups are almost the same. The p-value (p > 0.05) confirms that there is no 
statistical evidence for any differences between the median number of fatalities in the two 
chemical groups. This confirms the results of Figure 4.13 which shows that there are no 
differences between the median number of fatalities for the two chemical groups. There 
was no difference in the result of the test when the transport accidents were excluded. 
Table 5.15: Mann-Whitney test 
Chemical type Number of 
accidents 
Extremely flammable 66 liquified gas 
Flammable gas 35 
Total 101 
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5.6.4 Accidents without zero fatalities 
In this section the previous analyses were repeated for the accidents after excluding the 
accidents which did not cause any fatalities. This has been done in order to investigate 
whether these accidents have a significant impact on the results. The following tables show 
the results of the tests excluding the zero accidents. 
Table 5.16: Descriptive Statistics 
Standard 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Deviation 
Number of 73 1 650 26 85 fatalities 4 
Amount of 
material (tonne) 73 0.03 95000 2424 18 12258 
N IS the number of aCCIdents 
Table 5.17: Spearman's rank Correlations 
All Process Storage Transport 
accidents 
Correlation Coefficient 003 0031 0.713 -0.151 
Significance, p value 0.011 0.096 0.021 0.443 
N (number of accidents) 73 30 ID 28 
Comparing Table 5.17 to Tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 show that in the case of applying 
all the fire and explosion accidents, the Spearman' s correlations were the same in case of 
including and excluding the accidents that did not cause any fatalities, (rs = 0.3). 
Comparing the type of accidents shows that the correlations obtained from process 
accidents were also similar in both cases, (rs = 0.31). Storage correlation was much 
stronger for the case of excluding the accidents with no fatalities (rs = 0.713). It also 
changed from a non significant correlation (p = 0.164) to a significant correlation (p = 
0.021). There was no transport correlation in both cases. 
The Kruskall-WalIis and the Mann-Whitney tests were conducted on the accidents without 
zero fatalities grouped by amount of chemicals, the type of accidents and the type of 
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chemicals that were involved in the accidents. Tables 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20 show the results 
from these tests. 
Table 5.18: Kruskal-Wallis test for amount of material 
Mass of chemicals Median number Significance, p 
(tonne) N of fatalities value 
<=1 8 3 0.05 
1-10 17 4 
10-50 26 7 
50-200 13 2 
200-100000 9 7 
Total 73 
Table 5.19: Kruskal-Wallis test for type of accidents 
Accidents type Median number of Significance, p 
N fatalities value 
Process 30 4 0.35 
Storage 10 6 
Transport 28 7 
Total 68 
Table 5.20: Mann-Whitney test for chemical type 
Chemical type Median number Significance, p 
N of fatalities value 
Extremely flammable 49 5 0.79 liquified gas 
Flammable gas 24 4 
Total 73 
Comparing the results obtained from both data sets, with and without the zero fatalities 
accidents showed that both of them resulted in positive correlation between the number of 
fatalities and the amount of chemicals involved in the accidents. These correlations were 
significant in both cases. Correlating the same variables by the accident type showed that 
the process operations resulted in the same correlation coefficients. The storage correlation 
became stronger when the zero fatalities accidents have been excluded, it jumped from non 
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significant correlation (r = 0.343, p = 0.164) to a significant correlation (r = 0.713, P = 
0.021). There was no transport correlation in both data sets. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test showed that in both data sets there were no significant differences 
in the median number of fatalities between the process, storage and transport accidents. 
Applying the same test to the amount of chemicals as groups showed that there is an 
increase in the median number of fatalities as the amount of chemicals increase to the 
range of 10 to 50 tonnes then it fluctuates, which is the same results obtained from 
including the accidents with zero fatalities in the data. The Mann-Whitney test showed that 
there is no significant difference between the two chemical groups in the case of including 
or excluding the accidents that did not cause any fatalities. Conducting the two tests 
excluding the transport accidents did not change the results. 
It can be seen from the results obtained from the two sets of data that there is statistical 
evidence that the amount of chemical has an impact on the number of fatalities. However, 
plotting the two variables together has not resulted in a clear relationship that can be used 
to predict the number of fatalities from knowing the amount of chemical. This can be due 
to the non consistency of the data as it represents accidents with different chemicals which 
took place in different countries with different regulations and different design standards. 
In addition, the accidents happened in very wide range of time since it includes very old 
accidents when safety was of less concern compared to nowadays. This may explain why 
the number of fatalities in many cases did not bear any relation to the amount of chemical 
involved. For example I tonne killed 6 people while 60 tonnes did not kill anybody. 
This raised a concern about the validity of using the raw data to compare accidents 
happening in different situations and different circumstances, for example different 
locations, different population densities and historic time period. This suggested that there 
are more factors that can play role in the consequences of accidents. 
5.6.5 Accident by location and time 
This section aims to investigate if the relationship between the number of fatalities and the 
mass of chemicals varies according to place and date. In order to do this, accidents were 
divided into three groups by location and three groups by time. The next sections show the 
analysis according to location and time. 
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5.6.5.1 Accident by location 
The three groups by location are as follows: the first group is for the accidents which took 
place in the United States of America and Canada and they are labelled as (US), the second 
group is for the accidents happened in the European countries and are labelled as (EU). 
These accidents happened in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, and Norway. The last group is labelled as others and it consists of accidents that 
happened in less developed countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Czechoslovakia and Lithuania. The two accidents which happened in Japan are not 
included in the analysis as it was not known if Japan uses the American or the European 
regulations or if it has its own regulations. 
Tables 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23 show the output from calculating the Spearrnan's rank 
correlation between the number of fatalities and the amount of chemicals involved in the 
accidents for the US and the EU and the accidents that are labelled as others. 
Table 5.21: Spearman's rank correlation for US 
Correlation Coefficient 0.063 
Significance, p value 0.7 
N (number of accidents) 40 
Table 5.22: Spearman's rank correlation for EU 
Correlation Coefficient 0.3 
Significance, p value 0.2 
N (number of accidents) 21 
Table 5.23: Spearman's rank correlation for others 
Correlation Coefficient 
Significance, p value 
N ("number of accidents) 
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As can be seen there was no correlation between the number of fatalities and the amount of 
chemicals in the case of the US accidents while there were positive correlations for both 
EU and for the less developed countries accidents. It can also be noticed that the 
correlations that obtained from EU and others are similar to the one obtained from all the 
accidents except that both of them are not significant. However, the reason for that might 
be the small sample sizes. Figures 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 show the shape of the relationships 
between the two correlated variables for the three groups. 
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It can be seen from Figures 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 that the scatter plots in the three cases show 
no clear relationship that can not be used to predict the number of fatalities. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was applied to the three accidents groups in order to detennine 
whether there were any differences in the median number of fatalities between the three 
groups of accidents. Table 5.24 shows the results of this test. 
1000 
• 
ii 
'" 3 lOO • ~ • 
.... 
'" ... 
.. 
,Q 10 ~ • • • • 
I 
1 10 lOO 1000 10000 lOOOJO 
Amount of material 
Figure 5.16: The less developed countries (others) accidents 
Table 5.24: Kruskal-Wallis test 
Locations Median number of Significance, p 
N fatalities value 
US 40 4 0.05 
EU 21 5 
Others 10 7 
Total 73 
The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the US have the lowest median number of fatalities 
followed by the BU. The others group which represents the less developed countries have 
quite high median number of fatalities. This seems to be logical as safety regulations could 
be less strict in these countries compared to the developed ones. The p value suggests that 
the differences in the median between the three groups are significant which indicates that 
the location of accident is an important factor that affects the accident consequences. 
5.6.5.2 Accidents by time 
The same procedures as in the accidents by locations were applied to the accidents after 
they classified according to time. Accidents were divided into three periods as foIIows: 
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from 1921 to 1950, which represents very old accidents when safety was less concern 
compared to nowadays; from 1951 to 1980, representing the appearance of hydrocarbons 
which resulted in great changes in the chemical, oil and petrochemical industries; and from 
1981 to 2000 which represent recent accidents and showed decline in the number of fire 
and explosion accidents. Figure 5.2 in section 5.7.1 show the basis of the division. Tables 
5.25,5.26 and 5.27 show the Spearman's rank correlations. 
Tbl 525 S nk a e 
· 
: speannan s ra I' (1921 1950) corre ation 
-
Correlation Coefficient 0.72 
Significance, p value 0.17 
N (number of accidents) 5 
T bl 526 S a e 
· 
: speannan s ra nk I' (1951 1980) corre ation 
-
Correlation Coefficient 0.22 
Significance, p value 0.11 
N (number of accidents) 54 
Tbl527S a e 
· 
: ;peannan s ra nk I ti (1981 2000) corre a on 
-
Correlation Coefficient 0.24 
Significance, p value 0.42 
N (number of accidents) 14 
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Figure 5.17: Accidents from 1921 to 1950 
It can be seen from the above tables that none of the groups yielded significant correlation. 
Figures 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19 are the scatter plot for the three periods. 
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Figure 5.18: Accidents from 1951 to 1980 
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Figure 5.19: Accidents from 1981 to 2000 
It can be seen from the above tables that correlating the mass of chemicals and the number 
of fatalities for the three showed periods of time did not result in significant correlations. 
Despite the high correlation coefficient in the period of 1921 to 1950 of 0.72, the value of 
p = 0.17 suggests that no reliable relationship can be obtained from the two correlated 
variables. The scatter plots for the three periods of time showed that no clear relationships 
exist between the mass and the number of people killed. 
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5.6.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion these results indicate that the amount of materials does have an impact on the 
number of fatalities. The reason for the weak relationship between the number of fatalities 
and the amount of materials might be the non consistency of the data. In other words, 
taking into consideration only the amount of material involved in the accidents might not 
be sufficient. Other factors such as the location of the accident (for example, in densely 
populated city or in the middle of a desert), or the country of operation are also important. 
In fact conducting the Kruskal-Wallis test on the accidents classified by countries showed 
that there are differences in the median number of fatalities between developed and less 
developed countries. More rigorous classification, by grouping countries that use the same 
regulations and same design standards, could produce more accurate results. 
The time of the accident is also a factor because the consequences of an accident might be 
different if it happened during day or night, or if it happened during a weekday or at a 
weekend. If these information were available it would be possible to compare accidents 
which took place in similar circumstances (the same quantity, the same time, the same 
location, the same population density, etc .. ). These factors might generate basis for further 
analysis in which stronger relationships could be obtained. 
5.7 Estimating the number of people killed by type of chemicals 
In the previous part, chemicals were classified by hazard type or risk phrases into 
extremely flammable liquefied gases and flammable gases. In the following sections 
hazards will be assessed by type of chemical. Accidents will be classified by chemical type 
in order to investigate whether specific chemicals pose more hazards to people than others 
and subsequently to estimate the number of fatalities per mass of those chemicals. 
As stated before, the accident data collected shows that the mass of the chemicals involved 
in the accidents is often missing. This hindered the estimation of the number of fatalities 
for every chemical that was involved in fire andlor explosion accidents. However, 
quantities of chemicals involved were available for some groups of hydrocarbons. They 
may be classified according to the number of carbon atoms in the molecule as follows: 
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• One carbon atom (methane): this is often handled as a refrigerated liquefied gas. 
• Two carbon atoms (ethane, ethene): these are usually handled as refrigerated 
liquefied gases. 
• Three and four carbon atoms (propane, butane and corresponding unsaturated 
compounds): these are handled as liquefied vapours. 
• Five or more carbons (pentane, hexane): these are liquids at ambient temperatures. 
Chemicals were classified according to the above classification. The one carbon atom class 
contains methane (natural gas) and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). It was not possible to 
assess the hazard of these hydrocarbons due to the unavailability of the mass involved for 
most of these accidents. There were 45 accidents in total and the mass was available in 
only 3 accidents. 
The second hydrocarbon group is the two carbon atoms which are represented by ethylene. 
The following section describes the estimation of the number of fatalities from ethylene 
accidents. 
5.7.1 Estimating the number of fatalities per mass of ethylene (C2) 
Ethylene was found to be involved in 23 fire and explosion accidents resulting in 165 
fatalities. The mass of ethylene was available for 12 of these accidents. Figure 5.20 shows 
the relation between the number of fatalities and the mass of ethylene involved for the 
accidents that caused one or more fatalities. The figure does not show the accidents that did 
not cause fatalities. 
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Figure 5. 20: Ethylene accidents 
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From Figure 5.20 it can be seen that there is a roughly proportional relationship between 
the mass of ethylene and the number of fatalities. The more ethylene involved, the greater 
the number of people killed. In seven accidents fortunately no one was killed. 
The accident which took place in 1982 at Alberta, Canada, involving 2.9 tonnes of 
ethylene killed no-one because the explosion happened in an unmanned compressor 
building. There is no detailed information available about the other six accidents that 
resulted in no fatalities. 
Fitting a line to the ethylene accidents with fatalities, as shown in Figure 5.20 leads to the 
following relation between the number killed and the mass of ethylene involved: 
[No Killed, if any] = 1.4 (mE )+ 2.4 5.1 
Where mE, is the mass of ethylene involved in the accident in tonnes. Although of the 
significance of Equation 5.1 (R2 = 0.77), it can not be considered as a model to predict the 
number of fatalities from ethylene accidents. It will be inappropriate to base a model on 
five accidents. Additionally, with the non-availability of detailed information about the 
accidents which caused no fatalities, it would be difficult to know if these accidents were 
in situations where no-one was around. If more information is made available, specifically 
the mass of ethylene for more accidents, it might be possible to establish a more reliable 
relationship between the fatalities and the mass of ethylene. 
The third group of the classification is those hydrocarbons with three or four carbon atoms 
which contain LPG, propane/propylene, butane. The next section assesses the hazards of 
these hydrocarbons. 
5.7.2 Estimating the number of fatalities per mass of LPG, propane/propylene, 
butane 
Among the various chemicals handled in a refinery Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) is the 
most common and most hazardous, it is extremely flammable and is handled in huge 
quantities. Numerous accidents involving LPG have been reported in the accidents 
statistics involving more than 1000 injuries of varying seriousness, and several hundred 
deaths, Khan and Abbasi (1990). 
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The term Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) covers several mixtures of C3 and C4 
hydrocarbons. It is widely used as a fuel in industrial and domestic heating systems and as 
a feed for petrochemical processes as well, Speight and Ozum (2002). It is a vapour at 
atmospheric temperature and pressure and is held in the liquid state by pressure to facilitate 
storage, transport, and handling. 
Marshall and Ruhemann (2001) have argued that the term "liquefied petroleum gases" is 
scientifically inappropriate, as they are vapours. The vapour phase is a sub phase of the gas 
phase and it is that phase where the temperature lies below the critical temperature. Only 
below that temperature can the gas be liquefied by pressure alone. The term "liquefied 
gases" should be reserved for liquids with a critical temperature below ambient which are 
kept at, or around, their normal boiling points by means of refrigeration. 
Petroleum vapours may flow along surfaces for substantial distances, reach a source of 
ignition and flash back. They are often heavier than air, and may accumulate in pits and 
other low-lying areas where they may displace air. 
LPG was found to be involved in 47 accidents. The mass of LPG was available for 13 
accidents; this made it impossible to analyse all the LPG accidents. Figure 5.21 shows the 
relation between the number of fatalities and the amount of LPG. It can be seen that the 
number of people killed in a lot of accidents do not bear any relation to the amount of 
LPG. Thus, it can be concluded that there is no relationship between the number of people 
killed and the amount ofLPG that was involved in the accidents. 
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Figure 5.21: LPG accidents 
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Propane/Propylene were involved in 51 accidents resulting in 246 fatalities. Figure 5.22 
shows the 13 accidents in which the amounts of the propane/propylene involved were 
available. There is no clear relationship between the amount of the propane/propylene 
involved and the number of fatalities that resulted. For example a vapour cloud explosion 
in which 53.5 tonnes of propylene exploded killed one person while 23.5 tonnes caused 
216 fatalities. This is more evidence that the amount of material is not the only factor 
which affects the impact of accidents. Factors such as the accident time (day or night), the 
location of the accident and other chance events can play a major role in the consequences 
of an accident. Figure 5.23 shows the nine butane/isobutane accidents in which the 
quantity of materials involved were available. 
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Figure 5. 22: Propane I Propylene accidents. 
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Figure 5.23: Butane accidents 
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Figure 5.24 shows all the LPG accidents where the mass of LPG was available. It also 
shows pure propane and pure butane accidents and the only two accidents that are available 
for propane-butane. The figure shows that there was no clear relationship between the mass 
and the number killed by the LPG. It can be seen that it was not possible to predict the 
number of fatalities from the LPG accidents in case of using the C3, C4 hydrocarbons 
individually or considering all the LPG components as one component. 
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5.7.3 Estimating the number of fatalities per mass of liquids with more than five 
carbon atoms 
A number of chemicals with five or more carbon atoms were found in the fire and 
explosion accident data. They are: pentane, llaphtJJa, benzene, cyclohexane and petrol. 
Data for amount of chemicals involved in the accidents was available only for 
cyclohexane. 
The only serious accident in which Cyclohexane was invo lved happened in Flixborough, 
UK in 1974 in which 28 people lost their lives. Figure 5.25 shows the number of fatalities 
per mass of cyclohexane exploded. 
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Figure 5.25: Cyclohexane accidents 
5.7.4 Conclusion 
The above section aimed to assess the hazards posed by the chemicals which were 
involved in dle historic acc idents. The idea was to con'elate tJle mass of a celtai.J.l chemical 
and the number of people killed by that chemicaL Hydrocarbons were dominant in tJle 
accidents data so groups of hydrocarbons were classified by ilie number of ilieir carbon 
atoms. It was thought to classify tJle hydrocarbons by phase and to obtain relationships 
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between the numbers of people killed by certain phase. These relationships can then be 
used to estimate the potential number of fatalities for certain phases, for example: gas, 
vapour, liquefied gas, liquefied vapour, and to find out whetber the accident happened in 
process or in storage operation. The analysis has been obstructed by the unavailability of 
the mass of chemicals for every accident, which prevented a large number of accidents 
from being used. 
However, an equation to assess the hazard posed by ethylene has been obtained. This 
equation can be presented as a model if more information about the quantities of ethylene 
involved in the accidents is available. 
5.8 Mean and median number of fatalities ranking index 
As an alternative to estimating tbe number of fatalities per mass of chemical involved, the 
mean and the median number of fatalities were calculated for tbe chemicals involved in 
fire and explosion accidents in order to rank the chemicals by mean/median fatalities tbey 
yielded. From the 512 fire and explosion accidents listed in Table I in Appendix A, the 
chemicals tbat occurred most frequently in these accidents are summarized in Table 5.28. 
It can be seen that hydrocarbons were dominant in the fire and explosion accidents. 
Therefore, more account will be given to hydrocarbon accidents. 
Table 5. 28: Table of most frequent occurring accidents caused by hydrocarbons 
Chemical 
LPG 
Natural gas 
Ethylene 
Hydrocarbons (unspecified) 
Butane 
Propane/propylene 
Crude oil 
Total 
Using historic accidents data to estimate the 
potential fatalities due to chemical hazards. 
Number of occurrence 
47 
30 
23 
22 
19 
51 
14 
206 
120 
Chapter 5 Data analysis for fire and explosion accidents 
5.S.1 Calculation of the mean & median numbers of fatalities by type of chemical 
The accident fatalities distribution for LPG, propane/propylene and butane are plotted in 
Figures 5.26, 5.27 and 5.28. The number of fatalities is plotted against the number of 
accidents. The LPG, propane/propylene and butane charts appear to have a similar curve 
profiles. They show an exponential decay trend with a few very large fatality accidents; 
these are best fitted by power curves. 
It has been found that LPG was involved in 47 accidents of various types for example, in 
storage, transportation (road, rail and pipelines) and accidents that happened in refineries. 
The mean number of fatalities was 7 persons per accident. The Mexico City vapour cloud 
fire which happened in a residential area and in which 650 people were killed and the 
pipeline accident which occurred in Russia in 1989 and caused 462 fatalities were 
excluded from this calculation. The median number of fatalities was 3. If the Mexico City 
and the Russian accidents are included, the mean number of accidents jumps to 30 people 
per accident while the {uedian remains the same. This is a good example of why the 
median is a better statistic than the arithmetic mean as the few accidents with a large 
number of casualties skew the mean. Propane/propylene and butane were found to have the 
same mean and median number of fatalities (10 and 2 respectively), although the number 
of accidents and number of fatalities for propane are twice that of butane. Isobutylene, a 
chemical with a similar number of carbon atoms to butane, was involved in only one 
accident resulting in 7 fatalities from a pipeline explosion. Thus, it has been added to the 
butane accidents. Figure 5.29 shows the accidents - fatalities distribution for LPG, 
propane/propylene and butane accidents together. It can be seen that the trend of the 
accidents is the same in case of plotting the accidents individually or together. 
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Using historic accident data to estimate the 
potentialJatalities due to chemical hazards 
122 
No. of fatalities 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
51 
216 
No. of accidents 
13 
6 
7 
2 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Data W.UijSi3 till 1110 WIG t7XPI031Wl " .. CIULlll::> 
Accidents - Fatalities Distribution 
Kr------------------------------------------------------------, 
!2 
IJ 
4 
2 
o 
Total number of propane fatalities == 444 
Total number of accidents == 46 
mean number of fatalities == 444/46 == 10 
median number of fatalities == 2 
Figure 5. 27: Distribution of the number of fatalities for propane/propylene accidents. 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
potential fatalities due to chemical hazards 
123 
No. of fatalities 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
23 
37 
100 
No. of accidents 
8 
3 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
:l 
5 
~ 
'" CS 
Q 
Z 
Data analys1s for fIre and explosiOn acc1dents 
9 
Accident - Fatalities Distribution 
8 
7 
6 
5 
median no. 
4 
3 
2 
\ of fatalities 
If--
1 
0 nn 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Total number of Butane fatalities = 233 
Total number of accidents = 24 
9 
y =5x·O.53 
. 
mean no, of 
fatalities 
/ 
A/ 
.! .. n 11 N 
i , i /V i i i (V-
10 11 12 23 37 
No.offatalities 
mean number of fatalities = 233/24 = 10 
median number of fatalities = 2 
-= 
_U 
100 
Figure 5. 28: Distribution of the number of fatalities for butane accidents. 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
potential fatalities due to chemical hazards 124 
---------
No. of fatalities No. of accidents 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
23 
37 
51 
60 
63 
100 
216 
31 
16 
13 
5 
9 
3 
5 
6 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Data anatysls tor hre and explosion accidents 
35 
Accident· fatalities Distribution 
30 
median no. 
/Off:'OOOf 
25 
y = 26.0x.o·97 20 
15 
': ~~ f7 n n oD1lUUlILUIJni]llttt::~nnI~n,a'Jn~B"'~~Qj-~t=~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~~ 
o 1 .l 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 23 37 51 60 63 100 216 
No. of fataH les 
Total number offatalities = 1004 Total number of accidents = 117 
mean number of fatalities = 1004/117 = 9 median number of fatalities = 2 
Figure S. 29: Distribution of the number of fatalities for LPG, propane/propylene and butane accidents 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
potential fatalities due to chemical hazards 125 
Chapter 5 Data Analysis for fire and explosion accidents 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), is mainly methane that has been liquefied for ease of 
transport by cooling it to (-162°C), Speight and Ozum (2002). LNG was involved in 10 
accidents with a total number of fatalities of 242 people. The mean number of fatalities for 
LNG was 24 persons per accident, while the median was 2. The data is shown in Figure 
5.30. The high mean number can be attributed to the storage tank fire and explosion 
accident, which happened in 1944 at Cleveland, Ohio, in which 126 people were killed. 
The high number of fatalities was due to the massive quantity of material spilled, about 
3000 tonnes of LNG in total. Furthermore, the plant was located in the middle of a densely 
population area containing a mixture of housing and business places, Marshall (I 987). It 
can be seen that the LNG distribution of the number of fatalities is different from the LPG 
and propane. This is probably due to the lack of data compared to that for LPG and 
propane. 
Natural gas is a gaseous mixture that is predominantly methane but also contains other 
combustible hydrocarbon compounds, Speight and Ozum (2002). It is lighter than air 
(density 0.584), so it can disperse readily and it rises even when it is cold. It has been 
found that it was responsible for the death of 173 people from 35 accidents with a mean 
number of fatalities of 5 persons per accident and a median of 3 as can be seen in Figure 
5.31. 
Crude oil was involved in 21 fire and explosion accidents, killing 193 people with a mean 
of9 deaths per accident. The median number of fatalities for crude oil was I, Figure 5.32 
There were 12 accidents in which the material involved is known as a hydrocarbon causing 
105 fatalities with a mean number of fatalities of 9 persons per accident and a median of 1. 
Natural gas liquids (NGL) are the hydrocarbon liquids that condense during the processing 
of hydrocarbon gases that are produced from oil or gas reservoir, Speight and Ozum 
(2002). They were involved in 4 accidents. All of them took place during transporting by 
pipeline. One of these accidents was the explosion that happened in 1989 in Ufa, USSR 
and caused the death of 645 people. Excluding this accident, NGL had a mean number of 
fatalities of 4. 
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Table 5.29 gives the mean and the median number of fatalities per accident for some 
hydrocarbons. Table 5.30 compares the heat of combustion of the substance to the heat of 
detonation of TNT (4652 KJ/Kg), the energy ratio. This ratio shows that the energy of 
combustion of hydrocarbons is about ten times the energy of detonation of TNT. It can be 
noticed that the energy ratio for hydrocarbons is almost the same, ranging from 9 to II 
despite the difference in their phase. 
Table 5. 29: The mean and the median number of fatalities for some hydrocarbons 
Substance Formula No. of No. of Mean Median 
accidents fatalities fatalities fatalities 
Hydrogen H, 13 278 21 4 
LNG CH, 10 242 24 2 
Methane/natural gas CH, 35 173 5 3 
Ethylene C,H, 23 165 7 1 
LPG C,-C, 47 327 7 3 . 
Propane/propylene C,H8 /C,H, 46 444 10 2 
Butanelbutylene C,H IO 24 233 IO 2 
Pentane CsHI2 2 3 2 I 
Naphtha CS -C9 9 72 8 2 
Light HCs 
-
6 10 2 2 
Benzene C,H, 2 I 
- -
Cyclohexane C,H12 5 35 7 2 
Petrol C7 - CII 20 611 31 3 
Crude oil . 21 193 9 1 
Hydrocarbons 
-
12 105 9 1 
(unspecified) 
Table 5.31 ranks the hydrocarbons according to their median number of fatalities. For ease 
of ranking, it is convenient to group some hydrocarbons together and order them in terms 
of their number of carbons and their median number of fatalities. 
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Table 5.30: The energy ratio for some hydrocarbons 
Substance Formula Heat of combustion Energy ratio 
(KJ/Kg) 
Hydrogen H, - 120,034 26 
Methane CH, - 50, 470 11 
Ethylene C,H, -47,192 10 
Propane C3H, - 46,386 10 
Propylene C3H6 - 45,813 10 
Butane C,H IO - 45,771 10 
Pentane C,H" - 45,384 10 
Benzene C6H6 -40,171 9 
Cyclohexane C6HI, - 43,470 9 
Hydrogen came at the top of the list; it has the highest mean and median number of 
fatalities, (21 and 4 respectively). This can be attributed to the high energy of hydrogen as 
evidenced by its high energy ratio of 26. Hydrogen has also a wide range of flammability 
(4% to 74%) and, when diluted with inert gas, it can still bum with only 5% oxygen 
compared with about 11 % for hydrocarbon gases. Hydrogen has a high burning velocity 
compared with hydrocarbon gases, and it can be ignited by low energy sparks as it requires 
only about 1110 of the energy that is required by hydrocarbon gases, Marshall (1987). 
However, it is an extremely light gas and does not pool on the ground like petrol or LPG 
and is therefore less hazardous when not confined. Figure 5.33 shows the mean and the 
median number of fatalities for hydrogen accidents. 
Table 5.31: Hydrocarbons ranking 
Substance Formula No. of No. of Mean no. of Median no. of 
accidents fatalities fatalities fatalities 
Hydrogen H, 13 278 21 4 
LN G+methane CH, 45 415 9 3 
LPG C3 - C, 47 327 7' 3 
Petrol C7 - CII 19 103 5+ 3 
LightHCs C,-C6 108 914 8 2 
Naphtha C,-C, 9 72 8 2 
HC (unspecified) 
-
12 105 9 I 
. . .. 
• thIs value IS excludmg the MexIco CIty (650 fatahtles) and the RussIan (462 fatahtIes) aCCIdents. 
+ this value is excluding the pipeline accident took place in Brazil and caused 508 fatalities. 
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Some releases are not pure hydrogen, but also contain other materials. Lees (1980) cited 
that the addition of hydrocarbons narrows the flammable range and reduces the burning 
velocity. This might explain the reason behind the four accidents shown in Table 5.32 in 
which hydrogen contained hydrocarbons and in which nobody was killed. 
Table 5.32: Hydrogenlhydrocarbons accidents 
Date Chemical Type Fatalities Location Equipment 
1973 Hydrogen, Fire 0 St.Croix, Virgin Islands Hydrodesulphurizer 
HCs 
1975 Hydrogen, VCE 0 Cologene, FRG 
-
Naphtha 
1987 Hydrogen, Fire 0 Mississauga, Ont. Hydrotreater 
HCs 
1989 Hydrogen, Fire or 0 Martinez, CA Hydrotreater 
HCs Explosion 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG)/methane, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and petrol came at 
the second position in the list with a median number of fatalities of 3. 
Gasoline and petrol accidents are added together as they are one component with different 
names, Speight and Ozum (2002). Petrol was involved in 20 accidents and caused the 
death of 611 people with a mean of 3 1 and a median of 3, as shown in Table 5.29. If the 
pipeline accident, which took place in Brazil in 1984 and resulted in 508 fatalities is 
excluded from the calculation of the mean and the median number of fatalities, the mean 
goes down to 5 and the median remains the same. 
Naphtha is a generic term applied to refined, partly refined, or unrefined petroleum 
products and liquid products of natural gas, the majority of which distill below 240°C 
(464°F), It is a complex mixture of more than 100 components of Cs - C9 paraffins, 
naphthene, and aromatic hydrocarbons, Speight and Ozum (2002). Naphtha was involved 
in 9 accidents resulting in 72 fatalities. Figure 5.35 gives the trend of the accidents. There 
was not a clear pattern; this could be because there are too few data points. 
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Light hydrocarbons are defined in Speight and Ozum (2002) as the hydrocarbons with 
molecular weights less than that of heptane (C7HI6). Based on this definition, the C2 - Cs 
hydrocarbons accidents have been added together and named as light hydrocarbons. Table 
4.33 below lists the components which are now considered as light hydrocarbons. LPG and 
LNG are treated separately. 
Light hydrocarbons and naphtha found to have the same level of hazard as both of them 
give the same mean and median number of fatalities of 8 and 2 respectively. 
Unspecified hydrocarbons, which are accidents for hydrocarbons (unspecified), oil and 
petroleum, gave the lowest median number of fatalities of 1. 
Table 5.33: Light hydrocarbons accidents and fatalities 
Hydrocarbon No. of accidents No.offatalities 
Ethane & propane 3 34 
Ethylene 23 165 
Propane/propylene 48 458 
Propane & butane 3 11 
Butanelbutylenes 24 233 
Pentane 2 3 
Light hydrocarbons 5 10 
Total 108 914 
It can be seen from Table 5.31 that there is not much difference between hydrocarbons in 
terms of the mean and the median number of fatalities. The median number of fatalities 
range from 1 to 3 with the highest number for liquefied gases and liquefied vapours. The 
mean number of fatalities range from 5 to 9. 
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5.8.2 Calculation of the mean and median numbers of fatalities by type of process 
operation 
As mentioned in section 5.5.2, the accidents have been classified as process, storage, 
transport and utilities. In this section the mean and the median number of fatalities are 
calculated for each class. 
5.8.2.1 Process accidents 
The mean and median number of fatalities for process accidents is calculated for the 171 
process accidents. The 53 accidents in which it was unknown whether there are fatalities or 
not have been discarded. The mean number of fatalities was 7 people per accident while 
the median was 2. In Figure 5.36 the trend shows a clear power curve. 
5.8.2.1.1 Reactor accidents 
The mean and the median number of fatalities for reactor accidents have been determined. 
It was found that reactors were involved in 30 accidents resulting in 83 fatalities with a 
mean of 3 people per accident. The median number of fatalities for the reactor accidents is 
1. The distribution is shown in Figure 5.37. 
5.8.2.2 Storage accidents 
Figure 5.38 shows all the 70 accidents which happened during storing materials. The 
number of fatalities caused from storage accidents was 1744 people with a mean of 25 
people per accident while the median number of fatalities was 2. 
5.8.2.3 Transport accidents 
Transport accidents are classified by type of transport, rail, road, ship, and pipeline and the 
mean and median number of fatalities were calculated for each class. Table 5.34 
summarise the data and statistics for transport accidents by category. 
From Table 5.34, it can be seen that during the period from 1911 - 2000, 134 transport 
accidents happened in which 3088 people were killed, with a mean of 23 persons per 
accident. Looking at the categories individually, it can be noticed that pipeline accidents 
tend to yield more fatalities than the other methods of transport. Among the 3088 people 
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killed in transport accidents in general, 1939 people were killed by pipeline accidents, 
while the remaining 1149 fatalities were distributed between rail, road and ship accidents. 
Transport by pipeline has the highest mean number of fatalities because large quantities of 
petroleum products and crude oil are transported by this means. Road transport tends to kill 
more people than rail and ship; this may be because roads often pass through populated 
areas, especially in developing countries. Figure 5.39 shows the mean and the median 
number of fatalities for transport accidents. 
Table 5.34: classification of transport accidents, 1911-2000 
Transportation type Rail Road Ship Pipeline Total 
No. of accidents 35 25 12 62 134 
No.offatalities 491 495 163 1939 3088 
Mean fatalities 14 20 14 31 23 
Median fatalities I 6 5 3 3 
5.8.2.4 Utilities accidents 
As mentioned in section 5.7.2, utility accidents are accidents that took place in equipment 
that supports the operating plant; such as pumps, compressors, heat exchangers and boilers. 
It has been found that those equipment were involved in 23 accidents causing the death of 
114 people with a mean of 5 persons per accident and a median of2. Figure 5.40 shows the 
distribution. 
5.8.3 Conclusion 
Table 5.35 ranks the types of accidents by their median number of fatalities. Transport 
appears to be the most hazardous class of accidents as it caused the highest median number 
of fatalities while the other three classes, - storage, process and utilities - have the same 
level of hazard. In terms of the mean number of fatalities, storage and transport accidents 
have almost the same mean number of fatalities although of the difference between the 
number of accidents and the number of fatalities they caused. 
On the other hand, although the process and utility accidents have the same median 
number of fatalities, process accidents can be considered as more hazardous from the 
number of accidents involved and the number of people killed compared to the utilities 
accidents. 
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Table 5.35: Ranking types of accidents 
Type of accident No. of accidents no. offatalities mean no. median no. 
fatalities fatalities 
Transport 134 3088 23 3 
Storage 70 1744 25 2 
Process 224 1247 6 2 
Utilities 23 114 5 2 
5.9 The Mortality Index 
This section presents another methodology for estimating the possible number of fatalities 
due to fire and explosion accidents, as a function of the quantity of flammable substance 
involved. The method is called the mortality index and was developed by Marshall (1977). 
The mortality index value is expressed in terms of the mean number of fatalities per tonne 
of chemical involved. 
The mortality index is intended to apply to the historical accident data in order to develop a 
method which will be used as a basic tool for measuring the inherent safety of a chemical 
plant in conceptual design stage. This method is supposed to be able to predict the number 
of fatalities from knowing the quantity of chemical that involved in a chemical accident. 
As mentioned before, it is not vital that such a method is to be very accurate as it will be 
used in association with other hazard assessment methods to help in selecting the safest 
process in a phase when limited design data are available. 
The data set studied in this section consists of 101 fire and explosion accidents that 
happened during process, transport, and storage where the mass of material involved was 
available, see Table 5.36. These accidents were divided into 13 classes according to the 
mass of material involved. Each class is defined by lower and higher bounds on the mass 
of material. The higher bound is equal to the lower bound multiplied by 10°.5, i.e. by 3.17. 
When there are no accidents in a class, two classes are combined together. Marshall (1977) 
used this division into classes in deriving the mortality index. The first interval has been 
chosen arbitrarily according to the data as in an article by Vilchez et al. (2001) in which 
the same methodology was used. 
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Figure SAl shows a histogram for the frequency of accidents occurring in each class. As 
can be seen, the numbers of accidents is low in the first three classes which represent 
accidents with masses between 0 and lA tonnes of chemicals. This could be attributed to 
the safety of dealing with small inventories, or as Marshall (1977) claimed, to the failure of 
recording small accidents, especially if not accompanied by fatalities. On the other hand, 
the mass range from 1.44 to 144 tonnes seems to be critical since it has the highest number 
of accidents, 58 accidents. Accidents involving masses of more than 500 tonnes tend not to 
happen often. 
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Figure 5.41: Fire and explosion accidents 
5.9.1 Mortality index for all fire and explosion accidents 
The fITst column of Table 5.36 shows the range, in tonnes of hazardous material, for the 
classes. The following three columns show: the total number of fatalities over all the 
accidents in the classes, the total mass of material involved in the accidents in the class and 
the number of accidents in each class. 
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The last three columns show, respectively, the mean number of fatalities per accident, the 
mass involved per accident (mean) and the mortality index (MI). The mortality index (MI) 
was calculated for each class and plotted on logllog scale against the mean mass for each 
class, as shown in Table 5.36 and Figure 5.42. After applying linear regression of logllog 
values and transforming back to the original scale, the following equation has been 
obtained: 
MI = 2.22m-o·68 
where, MI, is the mortality index (fatality per tonne of material involved). 
In, is the quantity of material in tonne. 
Table 5.36: All fire and explosion accidents. 
5.2 
Size of ",""dent Total fatalities Total mass Total:no. of ncddents A veroge fatalities Avemge tonnes ~ (fatalities pcrtonnc) 
(tonne) in cl ..... (1) in cl .... (2) 
0- 0.143 2 0.142 
0.144 - 0.453 12 1.95 
0.454-1.436 10 6.11 
1.437 -4.53 20 35.8 
4.531-14.36 145 159.2 
14.361-45.3 712 5n.7 
45.301-143.6 53 1386.7 
143.601-453 28 1828 
453.001-4530 128 6390 
4531-14360 657 13000 
14361- 45300 57 88000 
>45300 52 95000 
Total 1876 206,386 
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Figure 5.42: Fire & explosion accidents 
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In Figure 5.43 the same procedures as above were applied for only the accidents that 
caused one or more fatalities. The regression factor for this relation was (R2 = 0.9) which 
indicates a good fit. The following equation can be used to estimate the MI: 
MI = 3.7m -<J·7 5. 3 
It can be seen that both including and excluding the accidents that did not cause fatalities 
resulted in strong relationships. It should point out that the high regression factors for these 
relationships is expected since regression is done using mean values for both the size of 
accident and the mortality index. 
Table 5.37:Fire and explosion accidents (caused one or more fatalities). 
Size oC accident total fatalities total mass 
(tonne) in class (1) in class (2) 
0·0.143 2 0,03 
0.144·0.453 12 1.4 
0.454· 1.436 10 3.21 
1.437·4.53 20 19.9 
4.531-14.36 145 144.2 
14.361- 45.3 712 487.4 
45.301 - 143.6 53 899.5 
143.601-453 25 1100 
453.001 - 4530 131 3455 
4531- 14360 657 13000 
14361 - 45300 57 63000 
>45300 52 95000 
Total 1876 177,111 
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Figure 5.43: Fire & explosion accidents. 
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5.9.2 Mortality index by type of process operation 
The fIre and explosion accidents were classifIed by the type of accidents. Tables 5.38, 5.39 
and 5.40 show respectively, the process, storage and transport accidents analysis and 
Figures 5.44, 5.45 and 5.46 show the relationships between the mortality index and the size 
of accidents by type of accident. It should be pointed out that the storage and transport 
relationships are not valid for accidents with small masses. 
Table 5.38: Fire and explosion for process accidents. 
Size of accident toW fatalities "'tal ...... total no. of acddents mean fatalities mean tonnes 
(tonne) 
0·0.143 
0.144 - 0.453 
0.454 - 1.436 
1.437 -4.53 
4.531 - 14.36 
14.361 - 45.3 
45.301 - 143.6 
143.601 - 453 
Total 
in dass(1) in. cIaso;: (2) 
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Figure 5.44: Fire and explosion process accidents. 
Table 5.39: Fire and explosion for storage accidents. 
MI (fatalities per tonne) 
(1)1(2) 
62.50 
7.27 
1.36 
0.69 
0.64 
0.32 
0.06 
0.01 
1000.0 
Size of Betide-ut total fatalities totalmlWS total no. of accidents mean fatalities mean tonnes MI (fataJifiesper tonne) 
(tonne) in class (J) incla~(2) Inda",(3) (lV(3) (2)1(3) (IV(2) 
0-0.143 0 0.11 1 0 0.11 0 
0.144 - 0.453 0 0.3 1 0 0.3 0 
0.454 - 1.436 4 1.71 2 2 0.86 2.34 
1.437 - 14.36 4 15 2 2.00 7.50 0.27 
14.361- 45.3 4 20 1 4.00 20.00 0.20 
45.301- 143.6 2 208 2 1.00 104.00 0.01 
143.601 - 453 18 600 2 9.00 300.00 0.03 
453.001 - 4530 128 6390 3 42.67 2130.00 0.02 
4531-14360 657 13000 2 328.50 6500.00 0,05 
1436\ - 45300 7 48000 2 3.50 24000.00 0.0001 
Totlll 824 68,235 18 
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Figure 5.45: Fire and explosion storage accidents. 
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Figure 5.46: Fire and explosion transportation accidents. 
5.9.3 Mortality index by type of chemical 
The same analysis as that made for all fIre and explosion accidents was applied to the 71 
hydrocarbon accidents in which the mass of hydrocarbons were known. Table 5.41 shows 
the analysis and Figure 5.47 shows the relationship between the MI and the size of accident 
in tonnes of hydrocarbons. It can be seen that the relationship between the two variables is 
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strong, giving a regression factor of (R2 = 0.85). The following equation can calculate the 
mortality index for hydrocarbon accidents: 
MI = 2.55m..()·67 5.4 
Analysing hydrocarbon accidents excluding the accidents which did not result in any 
fatalities yielded the same results as that given including the accidents with zero fatalities. 
The regression factor was (R2 = 0.87) in the flISt case and (R2 = 0.85) in the second case as 
shown in Figures 5.48 and 5.47. 
Table 5.41:Hydrocarbon fire and explosion accidents. 
Sire of &<rident total fatalities tatal Jm'lS 
(torme) in cl"" (1) in d"" (2) 
O· 0.143 0 0.11 
0.144· 0.453 9 0.95 
0.454· 1.436 7 4.5 
1.437 ·4.53 19 31.6 
4.531· 14.36 122 121.7 
14.361· 45.3 451 415.4 
45.301·143.6 31 900.7 
143.601· 453 24 935 
453.001· 4530 128 5190 
4531·14360 650 6000 
14361· 45300 57 88000 
>45300 52 95000 
TntaI 1550 196,600 
10.00 
J 
So 
1.00 
t 0.10 S j 0.01 
f 0.00 0.00 
total no. of accidents 
in~(3) 
1 
3 
5 
11 
13 
17 
11 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1 
71 
• 
JmUt fatalities IlE8D tunnt'S 
(1)1(3) 
0 
3.00 
1.40 
1.73 
9.38 
26.53 
2.82 
8.00 
64.00 
650.00 
19.00 
52.00 
(2)1(3) 
0.11 
0.32 
0.90 
2.frI 
9.36 
24.44 
81.88 
311.67 
2595.00 
6000.00 
29333.33 
95000.00 
y = 2.55,(°·67 
R2 =0.85 
• 
• 
MI (fatalities per tonne) 
(1)1(2) 
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9.47 
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Figure 5.47: Hydrocarbons accidents. 
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Table 5.42: Hydrocarbon fire and explosion accidents 
(caused one or more fatalities) 
Size of accident total fatalities total mass total no. of accidents mean fatalities mean toones M I (tatalilles per tonne) 
(Ion ne) in class (1) in class (2) 
0-0.143 
0.144 - 0.453 9 0.95 
0.454 - 1.436 7 2.6 
1.431-4.53 19 15.1 
4.531 - 14.36 122 106.1 
14.361 - 45.3 451 386.4 
45.301 - 143.6 31 591.5 
143.601 - 453 24 935 
453.001 - 4530 12. 3000 
4531 - 14360 650 6000 
14361- 45300 57 63000 
> 45300 52 95000 
Total 1550 169,039 
,., 10.00 
" ~ 1.00 ~ 
.r! 0.10 ] 
<! ~ 
~ 0.01 
~ 
f 0.00 ~ 0.00 
In class (3) 
3 
3 
5 
11 
16 
8 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
54 
(1)/(3) 
3.00 
2.33 
3.80 
11.09 
28.19 
3.88 
8.00 
12&.00 
650.00 
28.50 
52.00 
y =3.7x-'J·69 
R' =0.87 
(2)/(3) (1)/(2) 
0.32 9.41 
0.87 2.69 
3.14 1.21 
9.70 1.14 
24.15 1.17 
73.94 0.05 
311.67 0.03 
3000 0.04 
6000 0.11 
31500 0.001 
95000 0.001 
• 
• 
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Size of accident (tonnes of material) 
Figure 5.48: Hydrocarbon accidents that caused one or more fatalities 
Table 5.43: The mortality index relationships for fire and explosion accidents. 
Type of accident 
All F & E accidents 
All F & E accident 
Process F & E accidents 
Storage F & E accidents 
Transport F & E accidents 
HC F & E accidents 
HC F & E accidents 
F & E: fIre and explOSIOn 
HC: hydrocarbons 
Equations R' 
MI _ 2.22 (m)~·vo 0.90 
MI - 3.7 (m)~· 0.90 
MI _ 2.23 (m)""" 0.96 
MI- (m) '.~ 0.70 
MI - 6.0 (m)~·~ 0.87 
MI = 2.55 (m)"'·" 0.85 
MI = 3.7 (m)~· 0.87 
MI: Mortality Index (no. of fatalities/tonne of chemical) 
m: arnmmt of chemical (tonne) 
o fato1ities No. of No. of 
accidents accidents fatalities 
included 
Yes 101 1876 
No 73 1876 
Yes 43 184 
Yes 18 824 
Yes 34 856 
Yes 71 1550 
No 54 1550 
Total 
rnass 
involved 
206,386 
177,111 
904 
68,235 
137,064 
196,600 
169,039 
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Table 5.43 summarises all the relationships observed between the MI and the mass of 
chemicals involved. 
It can be seen from Table 5.43 that for all fire and explosion accidents, the number of 
process accidents are much higher than the number of storage accidents. Among the 10 1 
accidents with known amount of chemicals, 43 took place during processing while 34 and 
18 happened during transport and storing operations respectively. In terms of the number 
of fatalities, process operations have yielded a lower number of fatalities than storage and 
transport. Process accidents caused the death of 184 people, while storage and transport 
caused 824 and 856 fatalities respectively. Calculating the amount of chemicals involved 
in the three operations shows that process operations involved a smaller amount of 
chemicals than storage and transport operations. 
It can be noticed from Tables 5.36 to 5.42 that in most cases, the MI is higher for accidents 
that involve a smaller quantity of material. This can be due to the failure of reporting small 
incidents unless they involve fatalities which lead to high values for the mortality index for 
small incidents. 
On the other hand, the number of accidents which happened in transporting chemicals was 
almost twice the number that took place in storage. Also the mass of chemicals involved in 
transport operations was twice that of storage. However, the fatalities toll from storing and 
transporting chemicals were almost the same. 
Table 5.43 also summarises all the relationships observed between the MI and the mass of 
chemicals involved. Although the curves fit the data well, as indicated by the high values 
of RZ, it is not expected that these equations will have particularly good predictive values 
as they are obtained from plotting the mean mass and the mean mortality index within 
bands (as detailed in Table 5.36). This will reduce the variability between the data points 
and give a high correlation. 
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It should be po inted out that the number of fatalities resulting from a chemical acc ident 
will depend not onJy on the accident 's physical effect but also on the distribution of the 
population in the area affected by the accident. Thus, it is necessary to look more closely at 
likely population densities and the mOltaEty index may have to take account of variations 
in population density. Attention also has to be called to the fact that Ulere are differences in 
population densities between oft'ice hours and outside oft'ice hours. 
The above relationships do not take the population density ittto consideration. Population 
density in the area sUlTo unding the source of the explosion is not uniform and in order to 
include such a factor, population data to r both on site alld oft· site is required as well as 
data to r the actual population density at the time of acc ident. The information about 
process location, local population or number of employees is not known at the conceptual 
design phase. In add ition, it was not possible to ObtaiJl data of the actual population density 
at the time of acc ident. Therefore, the exact number of people affected is unlikely to be 
accw'ately predicated (i'om these equations. 
5.9.4 Validation of results 
In order to examine the validity of the mOltality index relationships shown in Table 5.43, 
the mean mass to r every class was used to predict the mortality index using equation 5. 3. 
The predicted number of fatalities was plotted against the actual ones as shown in Figure 
5.49. The figure shows that the method predicted fatalities up to about 1000 fo r accidents 
in vo lving between 0.03 and 100,000 tOlmes of chemicals. 
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Comparing the predicted number of fatalities to the actual ones showed tbat there are 
sometimes large differences between the actual and the predicted numbers. For accidents 
involving small quantities of chemicals, up to one tonne, the agreement between the actua l 
and the predicted fatalities is reasonably close. However, variability exists that appears to 
increase somewhat with increasing quantity of material. As the quantities increased the 
actual fatalities range became too broad to suggest a specific pattem. 
It can be seen that accidents with fatalities exceeding 100 are for the two storage accidents 
whicb happened in Cleveland, Ohio (1944) and the Mexico City fire ( 1984) in which the 
location o f the plants in densely populated areas were responsible for the high death toll o f 
128 and 650 respectively. The other two accidents witb more than 100 fatalities are the San 
Carlos, Spain (1978) and the Ludwigshafen, Germany ( 1948) transpOlt accidents ill which 
the former took place in a camp of about 500 people and the latter occurred in very large 
population density place. in addition these accidents bappened a long time ago when safety 
issues and risk planning were of less concern compared with those that are used nowadays. 
It is believed that it would be inappropriate to take acc idents that happened in such 
extraordinary circumstances which would not be tolerated today into consideration in a 
method that is intended to assess the hazards of plants that will be located outside built-up 
areas. 
Therefore, due to the above reasons, it is believed that not taking those accidents into 
consideratioll reduces tbe variability of the actual data and thus makes the prediction 
slightly more accurate. Figure 5.50 shows that actual and the predicted fatalities after 
excluding the above accidents. 
100 
. • • 
. = 
'3 .+. 
• .:: ., • • • 
-
10 0 ~ ", . • 
-
+ • • Jl + • .-
11 ~ •• 
'" • • ••• ••• I 
om 0. 1 10 100 1000 10000 
Size uf *c.::idenl (l~lme of m"le rilil) 
• Acttlltl fHWilies • Predicted flthtlitie s 
Figure 5.50: Predicted versus actual fatalities 
(no high number of ratalities accidents) 
Using historic acddelJl c/allllo estimate the 
potential fatalities due 10 chemical hazards 
----- -----
• 
• 
154 
Chapler 5 Data clllalysis for fire ::md explosion accidents 
The proposed method is valid for predicting fatal ities for accidents involving chemicals 
between 0.03 and 100,000 tonnes. For quantities below and above that range, extrapolation 
is needed to obtain the number of fatalities. However, although it is possible to predict 
fatalities tor quantities below 0.03 and above 100,000 tonnes, these results could not be 
validated due to the lack of actual data for these lower and higher quantities. If more data 
were available for accidents involving large quantities of chemicals it would provide 
means to r val idating results for acc idents invo lving very low or very high quantities o f 
chemicals. 
A close look at the relations obtained for different operations show that the tit between the 
actual and the predicted fatalities tor process and storage were reasonably acceptable. The 
process method predicted fatalities between abo ut one and ten for quantities between about 
O.Ol and 1000 tOlJlles while in the case of storage the predicted number of fatalities was 
between I and 100. As mentioned before, the higher ditferences between the actual and the 
predicted fatalities tor storage accidents are due to the presence of the two accidents which 
resulted in very high fatalities due to cellain circumstances. The agreement between the 
actual the predicted fatalities in the trallspOll accidents were very poor. Figures 5.51 , 5.52 
and 5.53 are the actual versus the predicted fatalities tor process, storage, and lranspOlt 
accidents. 
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Figure 5.52: Predicted versus actual fatalities for storage accidents 
It can be seen that the accw·acy of prediction for tbe obtained equations is quite low, except 
for storage accidents invo lving less than 1000 tOL1lles. The difference between the actual 
and the predicted number of fatalities for equation 5.3 which was obtained from app lying 
all the fire and explosion accidents that caused one or more fatalities was sometimes up to 
70 fatalities for quantities more than I tonne. Unlike tbe accuracy of tbe eq uations obtained 
fi'o m the process and the storage accidents, tbe maxiInwll difference between the predicted 
and the actual fatalities was about 20 for process and 7 for storage. 
It is difficult to allocate criteria for an acceptable limit between the theoretical and the 
actual approach. On the other hand, it is not vital that an assessment method which will be 
used in assoc iation with other bazard assessments to help process designers to apply good 
judgment in selecting the safest process Ul a conceptual design phase to be very accurate. 
in addition, the method is still novel and as mentioned earlier it did not take the variation 
of population density into consideration. It is believed that if data about population density 
becomes available as well as the possibility to obtain the quantity of chemicals for the rest 
of accidents it could belp to reduce the big difference between the theoretical and the 
actual fatalities and thus to increase the accuracy of the method. The accuracy o f tbe 
transpOlt equation was very poor. As mentioned earlier in section 5.6.1.1 , this could be due 
to the different types of transportation included in the data. It inc ludes rail tank cars, road 
tankers and oil tankers. Also the circumstances of the acc idents vary widely tor example 
happening in the middle of a built-up area or where there are no people. 
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Figure 5.53: Predicted versus actual fatalities for transport accidents 
5.9.5 Conclusiou 
Another method of assessing hazards from chemical accidents is the mean mortality index 
approach in which the ratio fata lities to size of release are determined. MOItality Indices 
were obtained for general chemicals and for hydrocarbons as well as for accidents by 
process operations. These indices allowed prediction of the potential number of fatalities 
from a chemical acc ident by knowing the quantity of the potential release. Comparing the 
actual to the predicted fatalities showed that there are sometimes large differences between 
the actual and the predicted number of fatalities. However, the fit between the actual and 
the predicted number were reasonably acceptable in the case of process and storage 
acc idents, especially if the accidents which resulted in very high number of fatalities due to 
extraordinary circumstances were not taken into account. 
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5.10 Overall conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to develop a method for assessing the inherent safety of a 
chemical plant. This method is intended to predict the number of people that might be 
killed in case of a chemical accident involving a certain mass of specified chemical. 
The major concern was to quantify the hazard posed by the chemicals that were involved 
in the accidents data. This has been done by estimating the number of people that could be 
killed in case of an accident per unit mass of a certain chemical released or exploded. It 
was also intended to investigate if the number killed is associated with other factors. 
A trial has been made to seek and measure whether any correlation exists between the 
number of fatalities and the mass of chemicals involved in the accidents. The results 
indicated that there is a positive relationship between the number of fatalities and the 
amount of chemicals, the two variables increase together. However, the low value of the 
correlation suggests that there are other factors that maybe important in such relationship. 
The results also showed that factors such as the location and time of accident, and the 
country of operation affect the consequences of a chemical accident. 
A trial has been made to investigate whether certain chemicals or phases pose more 
hazards than others. Hydrocarbons, which were found to be dominant in the accident data, 
were classified by the number of their carbon atoms. The analysis was obstructed by the 
unavailability of the mass of chemicals for every accident. However, an equation to assess 
the hazard posed by ethylene has been obtained which stilI needs validation. 
As an alternative to estimating the number of fatalities per mass of chemicals, the mean 
and the median number of fatalities were calculated for the chemicals involved in the 
accidents. This method did not involve the mass of chemicals which allowed the use of all 
the fire and explosion data. The results revealed that hydrocarbons were the most frequent 
chemicals involved in the accidents. The results allowed ranking of the hydrocarbons by 
median number of fatalities as well as by type of accident. 
Another method of assessing hazards from chemical accidents is the mean mortality index 
approach in which the ratio fatalities to size of release are determined. Mortality Indices 
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were obtained for general chemicals and for hydrocarbons as well as for accidents by 
process operations. These indices allowed prediction of the potential number of fatalities 
from a chemical accident by knowing the quantity of the potential release. Comparing the 
actual to the predicted fatalities showed that there are sometimes large differences between 
the actual and the predicted number of fatalities. However, the fit between the actual and 
the predicted number were reasonably acceptable in the case of process and storage 
accidents, especially if the accidents which resulted in a very high number of fatalities due 
to extraordinary circumstances not taken into account. There was no agreement between 
the actual and the predicted fatalities in the case of transport. 
Despite this, it can be concluded that the mortality index could be an appropriate method to 
measure the inherent safety of a chemical plant. The weakness of the prediction accuracy is 
because the mortality index equations have not considered the variations in population 
density. This is due to the unavailability of this particular data in the conceptual design 
phase. If this data were available the mortality indices could then be corrected to take 
account of population density factor. This might improve the accuracy of the predicted 
equations. Use of the median number of fatalities instead of the mean did not change the 
accuracy of prediction. 
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Chapter 6: Data analysis for toxic release accidents 
6.1 Introduction 
The other major hazard after the fIre and explosion is a release of a toxic chemicaL A very 
large release of toxic chemical is usually regarded as having a disaster potential greater 
than that of fIre or explosiolL This is because toxic releases have possibly the greatest 
potential to kill a large number of people. However, according to Lees (1996), a large toxic 
release is a much less frequent occurrence than a large frre or explosiolL In this chapter 
toxic accidents are analysed in order to assess the hazards posed by toxic chemicals. Table 
2 in Appendix A is a list of the toxic accidents. 
6.2 Classification of toxic accidents over time 
As mentioned in chapter 5, section 5.5, there were 119 toxic release accidents with 
reported data between 1914 and 1999. Table 2 in Appendix A is a list of the toxic accidents 
. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of toxic accidents over time. 
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Figure 6.1: Distribution oftoxic accidents as a function of time. 
As can be seen from Figure 6.1, there were few releases during the fIrst half of the 
twentieth century. The number varied from 3 to 8 accidents per decade, until the 1960s, 
when a significant rise in the number of toxic release accidents was observed. This rise was 
maintained during the seventies before it fell in the nineties. 
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A number of chemicals were found to be responsible for these toxic releases in different 
frequencies. Figure 6.2 shows the number of accidents for each chemical. 
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As can be seen from Figure 6.3 chlorine is the dominant chemical, accounting for 44% of 
the toxic accidents, followed by ammonia with 23%. The number of accidents involving 
chlorine is about double the number of ammonia accidents that took place in the same 
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period. Hydrogen sulphide and Tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin (TCDD) accounted for 9% 
and 5% respectively. The other 19% were for the chemicals shown in Figure 6.2. 
Chlorine and ammonia were dominant in tenus of the number of fatalities caused as well. 
Chlorine was found to be responsible for the death of 195 people from the 52 accidents it 
caused. In 8 accidents there was no information available as to whether or not there were 
fatalities. Ammonia was been found to cause 109 fatalities. Figure 6.3 shows the number 
of fatalities caused by the toxic accidents. Fatalities caused by Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) 
were left out of the figure for scale purpose. 
6.3 Origin of toxic accidents 
Reviewing the toxic accidents data revealed that toxic releases varied in their origin. The 
data showed that accidents happened in process plants, storage, transport and during 
loading terminals. Of the 119 toxic releases reported, 11 % are of unknown origin. For the 
rest, the distribution according to origin is presented in Figure 6.4. It is obvious from the 
figure that most of the accidents took place during transportation of the chemicals (42%). 
The transport methods included rail tank cars (31 accidents), road tankers (3 accidents) and 
only one accident on a ship and it includes transporting by pipelines (15 accidents). 
Process accidents came second (24%) followed by storage accidents (16%). The last two 
categories are for accidents happening in chlorine cylinders (4%) and for accidents that 
happened in loading terminals (3%). 
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Figure 6.4: Origin oftoxic release accidents. 
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Figure 6.6: Anmlonia Accidents. 
Figures 6.S and 6.6 make a comparison between chlorine and all1ll1onia spills in terms of 
the size of the spill in tonnes and the number of people killed. It can be seen that in the 
case of chlorine, acc idents invo lving fixed storage tanks tended to cause more fatalities per 
tOlllJe released than did accidents invo lving rail tanks and pipelines. This might be 
attributed to the relatively small number of people exposed in transportation accidents, 
compared with production plant accidents. Amrnollia accidents caused a greater number of 
fatalities due to rail tank cars but these still caused less fatality than storage tanks. 
The sizes of chlorine containers are as foUows. Storage is typica lly in large pressw-e 
vessels or refrigerated atmospheric tanks containing 1000 or 2000 tons each. Barges 
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usually carry four pressure vessels each containing 275 tons, making 1100 tons total 
capacity. Rail tank cars are pressure vessels ranging in size from 16 to 90 tons, but only the 
latter size is now made. Road tankers are also pressure vessels and normally have a 
capacity of 16 tons. Cylinder sizes are usually I tons, 150 lb or smaller. 
6.4 Toxicity 
Toxicity is a measure of the ability of a material to harm the health of living organisms. 
Toxic materials can be classified into those that cause severe impact upon short term 
exposure, and others that generate noticeable effects or permanent damage only on long-
term exposure. 
Toxicity is typically measured in terms of the concentration of the material in mg/m3 or 
ppm (parts per million), and exposure time, which can be seconds, minutes or even years. 
Common measures of toxicity are the TLV (threshold limit value), LD (lethal dose) and 
ED (effective dose). TL V refers to concentrations that cannot cause harm in the lifetime or 
workers who are exposed to such materials during normal working hours of 40hlweek. 
Lethal dose refers to a dose of material that if inhaled, produces lethal effects or can cause 
death or permanent damage. The smaller the lethal dose, the higher the toxicity and the 
more inherently unsafe the material is. Effective dose is the dose of a material that if 
inhaled, creates minor and reversible effects such as eye irritation. 
Lethal dose is usually expressed as LDso, which is defined as that dose administrated orally 
or by skin absorption which will cause the death of 50% of the test group within a 14-day 
observation period, King (1990). It is generally expressed as mg or Ilg of substance per kg 
of body weight of the animal. Another unit, the lethal concentration LCso, is used for 
airborne materials which are inhaled. It is defined as the concentration of airborne material, 
the four-hour inhalation of which results in the death of 50% of the test group within a 14-
day observation period, King (1990). 
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6.5 Assessing the hazard oftoxic material 
An important part of choosing a process is establishing just how hazardous a particular 
material is. To do so it is important to know the effect of toxic material to people by one of 
the known measurements of toxicity, for example LDso. 
Marshall (1987) has suggested considering the number of lethal doses for quantifying toxic 
hazards. His idea is to categorise chemicals by how much is required to produce 107 or 108 
lethal doses, based on the LDso value of the chemical. Masses of hazardous chemicals can 
be converted to numbers of doses that would have a certain effect on a human by using the 
following formula: 
The number of possible human lethal doses is: 
Where, 
PLD = -_Q,,---
MH ·LD,. 
PLD = number of possible lethal doses 
Q = mass oftoxic chemical (mg) 
LDso = Lethal dose (mg of chemical /kg of body weight) 
MH = average mass of person = 70 kg 
6. I 
For example, the number of lethal doses from I tonne offormaldehyde, LDso = 800 mg/kg 
PLD = 1000,000,000 17857.1 
(70 x 800) 6.2 
Realistically, it would be extremely difficult to kill this many people from a release of 
formaldehyde. For example 300 tonnes of ammonia (LDso = 350 mg/kg) only killed 12 
people in Montana, Mexico, Marshal! (1987), whereas the number of possible lethal doses 
is 12.2 x 106• The value is not representative of the hazard as the method overestimates 
greatly the number of potential deaths from a release. Therefore the method is rejected and 
another possible method is suggested. 
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Marshall (1987) introduced the concept of the mortality index (MI) as a means of 
determining the potential number of fatalities in the chemical process industry. TIris index 
was the mean number of fatalities per tonne resulting from the realisation of the potential 
of given hazards. 
Marshall examined historical records from the first and Second World War, covering 
bombings and the use of early chemical weapons. From that data he developed empirical 
relationships for explosives and for vapour cloud explosions and fIreballs. For toxics, his 
research concluded that the mortality index was invariant with mass released. Therefore, he 
gives the MI directly for some chemicals, namely chlorine, annnonia and methyl 
isocyanate (MIC) in fatalities per tonne, Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: MI and LDso for some chemicals. 
Chemical LDs. (mglkg) Mortality Index (deaths/tonne) 
Chlorine 3.5 0.5 
Ammonia 21 0.052 
Mustard gas (MG)* 10.5 0.1 
Phosgene 0.3 1 
HCL 10.25 0.61 
*Mustard gas [bis (2-cWoroethyl sulphide)J 
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Figure 6.7: Toxicity verses mortality index. 
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An attempt has been made to assess the hazard posed by toxic releases by relating the 
mortality index (MI) of the chemicals that Marshall has calculated, with the LDso values. 
The average mortality index for phosgene and hydrochloric acid has been calculated from 
the data 0 btained. Unfortunately no data were available for more chemicals to calculate the 
mortality index. Table 6.1 shows the MI and the LDso for each chemical. 
In Figure 6.7 Methyl isocyanate has been left out as the mortality index is calculated from 
only one incident, where there was a very high population density near to the plant. It is 
possible to derive the following relationship: 
MI = -0.2In(LDso) + 0.77 6.3 
Equation 6.3 can be used to estimate the MI for a chemical knowing its LDso value. Where 
LDso is expressed as mass of toxic agent per kg of body weight (for an average human 
adult, the body weight is about 70 kg). 
When the lethal concentration (LCso) is available, instead of the LDso, the following 
formula can be used to obtain the LDso, Marshall (1987). 
Toxic concentrat ion (m%) ) x time (min ) 
Dose (mg {g) = ___ ~~~ __ /k~ 1O.(kg.mi%,) 6.4 
Where the lethal concentration is given in parts per million, this may be converted to (mg 
1m3) by multiplying by (mol. wt. of toxic x 0.0423) 
6.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to assess the hazards posed by toxic materials. A number of 
chemicals were found to be involved in the toxic accidents in different frequencies. 
However, ammonia and chlorine were found to be dominant in terms of both the frequency 
of occurrence and the number of fatalities caused. Data also showed that most of the toxic 
accidents took place during transporting chemicals followed by process accidents. 
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The mortality index approach was also used to assess the hazards posed by toxic 
chemicals. The mortality index values for few chemicals, the chemicals that Marshall has 
calculated, were used in conjunction with the toxicity expressed by LDso to derive a 
relationship that can be used to predict the potential fatalities caused by a toxic chemical. 
LDso was used as it is a property that can be obtained in early design stages. 
Although of the significance of the obtained relationship approved by the regression factor 
of (R2 = 0.76), it should be pointed out that it is based on few chemicals in which data for 
MI were available. It will be inappropriate to base a model on few accidents. In addition, 
this relationship is still primary and needs validation. If more MI data is available, it might 
be possible to establish a more reliable relationship in which the potential number of 
fatalities for toxic chemicals can be estimated by knowing their LDso. 
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
In order to avoid hazards the studies of process alternatives have to be carried out early in 
a design, for example at the conceptual stage when it is decided which product to make 
and by which operations. The aim of this research was to develop a method for assessing 
the inherent safety of a chemical plant which could be used in the early stages of plant 
design when the materials in process are known and their amount can be roughly 
estimated. This method is intended to predict the number of people that might be killed in 
case of a chemical accident involving a certain mass of specified chemical. 
Historical accident data for 631 Fire, explosion and toxic release accidents has been 
collected from all over the world from 1911 to 2000. A number of statistical tests were 
conducted on this data in order to investigate the possibility of developing relationships 
predicting the number of fatalities caused by a chemical accident. 
In order to determine the type of tests to be applied, the distribution of the mass of 
chemicals and the number of fatalities were examined. The results revealed that both 
variables in question are not normally distributed which suggests that parametric tests or 
tests that are used when the data is normally distributed are not applicable and so non 
parametric tests or tests that do not make assumptions about population distribution 
should be used. The following is a review of the different tests that were applied. 
7.2 Statistical analysis 
7.2.1 Spearman's rank correlation 
The Spearman' s rank correlation was calculated to examine whether any relationship 
exists between the number of fatalities and the mass of chemicals. Correlations were also 
sought between the number of fatalities and the mass of chemicals for the three different 
types of accidents: process, storage and transport. 
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The results showed that for all fire and explosion accidents, there is a positive significant 
correlation which suggests that the number of fatalities increases as the mass of chemicals 
increase but the low value of the correlation (rs = 0.3) suggests that there are other 
important factors that may affect the consequence of a chemical accident. 
Calculating the same correlation for the different type of accidents showed that the 
number of fatalities increases as the mass increase for the process accidents. However, as 
for all the fire and explosion accidents the low value of the correlation (rs = 0.3) indicates 
that the relationship is not strong. It can be noticed that the correlation coefficient for all 
the accidents and for the process accidents are similar. Applying the same test to storage 
accidents resulted in positive but non significant correlation (rs = 0.343). There was no 
correlation in the case of transport (rs = 0.037). 
The Spearman' s rank correlation was applied to the fire and explosion accidents classified 
by location and time in order to investigate if the relationship between the number of 
fatalities and the mass of chemicals varies according to place and date. The accidents 
were classified as (US) which are accidents that happened in the United States of America 
and (EU) for the accidents that took place in Europe. The rest were the few accidents that 
happened in the Gulf countries, in some Far East countries and in some less developed 
countries. These were classified as (others). The results showed that there was no 
correlation for the US. The results also showed that in the case of both the EU and the less 
developed countries there were positive correlations and they were similar to the 
correlation that obtained from applying all the fire and explosion accidents (rs = 0.3). 
However, even though the correlations are similar they were not significant in the cases of 
EU and less developed countries, this might be due to the small sample sizes. 
The same tests as applied to the accidents by location were applied to the accidents 
classified by time. Accidents were divided into three periods as follows: from 1921 to 
1950, which represents very old accidents when safety was less of a concern compared to 
nowadays; from 1951 to 1980, representing the appearance of hydrocarbons which 
resulted in great changes in the chemical, oil and petrochemical industries; and from 1981 
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to 2000 which represent recent accidents and showed decline in the number of fire and 
explosion accidents. 
The results from the tests showed that correlating the mass of chemicals and the number 
of fatalities for the three mentioned periods of time did not result in significant 
correlations. Despite the high correlation coefficient in the period of 1911 to 1950 of(rs = 
0.72), the value of p = 0.17 suggests that no reliable relationship can be obtained from the 
two correlated variables. The scatter plots for the three periods of time showed that no 
clear relationships exist between the mass and the number of people killed. 
7.2.2 Kruskal- Wallis and Mann - Whitney tests 
In a trial to examine whether there are differences between the median number of 
fatalities in the three types of accidents: process, storage and transport, the Kruskal -
Wallis test was made. The result from this test indicates that there is no statistical 
evidence for significant differences between the three types of accidents (p = 0.131). It 
should be pointed out that in this test only a portion of the data was involved, the 
accidents in which the mass of chemicals was available. 
The same test was carried out to determine whether the median number of fatalities varies 
with the amounts of chemicals involved in the accidents. The results showed that there is 
statistical evidence that mass of chemicals does have an impact on the number of 
fatalities. 
The Kruskal - Wallis test was applied to the accidents by location in order to determine 
whether place has an impact on the number of fatalities caused by a chemical accident. 
The result of this test showed that the location of accident is an important factor that 
affects the accident consequences. 
The Mann - Whitney U test was conducted to assess whether there are differences in the 
median number of fatalities by type of chemicals. In this test chemicals were classified by 
risk phrases (R). Chemicals were divided into two groups. The first group consists of 
extremely flammable liquefied gas which is R13, and the second group contains 
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combination of chemicals that are RIO, Rll and Rl2 which represent flammable, highly 
flammable and extremely flammable chemicals respectively. 
The results showed that there was no statistical evidence for any differences between the 
median number of fatalities in the two chemical groups. The box plots were also used to 
graphically represent the differences between the three types of accidents, the amount of 
chemicals and the chemical types. 
7.3 Estimating the number of people killed by type of chemicals 
In this section accidents were classified by chemical type in order to investigate whether 
specific chemicals pose more hazards to people than others and subsequently to estimate 
the number of fatalities per mass of those chemicals. The idea was to classify chemicals 
by phase. This analysis has been obstructed by the unavailability of the mass of chemicals 
for every accident, which prevented a large number of accidents from being used. 
However, quantities of chemicals involved were available for some groups of 
hydrocarbons namely: ethylene, LPG, propane/propylene, butane, and cyclohexane. It 
should be pointed out that in the previous analysis only part of the data was used, the 
accidents in which the mass of chemicals was known. A relationship between the number 
of fatalities and the ethylene mass was obtained which still needs more investigation to 
the circumstances of the accidents which resulted no fatalities to ensure its validity. No 
relationships were obtained from the other hydrocarbons. 
7.4 Mean and median number of fatalities ranking index 
As an alternative to estimating the number of fatalities per mass of chemicals, the mean 
and the median number of fatalities were calculated for the chemicals involved in the 
accidents. Unlike the previous analysis, this method did not involve the mass of chemicals 
which allowed the use of all the fire and explosion data. The results revealed that 
hydrocarbons were the most frequent chemicals involved in the accidents. The results 
allowed ranking the hydrocarbons by median number of fatalities as well as by type of 
accident. Hydrogen was the most hazardous chemical with a median number of fatalities 
of 4. Hydrogen was also found to have the highest energy ratio as shown in Table 5.30. 
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On the other hand, hydrocarbons were less hazardous than hydrogen as they gave a 
smaller median number of fatalities, ranging from I to 3. This also corresponded with the 
hydrocarbon energy ratio values that ranged from 9 to 11. In terms of type of accidents, 
transport accidents were found to be the most hazardous operations since they have the 
highest median nwnber of fatalities. Even though, there was a big difference in the 
number of accidents between the process, storage and utilities operations, they all yielded 
the same level of hazard giving 2 as a median number of fatalities. 
7.5 The mortality index (MI) 
The Mortality Index represents another methodology for estimating the possible nwnber 
of fatalities due to fire and explosion accidents. The MI is expressed in terms of mean 
fatalities per tonne for any given size of fire or explosion accident. In this method, 101 out 
of 512 fire and explosion accidents were analysed. A number of relationships between the 
MI and the mass of chemicals were obtained for all the fire and explosions and for the 
three types of accidents: process, storage and transport. 
Comparing the predicted fatalities from applying the MI approach to the actual fatalities 
showed that there are sometimes large differences between the actual and the predicted 
fatalities. This could be due to not considering the variation of population density. 
However, the fit between the actual and the predicted fatalities for process and storage 
were reasonably acceptable while it was very poor in the case of transport. 
7.5.1 Toxic accidents 
119 toxic release accidents were reported among the historic data. A nwnber of chemicals 
were found to be involved in the toxic accidents in different frequencies. However, 
ammonia and chlorine were found to be dominant in terms of both the frequency of 
occurrence and the number of fatalities caused. The mortality index was also used to 
assess the hazards posed by toxic chemicals. The mortality index values for few 
chemicals, the chemicals that Marshal! has calculated, were used in conjunction with the 
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toxicity expressed by LDso to derive a relationship that can be used to predict the potential 
fatalities caused by a toxic chemical. LDso was used as it is a property that can be 
obtained in early design stages. 
Although of the significance of the obtained relationship approved by the regression 
factor of (R2 ~ 0.76), it should be pointed out that it is based on few chemicals in which 
data for MI were available. It will be inappropriate to base a model on few accidents. In 
addition, this relationship is still primary and needs validation. If more MI data is 
available, it might be possible to establish a more reliable relationship in which the 
potential number of fatalities for toxic chemicals can be estimated by knowing their LDso. 
7.6 Dust explosion index 
The dust explosion phenomenon was studied in depth in chapter 4. The outcome of this 
research had suggested an "Index ofExplosibility" (lE) which consists of two parameters, 
the dust Ignition Sensitivity (IS) or the dust ease of ignition and Explosion Severity (ES) 
of dusts. This index could be used to assess and possibly predict the dust explosion hazard 
as it based on properties of dusts which can be available in conceptual design stage. The 
index of explosibility needs more investigation and scores have to be assigned instead of 
rating in order to be added to Edwards and Lawrence (1993) index. 
7.7 Conclusion 
A number of statistical tests were made in different ways on historical accident data in 
order to derive a method that can be used to estimate the potential number of fatalities 
from a chemical accident. In conclusion the above analysis showed that the amount of 
materials does have an impact on the number of fatalities. The reason for the weak 
relationship between the number of fatalities and the amount of materials might be the 
non consistency of the data. For example, in many data cases the amount of material was 
not known. In addition, the number of people killed in lots of cases does not seem to bear 
any relation to the amount of material. 
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In other words, taking into consideration only the amount of material involved in the 
accidents might not be sufficient. Other factors such as the location of the accident (for 
example, in a densely populated city or in the middle of a desert) are important. Actually 
population density in the area surrounding the source of explosion is usually not uniform. 
So, two accidents with identical characteristics can cause different number of fatalities. 
The key point is the number of people present in the affected area just at the time of the 
accident. However, this is an unpredictable factor. 
Another important factor is the country of operation. In fact, conducting the Kruskal-
Wallis test on the accidents classified by countries showed that there are differences in the 
median number of fatalities between developed and less developed countries. More 
rigorous classification, by grouping countries that use the same regulations and same 
design standards, could produce more accurate results. 
The time of the accident is also a factor because the consequences of an accident might be 
different if it happened during day or night, or if it happened during a weekday or at a 
weekend. If these information were available it would be possible to compare accidents 
which took place in similar circumstances (the same quantity, the same time, the same 
location, the same population density, etc .. ). These factors might generate basis for further 
analysis in which stronger relationships could be obtained. 
Despite the differences between the theoretical and the historical data for the equations 
that have been obtained from applying the mortality index approach, it is believed that the 
mortality index could be an appropriate method to measure the inherent safety of a 
chemical plant. It assesses the hazards posed by the chemicals by quantifying their impact 
on people represented by the potential fatalities. It might be concluded that there are many 
reasons behind the weakness of the relationships. The first is that small incidents tend to 
be under-reported unless they involve fatalities which lead to high values for the mortality 
index for small incidents. The other reason is that the equations do not take account of the 
variation in population density. 
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It should be highlighted that the mortality index approach was used as an available 
method for quantifying hazards. The intention was to apply this method to the historic 
accident data to test its capability of measuring the inherent safety of chemical plants at 
the conceptual design stage. There was no intention to update or improve Marshall's 
work. However, if a new data set for chemical accidents were available the obtained 
relationships and Marshall's relationships could be compared. 
It should also pointed out that there are some statistical analyses which can be used to 
predict the number of fatalities from historic data such as probit equations which are a 
familiar method in quantitative risk analysis. The use of probit equations was considered, 
but it was not possible because of the lack of getting information about the people who 
were exposed to risk at the time of the accidents. The other method that could be used for 
prediction is the logistic regression. The output from this method is dichotomous such as 
yes/no, pass/fail, and lived/died type, hence it cannot predict how many people will be 
killed in case of an accident. However, it allows prediction of whether there will be any 
fatalities or not. 
7.S Recommendations for future work 
During data collection extensive efforts are required in order to integrate information from 
different data sources. A common problem of using various sources is duplication of 
accidents. This caused some accidents to appear to be different when in fact they were the 
same. The main reason for duplication is that the way of reporting accidents usually 
depends on the knowledge and the information available to the person reporting the event. 
For example, the name of the chemical involved in the accident can be reported by 
chemical name or trade name, or the chemical may have different names in different 
countries. In addition, spelling errors of addresses and chemical names and even the way 
of reporting the exact location and address can cause an accident to be repeated more than 
one time. An appropriate solution to this problem would be to establish a universal 
database for industrial accidents which unites the individual sources of information in one 
source and facilitates the researcher's task. It would also provide researchers with 
comprehensive accident data. 
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Another problem in estimating chemical hazards is the lack of an important piece of data, 
the quantity of the chemical involved in the accidents. It was the lack of this particular 
data that caused a lot of data to be unusable. Obtaining the quantity of chemicals would 
make it possible to estimate the potential number of fatalities per unit mass for all the 
chemicals which were involved in industrial accidents. It would be also possible to 
analyse accidents by phase and by process conditions. In this case it would be possible to 
obtain relationships between the number of people killed by certain phase. These 
relationships can then be used to estimate the potential number of fatalities for certain 
phases, for example gas, vapour, liquefied gas, liquefied vapour, and to find out whether 
the accident happened in process or in storage operations. 
There are different types of data which represent the severity of an accident, such as 
number of fatalities and number of injuries. In this study the potential of chemical hazards 
was quantified as potential fatalities since it represents the extreme end of the spectrum of 
chemical hazards. However, the number of injuries can provide valuable information as 
an indicator of the potential hazards caused by a chemical accident. In fact, the number of 
injuries can represent a very important indicator of the severity of the accident. For 
example, the release accident which happened in Seveso, Italy, on 10th July 1976, was 
characterised by hundreds of cases of injury, but without fatalities. However, the Seveso 
accident led to the Seveso Directive, which has been the mainspring of much European 
legislation in the field of process safety. 
It would be important to investigate other possible methods as a measure of potential 
chemical hazard in addition to the number of fatalities. Near-miss data are less likely to be 
a valuable measure for chemical hazards as they are not taken seriously due to no damage 
or hurt being incurred on the worker or in the process operations. However, near-misses 
provide valuable information on how to prevent incidents and the ability to predict 
possible consequences. 
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Appendix A Table I 
Table 1: All Fire and Explosion Accidents (1911 - 2000). 
Amount 
Date Chemical Type Released Fatalities Injuries Location Equipment 
(Tonne) 
19J1 Dust explosion 5 8 Glasgow, UK 
19J1 Dust explosion 37 lOO Liverpool, UK 
19J1 Dust explosion 3 5 Manchester, UK 
1912 Steam Internal explosion 26 32 San Antonio, TX Loco boiler 
1913 Dust explosion 3 5 Manchester, UK 
1915 Petrol Fire 40 Ardmore,OK Rail tank car 
1919 Corn starch Dust explosion 42 Cedar Rapids, lA Starch plant 
1921 Hydrogen Explosion 6.9 Hull, UK Airship 
1924 Corn starch Dust explosion 42 Peking,IL Starch plant 
1930 Dust explosion Jl 32 Liverpool, UK 
1932 LPG 0 Detroit, MI Storage 
1933 Town gas Explosion 65 100+ Neunkirchen, Germany Gas holder 
1934 Town gas Fire 42 46 Hongkong Gas holder 
1939 Butane Vapour cloud exp1osion 0 Newark, NI 
1939 Crude oil Internal explosion 0 Wichita Falls, TX Pipeline 
1941 Dust explosion 6 40 Liverpool, UK 
1943 Butane Vapour cloud fire 16.5 5 >25 Los Angeles, CaJif 
1943 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 57 37 Ludwigshafen, Germany Rail tank car 
1944 LNG Fire & explosion 3000 128 300 Cleveland, OH Storage tank 
1944 LPG Fire \0 45 Denison, Tex. Tank 
1944 Corn mill Dust explosion 4 20 Kansas City, KS Grain dust 
1945 Butane Vapour cloud explosion 0 Los Angeles, CA Storage 
1947 Acetic anhydride, etc. Explosion 17 130 Los Angeles, CA Electrolysis plant 
1948 Dimethyl ether Vapour cloud explosion 33 245 2500 Ludwigshafen, Germany Rail tank car 
1948 Butane Fire 2 Sacramenta, CA Road tanker 
1949 HCs Fire 4 26 Perth, N. ] Storage tank 
1949 Propane, butane Vapour cloud explosion 1.6 5 Detroit,IL Catal ytic cracker (refinery) 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
potential fatalities due to chemical hazards. 
Appendix A Table I 
1949 LPG Fire I Winthrop, MO Rail tank car 
1950 Styrene, latex, butadiene Explosion 0 0 Midland, MI Reactor 
1950 Propane Vapour cloud fire 2 Wray,CO Road tanker 
1950 Propane, butane Vapour cloud explosion 0 0 Georgia, USA Storage tank 
1951 Oil Fire & explosion 2 Avonmouth, Bristol, UK Storage tank 
1951 C5 HCs Vapour cloud explosion 2 Baton Rough, LA Naphtha treating 
1951 Propane VCF,BLEVE 0 14 Pert Newark, NJ Storage 
1951 LPG VEEB 14 SI. Paul, MN Storage tank 
1951 Butadiene Explosion 0 0 Ontario, Canada butadiene separation 
equipment 
1952 Resin dust Dust explosion 5 21 Bound Brook, NJ Phenolic resin plant 
1952 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 2 Kansas City, KS Terminal LPG filling 
station 
1953 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 2 Campana, Argentina Refinery recovery unit 
1953 Organic peroxides Explosion 11 27 Tonawanda, NY Organic peroxides plant 
1954 Kerosene Fire 32 16 Bitburg, Germany 
1954 LPG Fire 4 0 California, USA Storage tank 
1954 Acrolein Internal explosion 19 0 Institute, WV Rail tank car, polymerization 
1955 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion I 0 Freeport, TX Polyethylene plant 
1955 BLEVE ? 2 Ludwigshafen, FRG Rail tank car 
1955 Grain dust Dust explosion 3 13 Waynesboro, GA Feed plant 
1955 Naphtha Explosion 2 30 Whiting. IN Hydroformer 
1955 Butane Vapour cloud explosion 0 Wilmington, CA (sic) Gasoline plant 
1956 Oil Fire ball 20 > 32 Amarillo, TX Storage tank 
1956 Butylene Vapour cloud explosion 10 0 Baton Rouge, LA Alkylation unit 
1956 LPG BLEVE 12 12 Cottage Grove, OR Storage 
1956 HCs BLEVE 19 32 Dumas, TX Storage vessel 
1956 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 2.5 0 North Tonawanda, NY Polyethylene plant 
1956 Steam Internal explosion 2 9 Uskmouth, Wales Turbogenerator 
1957 Butane BLEVE 0 Montreal, Quebec Storage vessel 
1957 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 1 Sacramento, CA Loading terminal 
1958 Butane Fire I 4 Alma Michigan, USA Storage tank 
1958 Nitromethane Explosion ? 200 Niagara Falls, N.Y. Rail tank car 
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1958 Oil froth Fire, BLEVE 2 34 Signal Hill, CA Tank farm 
1958 LPG Vapour cloud explosion I 16 Augusta, GA Loading terminal 
1958 LPG Vapour cloud explosion Ardmore, OK Loading terminal 
1958 Explosion ? Celle, FRG Rail tank car 
1959 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 18 23 78 Meldrin, GA Rail tank car 
1959 LPG BLEVE 0 2 McKittrick, CA Storage 
1959 LPG BLEVE 11 10 Deer Lake, P A Rail tank car 
1959 Gasoline Fire 5 Kansas City, MO 
1959 Lubricating and seal oil Explosion 6 6 Phillipsburge, N.J. compressor 
1959 Ammonia Explosion 11 40 Ube, Japan Reactor 
1960 Allyl dichloride, Explosion 6 14 Freeport, Tex. propylene chloride 
1960 benzene,mononitrobenzene,nitric acid, water Detonation 6.6 15 60 Kingsport, TN Nitrobenzene plant, process 
1961 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 18 I 5 Freeport, TX Cyclohexane plant, 
valve failure 
1961 Oxygen Explosion 15 FRG Air separation plant 
1961 Butane Vapour cloud explosion 2 Lake Charies, LA Alkylation unit 
1961 Vinyl chloride maDamer VEEB 4 10 Minimata, Japan Reactor 
1961 Acrylonitrile Fire 6 5 Galveston, USA marine tanker / collision 
1962 Ethylene oxide Internal explosion, VCE 16 1 19 Bradenburg, Kentucky Reactor 
1962 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 14.3 10 75 Berlin, NY Road tanker 
1962 Propane Fire 1.1 1 115 Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia Storage vessel 
1962 Acrylic polymer reaction Explosion to 46 Toledo, OH Reactor 
1962 HCs Vapour cloud explosion 0 0 Fawley, UK Catalytic cracker 
1962 P-Nitrodiphenlamine Internal explosion 2 18 FRG Reactor 
1962 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 2 2 Houston, TX Tank farm 
1962 Benzene Explosion I 3 Marietta, OH benzene stripper column 
1962 Grain dust Dust explosion 2 34 StLouis, MO Feed plant 
1962 Organic peroxides Explosion 20 4 4 Norwich, CT Transport tank 
1963 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.9 0 7 Plaquemine, L.A Ethylene plant 
1963 Reaction mixture, including TCDD Internal explosion 8 14 Amsterdam, Netherlands Trichlorochenol plant 
1963 Propylene Internal explosion ? 0 Texas, U.S.A. Ethylene plant 
1963 Acetylene, diacetylene Internal explosion 7 6 RRG Acetylene plant 
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1963 Cumene hydroperoxide Fire & explosion 4 9 Storage, decomposition 
1964 Ethylene oxide Internal explosion 4 20 Antwerp, Belgium Reactor 
1964 Vinyl chloride monomer VEEB 68 7 40 Attleboro, MA Reactor 
1964 Oxygen Internal explosion ? FRG Oxygen plant 
1964 Acrylamide reaction mixture Internal explosion 1 3 FRG Reactor 
1964 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 0 Liberal, KS Compressor station 
1964 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.2 2 Orange, TX HP Polyethylene line 
1964 Dust explosion 5 2 Paisley, UK 
1964 PVC Internal Explosion 7 27 Hebronville, MA Polyvinyl chloride plant 
1964 Ethylene Explosion 2 34 Texas, U.S.A. 
1965 Monovinyl acetylene Internal explosion 12 60 Louisville. KY Compressor 
1965 Natural gas Internal explosion 17 56 Natchitoches, LA Pipeline 
1965 Benzene Vapour cloud explosion ? Baltimore, MD Detergents plant 
1965 Ethyl chloride Vapour cloud explosion 19.3 0 ? Baton Rouge, LA Reactor 
1965 Flour Dust explosion 5 32 Bow, London, UK Flour mill 
1965 Hydrogen, carbon monoxide Vapour cloud explosion 0.07 ? Escambia, USA Chemical plant 
1965 Ethyl chloride Explosion 12 Houston, TX Ethyl chloride plant 
1965 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0 Lake Charles, LA Ethylene plant 
1965 Hydrogen, ammonia Fire 2 3 Pas.dena, TX Ammonia plant 
1965 Butane Fire ? Texas Chemical plant 
1965 Naphtha Explosion 0 0 Whiting, IN Reactor, separator 
1965 Ammonia Explosion 2 3 Pasadena, TX Reactor 
1966 Propane BLEVE 200 18 6 Feyzin, France Storage vessel 
1966 NGL Fire 7 20 Larose, LA Pipeline 
1966 Polystyrene Explosion 32 11 10 LaSalle, Quebec reactor 
1966 Cumene, benzene & propane Vapour cloud fire ? Philadelphia, PA Refinery 
1966 Methane Vapour cloud explosion 0.5 3 83 Raunheim, FRG Ethylene unit 
1966 Light Hes Fire & Explosion ? 0 FRG Storage vessel 
1966 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 0.45 3 Scotts Bluff, LA Reactor 
1966 Ethylene Explosion 0.3 3 83 Germany Compressor, pipework 
1967 Vinyl chloride monomer Fire 4 33 Antwerp, Belgium 
1967 Propane Fire ? 100 Buenos Aires, Argentina 
1967 Explosion 2 16 Hawthorne, N. J. 
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1967 Isobutylene Vapour cloud explosion 46 7 13 Lake Charles, LA Pipeline 
1967 Town gas Internal explosion ? 300 Santos, Brazil Gas holder 
1967 Fuel oil Fire ? El Segundo, CA Fuel oil reservoir 
1967 Cyclohexane Fire & explosion 4 0 Pipeline, storage tank 
1968 Vinyl chloride monomer Explosion 24 East Germany 
1968 Acetic acid Internal explosion 2 13 Hull, UK 
1968 Internal explosion ? Paris, France Petrochemicals plant 
1968 Light HCs «CIO) Vapour cloud explosion 140 2 85 Pernis, Netherlands Slop-oil tank, refinery 
1968 Propane Explosion 2 Tamytown, U.S.A. Chemical plant 
1968 LPG Fire 5 Yutan, NE Pipeline 
1969 Dinitrochloraniline Explosion 
reaction mixture 3 31 Basle, Switzerland Reactor 
1969 Explosion 6 Dudgeons Wharf, Tank dismantling LondonUK 
1969 Vinyl chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion 0 1 Glendora, MS Rail tank car 
1969 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 4 3 Escombreras, Spain Storage 
1969 Hydrogen, naphtha Vapour cloud explosion 23 0 Fawley, UK H ydroformer 
1969 Vinyl chloride monomer Explosion 0 0 Flemington, NJ Reactor 
1969 Natural gas Vapour cloud explosion 0 9 Houston, TX Pipeline 
1969 LPG BLEVE 63 2 33 Laurel. Mississipi Rail tank car 
1969 Petroleum Internal explosion 83 Long Beach, CA Tank 
1969 Naphtha 0 Rawley, England 
1969 Light Hes Fire 5 23 Puerto la Cruz, Venezuela Crude unit 
1969 LPG, propylene Fire 0 Repesa, Spain Refinery 
1969 Carbone dioxide Explosion 9 23 Repce1ak, Hungary 
1969 Butadiene Internal explosion, VCE 3 13 Texas City, TX. Butadiene recovery unit 
1969 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 3.6 Z 23 Wilton, UK Oxidation plant 
1969 Ethylene Internal explosion 4 Wilton, UK Polyethylene plant 
1970 Gas Explosion 29 10 Agha Jari, Iran Compressor station 
1970 Oil Fire ? Beaumont, TX 
1970 Olefins Vapour cloud explosion 0 Big Springs. TX Alkylation unit 
1970 Oxygen Fire 2 30 Brooklyn, NY Road tanker 
1970 Propane BLEVE 75 ? 66 Crescent City, IL Rail tank car 
1970 LPG Fire 6 Hudson, OH Road tanker 
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1970 Propane Fire 4 2 Hull, UK 
1970 Grain dust Dust explosion 6 18 Kiel, FRG Grain silo 
1970 C10HC Vapour cloud explosion 114 0 40 Linden, N.1. Refinery reactor 
1970 LPG Internal explosion 0 Mitcham, UK 
1970 Explosion 7 42 Philadelphia, PA Catalytic cracker 
1970 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 29 0 10 Port Hudson, MO USA Pipeline 
1970 Natural gas Internal explosion 0 25 SI. homas Island, Virgin Islands 
1971 Butadiene Explosion 8 21 Amsterdam, Netherlands Refinery 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 3.6 0 21 Baton Rouge, LA Rail tank car 
1971 Formic acid, hydrogen peroxide Fire & explosion many Emmerich, FRG Oxidation plant 
1971 Vinyl Chloride monomer BLEVE 165 1 50 Houston, TX Rail tank car 
1971 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 12 6 Houston, TX Butadiene plant 
1971 Trichlorethylene, perchlorethylene Vapour cloud fire 4 3 Lake Charles, LA Chemical plant 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.45 4 60 Longview, TX Polyethylene plant 
1971 Ethylene oxide, oxygen Internal explosion ? 4 Morris,IL Ethylene oxide plant 
1971 Petroleum Fire & explosion 7 Raunheim, FRG Tankship 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 1 3 6 Texas, USA reactor 
1972 Butane Vapour cloud fire I 4 Billings, MT Alkylation unit 
1972 Propylene Vapour cloud explosion 53.5 I 230 East SI. Louis, IL Rail tank car 
1972 Crude oil Fire 1 2 Hearne, TX Pipeline 
1972 Propane Fire ball 9 2 5 Lynchburge, V A Road tanker 
1972 Hydrogen Internal explosion 4 40 Netherlands 
1972 Propane Fire 2 28 NJ Turnpike, NJ. Road tanker 
1972 Butane Explosion 37 53+ Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Storage vessel 
1972 Fire 2 21 Tewksbury, MA Storage tank 
1972 Crude oil Fire 0 Trieste, Italy Terminal 
1972 Coke Explosion 10 10 Weirton, WV Coke plant 
1973 LNG Fire 70 8 21 Austin, Tx. Pipeline 
1973 Vinyl Chloride monomer Explosion 4 2 Cologne, FRG. Polyvinyl chloride plant 
1973 Ethylene oxide Vapour cloud fire ? 29 Freeport, TX Tank 
1973 Cumene Fire (decomposition) 0 0 Gladbeck, FRG Pipe to cumene reactor 
1973 Hexane, propylene Explosion 4 4 Goi, Japan reactor 
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1973 Propane BLEVE 45 13 95 Kingman, A2 RaiJ tank car 
1973 Methanol Vapour cloud fire 7 Lodi, NJ Reactor 
1973 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion 4.2 1 16 Noatsu, Japan Vinyl chloride plant 
1973 Town gas Explosion 4 24 Sheffield, UK Gas works 
1973 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 19 9 37 St-Amand-les-Eaux, Road tanker France 
1973 Hydrogen, HCs Fire O? St Croix, Virgin Islands Hydrodesulphurizer 
1973 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion I 23 Shinetsu, Japan Chemical plant 
1973 LNG Fire 40 3 Staten Island, NY Storage tank 
1973 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 4 Tokuyama, Japan Ethylene plant reactor 
1973 Propylene Fire & explosion 4 Chiba Area, J apa Polypropylene plant 
1973 Distillate Explosion 0.61 3 29 Sheffield, UK Tank 
1973 Natural gas Explosion 3 2 West Virginia, USA Pipeline 
1973 Natural gas Fire 3 1 Maryland, USA Pipeline 
1973 Natural gas Explosion 6 2 Texas, USA pump station pipeline 
1974 Cumene/cumene Fire hydroperoxide 0 0 UK reactor 
1974 Butane Fire ball 2 0 Aberdeen, U. K. Road tanker 
1974 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud fire 0 Barcelona, Spain Chemical plant 
1974 Gas Fire 0 Bealeton, V A Pipeline 
1974 Isoprene(>C5 HC) Vapour cloud explosion 7.6 2 10 Beaumon!, TX Isoprene plant 
1974 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vaponr cloud explosion 110 7 Climax, TX Rail tank car 
1974 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vaponr cloud explosion 0 3 Cologne, FRG. Vinyl chloride plant, 
separator 
1974 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 69 7 152 Deeatur,IL Rail tank car 
1974 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 1.8 0 Fawley, UK Polyethylene plant 
1974 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 25 28 104 Flixborough, UK Caprolactam plant (nylon) 
1974 Propane Fire 0 Griffith, IN Cavern storage 
1974 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 0 Holly Hill, FL Road tanker 
1974 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 75 235 Houston, TX Rail tank car 
1974 Organic peroxides Explosion 0 Los Angeles, CA Loading terminal 
1974 Natural gas Fire 5 0 Mississipi, USA Pipeline 
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1974 Natural gas Fire 3 0 Farmington, Pipeline, in the desert New Mexico 
1974 Natural gas Fire & explosion 0 Munroe,LA Pipeline 
1974 LPG BLEVE 0 0 USA Rail tank car 
1974 Butane Vapour cloud explosion 2190 0 24 Petal, Mississippi USA storage 
1974 Propylene Vapour cloud fire ? 0 Plaquemine, LA Cracking plant 
1974 HCs Fire ? Rotterdam, Netherlands Petrochemicals plant 
1974 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 100 Pitesti, Roumania Ethylene plant 
1974 Pentanes Vapour cloud explosion 2 Texas Chemical plant 
1974 Monomethylamine Explosion 2 66 Wenatchee, W A Rail tank car nitrate 
1974 LPG BLEVE 10 4 6 West St Paul, MN Storage vessel 
1974 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 14 79 Zaluzi, Czechslovakia Ethylene plant 
1975 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 2.5 6 13 Antwerp, Belgium Polyethylene plant 
1975 Oil Fire ? Avon, CA Refinery 
1975 Propylene Vapour cloud explosion 5.5 14 107 Beek, Netherlands Naphtha cracker column 
1975 Hydrogen, naphtha Vapour cloud explosion 0 Cologne, FRG. Cyclic hydro former 
1975 Ethylene Vapour cloud fire 1 4 Deer Park, TX Polyethylene plant 
1975 LPG BLEVE 0 3 Des Moines, lA Rail tank car 
1975 LPG Fire 4 Devers, TX Pipeline 
1975 LPG Fire ball 18.2 17 34 Eagle Pass, TX Road tanker 
1975 Hydrogen, oxygen Explosion 1 3 IIford, UK Electrolysis plant 
1975 Crude oil Fire 0 Lima,OH Terminal 
1975 Oil, phenol Fire ? Marcus Hook, P A Oil tanker, tanks hip 
1975 Crude oil Explosion (VCF) 8 20 Philadelphia, PA Tank farm 
1975 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 37.5 2 Rosendaal, Netherlands Line leak 
1975 Fire ? Seaule, WA Road tanker 
1975 Methane Fire 7 7 South Africa 
1975 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 0.3 0 Watson, CA Crack in tank 
1975 NGL Explosion 4 0 Texas, USA Pipeline 
1976 NGL Vapour cloud explosion I 4 Texas, USA Pipeline 
1976 LPG BLEVE 80 2 22 Belt, Mt Rail tank car 
1976 Ethyl benzene Explosion 13 2 Chalmette, LA Refinery 
1976 Petrol Fire ball 4 28 Gadsden, AL Tank farm 
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1976 Ethylene oxide Internal explosion ? 56 Geismar, LA Reactor 
1976 Feed additivereaction mixture Internal explosion 1 Kings Lynn Reactor 
1976 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 13 7 Lake Charles, La Refinery 
1976 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion Longview, Tex. failure of mixing nozzle 
1976 Gasoline Fire 6 35 Los Angeles, CA Pipeline 
1976 Crude oil Explosion 0 Los Angeles, CA Terminal 
1976 Pentanes Vapour cloud fire Puerto Rico Storage 
1976 Oil Internal explosion ? Plaquemine, LA Surge tank 
1976 Flammable liquid Explosion 6 Sandefjord, Norway 
1976 Trichlorphenol reaction mixture, including Internal explosion 0.002 0 Seveso Reactor TCDD 
1976 Ethylene Vapour cloud fire 15 Texas Pipeline 
1976 Petrol Explosion 0 3 Westoning, UK Road tanker 
1976 Propylene Fire IS 2 0 New Jersey 
1977 Acrylonitrile Explosion 400 0 0 Antwerp, Belgium Storage tank 
1977 Crude oil Fire 0 Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia Pipeline 
1977 Fuel gas Vapour cloud fire ? Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia NGLplant 
1977 Oil Explosion ? Baton Rouge, LA Preheat furnace 
1977 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 300 3 Bay town, TX Tanker 
1977 Gasoline Fire 7 6 Beattyville, KY Road tanker 
1977 Sodium chlorate Explosion 6S 0 13 Braehead, Renfrew, UK Warehouse 
1977 Light HCs Vapour cloud explosion 3 22 Brindisi, Italy Ethylene plant 
1977 LPG Internal explosion 9 Cassino, Italy 
1977 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 6S.2 0 Dallas, TX. Rail tank car 
1977 Crude oil Fire Fairbanks, Alaska Pipeline 
1977 Grain dust Dust explosion IS 22 Galveston, TX. Grain silo 
1977 Ethylene oxide Explosion 25 Gel., Italy 
1977 LPG Fire ball 70 2 9 Goldonna, LA Rail tank car 
1977 Hydrogen Internal explosion 5 35 India 
1977 LPG Fire 0 0 lacksonville, USA storage 
1977 Vinyl Chloride monomer 0 90 Mexico 
1977 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 4 Port Arthur, TX Stabilizer unit 
1977 Vapour cloud fire ? Puebla, Mexico 
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1977 Gasoline Fire 0 Romeoville, IL Tank fann 
1977 Propane Vapour cloud fire 2 Ruff Creek, PA Pipeline 
1977 Vinyl Chloride monomer Fire 6 10 Taiwan 
1977 LPG Fire 23,000 7 87 Umm Said, Qatar LPG storage tank 
1977 Grain dust Dust explosion 36 10 Westwego, LA Grain silo 
1977 Natural gas Fire & explosion 2 0 Kansas, USA Pipeline 
1977 Natural gas Fire & explosion 2 23 Pennsylvania, USA Pipeline, residential area 
1977 Propane BLEVE 1 9 Cassino, Italy Gas tank 
1978 LPG Fire & Explosion 20.5 4 0 Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia Gas pipeline 
1978 LPG Explosion 0 Conway, KS Pumping station 
1978 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 3 Denver, CO Cat polymerization unit 
1978 LPG Fire ball 435 3 2 Donnellson, lA Pipeline 
1978 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 0.25 0 Immingham, UK heat reboiler 
1978 Vinyl Chloride monomer Fire ball 110 0 2 LewisviUe, AR Rail tank car 
1978 Propylene Fire 12 Mexico city. Mexico Road tanker 
1978 Gasoline Fire & explosion 7 Oviedo Province, Spain Rail tank car 
1978 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 0 Pitesti, Roumania Gas concentration unit 
1978 Natural gas Vapour cloud explosion 40 Poblado Tres, Mexico Pipeline 
1978 Propylene Vapour cloud fire 23.5 216 200 San Carlos, Spain Road tanker 
1978 LPG BLEVE 7 10 Texas City, TX. Storage vessel 
1978 Butane Explosion 12 Tul., Mexico Road tanker 
1978 Propane BLEVE 16 43 Waverly, TN Rail tank car 
1978 Butane Vapour cloud fire 36.4 100 220 Xilatopic, Mexico Road tanker 
1978 Butane Explosion 6 14 Galveston Bay Texas, USA Storage tank 
1978 Natural gas Explosion 7 19 Pennsylvania, USA Pipeline 
1978 Natural gas Fire & explosion 6 41 Texas, USA Pipeline 
1978 Natural gas Fire & explosion 2 2 Sayda, East Germany Compression satation of pipeline 
1979 Crude oil Explosion 95,000 52 Istanbul, Turkey Oil tanker 
1979 Flour Dust explosion 14 17 Bremen,FRG Flour mill 
1979 LNG VEEB I Cove Point, MD Pipeline 
1979 Distillate Explosion ? Deer Park, TX Tankship 
1979 Crude oil Explosion 32 Galveston Bay, TX Oil tanker 
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1979 Oil Fire ? Geelong, Australia Crude unit 
1979 Butane Fire ball 12 25 Good Hope, LA Tank barge 
1979 Grain dust Dust explosion ? 2 Hamburge, FRG Grain silo 
1979 Grain dust Dust explosion 7 Lerida, Spain Grain silo 
1979 LPG Vapour cloud fire 0 Linden, NJ Catalytic cracker 
1979 LPG Explosion 1 Orange, TX Pipeline 
1979 Chemicals BLEVE ? 8 Paxton, TX Rail tank car 
1979 LNG Vapour cloud fire ? Pierre Port, LA Pipeline 
1979 LNG Explosion 0 Maryland, USA Pipeline 
1979 HCs Internal explosion ? Ponce, Puerto Rico Dimerizer vessel 
1979 Crude oil Explosion 0 Port Neches, TX Oil tanker 
1979 Reaction mixture Internal explosion ? Sauget,IL Reactor 
1979 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 3.1 0 Texas City, TX. Alkylation unit 
1979 C3-C4 HCs Vapour cloud explosion ? T orrance, CA Catalytic cracker 
1979 Propane Vapour cloud explosion ? Ypsilanti, MI Storage 
1979 Crude oil Fire 40,000 50 Banter Bay, Eire Crude tanker 
1979 Cumene Fire 4 0 Italy Cumene plant 
1980 Sodium chlorate Fire & explosion ? Barking, UK Warehouse 
1980 Petrolum products Explosion Bay.mon, Puerto Rico Pipeline 
1980 Light HCs Vapour cloud explosion 0 41 Borger, TX Alkylation unit 
1980 Natural gas Explosion 0 Brooks, Alberta Compressor station 
1980 HCs Fire ? Corpus Christi, TX Hydrocracker 
1980 Fire ? Deer Park, TX Phenolacetone plant 
1980 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 0.11 0 Enschede, Netherlands propane tank 
1980 Gasoline Fire 7 6 Kenner, LA Road tanker 
1980 LPG Fire & explosion 0 3 Longport, UK Warehouse 
1980 Gasoline BLEVE 2 2 Los Angeles, CA Road tanker 
1980 Vinyl Chloride monomer Fire 0 4 Muldraugh, KY Rail tank car 
1980 Grain dust Dust explosion ? 8 Naples, Italy Grain silo 
1980 Hexane Vapour cloud explosion 12.7 5 25 New castle, DE Blow-out of plug valve 
1980 Natural gas Fire 0 New Orleans, LA Pipeline 
1980 Propane Explosion 51 Ortuella, Spain Storage vessel 
1980 Crude oil 0 Rotterdam, Netherlands Oil tanker 
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1980 Reaction mixture Detonation ? Seadrift, TX Ethylene oxide reactor 
1980 Oil Explosion ? Sydney, Australia Refinery furnace 
1981 Tank contents VEEB ? Chicago Heights, IL Reactor weight tank 
1981 Syngas Vapour cloud explosion 12 6 Czechoslovakia Ammonia plant 
1981 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 15 2 Gothenburge, Sweden Pipeline 
1981 Herbicide reaction mixture Internal explosion ? Greens Bavou, TX Reactor 
1981 LPG Explosion 18 35 San Rafael, Venezuela Pipeline 
1981 Oil Fire Shuaiba, Kuwait Tank farm 
1981 Hexane Explosion ? Stalybridge, UK Solvent recovery unit 
1981 Cumene hydroperoxide Fire & explosion 0 0 Taiwan reactor 
1982 Acrylonitrile Fire & explosion 3 0 Mexico process column 
1982 Gasoline Fire 7 Valdecott Tunnel, Road tanker Oakland, CA 
1982 Oil froth Fire 150 >500 Caracas, Venezuela Storage tank 
1982 Ethylene Explosion 2.9 0 6 Edmonton, Compressor Alberta Canada 
1982 Propane Explosion 5 30 Florence, Italy Road tanker 
1982 Hydrogen Fire 0 Fort McMurray, Compressor Alaska USA 
1982 Oil Fire ? Freeport, TX Transformer 
1982 Natural gas Explosion 5 0 Hudson, Iowa, USA Pipeline 
1982 HCs Fire ? Kashima, Japan Desulphurization 
1982 Cumene hydroperoxide Fire & explosion 0 18 Philadelphia, PA Phenol plant (boiler) 
1982 Natural gas Vapour cloud fire 0 Pine Bluff, AR Pipeline 
1982 Natural gas Fire & explosion 6 0 Portales, NM, USA Pipeline 
1982 Sodium chlorate Explosion 11 ? 60 Salford, UK Warehouse 
1983 Recycle slurry Fire ? Avon, CA Catalytic cracker 
1983 Vinyl Chloride monomer Fire 0 Baton Rouge, LA Rail tank car 
1983 Natural gas VEEB 0 2 Bloomfield, NM Compressor station 
1983 LNG Internal explosion ? Bontang, India LNGplant 
1983 Kerosene Explosion 47 Dhurabar, India Rail tank car 
1983 light Crude oil Fire 25000 0 20 Milford Haven, UK Storage tank 
1983 Polyethylene Fire ? Port Arthur, TX Polyethylene bead plant 
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1983 Acrylonitrile/methy le Explosion 0 0 North Carolina, USA reactor isoketone/ethyle acetate 
1983 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion Port Newark, NI Storage tank 
1983 NGL Fire ? Prudhoe Bay, AK NGL surge drum 
1983 LPG Fire & Explosion 6 West Odessa, TX Pipeline 
1983 HCs Vapour cloud fire ? Basile, LA Gas plant 
1983 Methane Fire 2 Awali, Bahrain Hydrogen desulphurising unit 
1983 Natural gas Fire & explosion 0 Virginia, USA Pipeline 
1983 Natural gas Fire & explosion 13 32 Off! vary Coast, Pipeline West Africa 
1983 Cumene hydroperoxide Explosion 2 5 USA transfer pump 
1984 Methane Explosion 16 28 Abbeystead, UK Valve house 
1984 Gasoline Fire & Explosion 508 221 Cubatao, Brazil Pipeline 
1984 HCs Vapour cloud fire ? Fort McMurray, Alberta Coking unit 
1984 LNG Explosion 60 11 Ghari Dhoda, Pakistan Pipeline 
1984 HCs Explosion 0 Kerala, India Cooling tower 
1984 Oil Fire ? Las Piedras, Venezuela Hydrodesulphurizer 
1984 LPG Vapour cloud fire 6000 650 6400 Mexico city, Mexico Storage 
1984 Natural gas Fire & explosion 5 7 Phoenix, Arizona, USA Pipeline in a building 
1984 Propane Explosion 15 76 Romeville, IL Absorption column 
1984 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 0.Q3 2 Sarnia, Ont. Benzene plant 
1984 Natural gas Fire & explosion 9 41 Acachapan, Mexico Pipeline, valve failure 
1985 Styrene-butadiene, acrylonitrile Fire & explosion 5 0 Arezona, USA Pipeline, crack 
1985 Naphtha Fire & explosion 18 56 Algerais, Spain 
1985 Natural gas Fire 5 3 Be.umont, KY Pipeline 
1985 Syngas VEEB 6 Clinton, lA Ammonia plant 
1985 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 4.1 ? Cologne, FRG Ethylene plant 
1985 NGL Vapour cloud explosion 4900 m' ? Edmonton, Alberta Pipeline 
1985 Naphtha Explosion 7 12 Illinois, USA 
1985 Aviation fuel Explosion 1 6 Kaycee, WY Pipeline 
1985 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 0 Lake Charles, LA Reforming unit 
1985 Ethane, propane Vapour cloud explosion 0 Mont Belvieu Salt dome storage 
1985 Propane Fire 4 13 Mont Belyieu, TX 
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1985 Gasoline, fuel oil Fire ? Naples, Italy Terminal (tank overfilling) 
1985 Acrylonitrile Explosion 0 0 UK Reactor 
1985 HCs Fire 23 II Priola, Italy Ethylene plant 
1985 Natural gas Fire & explosion 0 Sharpsville, PA Pipeline 
1985 HCs internal explosion, VCE ? Tioga, ND Gas processing plant 
1985 Propane Vapour cloud fire 0 6 Wood River, lL Deasphalting-dewaxing 
unit 
1985 Methane Explosion 2 Westfield, Fife, UK Gas processing plant 
1986 Hydrogen Explosion 7 119 Kennedy Space center, FLUSA 
1986 Natural gas Fire 3 Lancaster, KY Pipeline 
1986 Aniline Explosion 3 76 Pascagoula, MS Distillation column 
1986 Pesticides, etc. Fire, pollution 1200 0 Schweizerhalle, Basel, Warehouse Switzerland 
1986 Oil Fire ? Thessalonika, Greece Oil terminal 
1986 LNG Fire & explosion 2 3 Edmonton, Canada Pipeline 
1987 Ethylene oxide Explosion 5 20 Antwerp, Belgium Distillation column 
1987 Acrylonitrile, sulphuric acid, Explosion 24 Bath, Pennsylvania USA Reaction vessel isopropyl a!chol 
1987 HCs Fire & explosion Alberta Oil refinery Oil well 
site Progress 
1987 Hydrogen Fire 67 21 Grangemouth, UK Separator vessel 
1987 Gasoline Fire 5 Lanzhhou, China Rail tank car 
1987 HCs Fire & explosion IS 21 Louisiana, TX 
1987 Hydrogen, HCs Fire 0 Mississauga, ant., Canada Hydrotreater 
1987 Acetic acid Vapour cloud explosion 3 43 Pamp., TX Acetic acid plant 
1987 Hydrogen Explosion 167 55 Piper Alpha Drilling platform 
1987 Oil Fire 2 8 Port Herriot, France Storage 
1987 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 300 m' 0 Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia Gas plant 
1987 HCs Fire ? Torrance, CA AkIylation 
1987 Acrylonitrile Explosion 0 II Kaohsiung, Taiwan PoJymerisation in 
column 
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1987 LPG releaselBLEVE 20 1 23 Queensland, Australia Rail tanker 
1988 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0 Beek, Netherlands Polyethylene plant, 
reactor 
1988 Acrylonitrile Fire & explosion 0 0 Houston, USA Holding tank 
1988 Acrylonitrile Fire 1 7 Acrylonitrile plant 
1988 Naphtha Fire 25 23 Maharastra. India 
1988 Crude oil Fire & explosion 12 80 Mexico city, Mexico Pipeline 
1988 Cyclohexane Explosion 5 0 0 Melbourne, Australia Terminal, unloading 
1988 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 9 7 48 Louisiana, USA fluid catalytic cracking 
1988 Propane Fire 0 Port Arthur, TX Storage tank (pipe failure) 
1988 Naphtha Fire 0 Pulau Merlimau, Storage tank Singapore (mechanical failure) 
1988 Ethylene dichloride, Vapour cloud explosion 55 7 13 Rafnes, Norway VC plant vinyl Chloride 
1988 Propane Explosion 6 6 Tennessee, USA road tanker 
1989 Ethylene oxide Explosion 32 11 Antwerp, Belgium Distillation column 
1989 Natural gas Explosion 2 24 Baker, Gulf of Mexico 
1989 Ethane, propane Vapour cloud explosion 4 12 Baton Rouge, LA Refinery (pipeline) 
1989 Ammonia Fire & explosion 7000 7 55 Jonova. Lithuania Ammonia storage 
1989 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 4 Minnebeavo, USSR Gasoline plant 
1989 Hydrogen, Hes Fire or explosion 0 Martinez, CA Hydrotreater 
1989 Propylene Vapour cloud fire 0 0 Monis, IlIinios, USA Distillation column 
1989 LPG Fire & explosion 462 290 Nizhnevartovsk, Russia Pipeline 
1989 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 37.8 23 314 Pasadena, TX Polyethylene plant 
1989 Ethylene Explosion 23 130 Phillips, USA 
1989 Hydrogen Fire 7 Richmond, CA Refinery, hydrocraker 
1989 Gasoline Fire 2 3 San Bernadino, CA Pipeline 
1989 Acrylonitrilr-Butadiene Fire & explosion 13 23 South Korea ABS compounding unit 
-Styrene 
1989 NGL Vapour cloud explosion 645 500 Ufa, USSR Pipeline 
1989 Reaction mixture Internal explosion ? Urdingen, Germany Paint plant 
1989 Carbone dioxide Explosion 3 25 Wonns, Germany 
1990 LPG Vapour cloud fire 5.6 63 100 Bangkok, Thailand Road tanker 
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1990 Gasoline Explosion I Bay City, TX Tankship 
1990 HCs Vapour cloud explosion 0 Chalmetle, LA Hydrocracker 
1990 Hydrogen Explosion 15 26 Czechoslovakia 
1990 Waste oil Explosion 5 13 Channelview, TX Wastewater storage 
tank 
1990 Xylene, solvent VEEB ? Cincinnati, OH Acrylic resins plant 
1990 Aviation fuel Fire ? Denver, CO Storage 
1990 Ethane, propane Vapour cloud explosion 31 Nagothane, Ethylene, plant Bombay India 
1990 Propane Fire and explosion 18 6 Candanos, Spain Road tanker 
1990 Propane Vapour cloud fire 2 7 North Blenheim, NY Pipeline 
1990 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 14 76 Porto de Leixhos Portugal Deasphalting unit 
1990 HCs Fire ? Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia Refinery 
1990 HCs Fire 3 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Boiler 
1990 2-4 dichloronitrobenzene Internal explosion 1 5 Stanlow, UK Reactor 
1990 Acrylonitril, sodium hydroxide Explosion 0 2 Lima, USA process equipment 
1990 HCs Fire & explosion 35 ID Thane, India 
1990 Gas Vapour cloud explosion ? Tomsk, USSR Ethylene plant 
1990 LPG Fire & explosion 0 Warren, PA FCC, refinery 
1990 Butadiene Fire & explosion 0 0 South korea Storage tanks 
1991 Reaction mixture Internal explosion 9 CharJeston, SC Reactor 
1991 Explosion ? Coatzacoala, Mexico Chlorine plant 
1991 Acrylonitrile Internal explosion 0 Coode Island, Australia Storage tank 
1991 Explosion ? Dhaka, Bangladesh Stripping column 
1991 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion ? Kensington. GA Synthetic rubber 
1991 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 3 Pajaritos, Mexico Vinyl chloride plant 
1991 Ethylene oxide Vapour cloud explosion Seadrift, TX Ethylene oxide plant 
1991 Explosion 8 Sterlington, LA Nitroparaffin unit 
1991 HCs Explosion ? Sweeny, TX Reactor 
1992 Ammonia Fire & explosion 90 403 Dakar, Senegal Storage tank, loading 
1992 Ammonia Explosion 11 9 Haryana, India Pipeline 
1992 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 10 7 Sodegaura. Japan Refinery 
1992 Propane, butane Explosion 10 6 12 Marseilles, France catalytic cracker 
1993 LPG 3 Madas, India 
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1993 Ammonia 
1993 Naphtha 
1994 Styrene, ethylene dibromide 
1994 eyelohexane, buradiene 
1994 Aviation fuel 
1995 Natural gas 
1995 Gas 
1996 HCs 
1997 LPG 
1997 Molten metal 
1997 LPG 
1997 HCs 
1997 LPG 
1997 Phenolic resins 
1998 LPG 
1998 LNG 
1999 Oil 
1999 Hydroxylamine 
2000 Styrene, eyc!ohex.ne, but.diene 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
potential fatalities due to chemical hazards. 
Explosion & toxic release 
Explosion 328 
127 
Fire 
Fire 
Fire 
Fire 
Fire 
Explosion 
Fire 
Explosion 
Fire & explosion 
Explosion 
(runaway reaction) 
Fire & explosion 
Fire 10 
Fire 
Explosion (decomposed) 
Fire & explosion 
Table 1 
3 25 Panipat, India 
18 Thane, India 
3 0 Belpre, Ohio reaction vessel 
0 
410 Dronka, Egypt Fuel storage 
0 Gujrat, India 
12 Ukhta, Russia Gas pipeline 
2 45 Bombay, India 
3 4 Chennai, India 
2 5 Chennai, India 
14 11 Kaoshiung, Taiwan 
3 11 Gujrat, India 
60 30 Vis.g, India 
4 Columbia, Ohio Resins production unit 
4 43 Kaoshiung, Taiwan 
2 Longford, Victoria, Australia 
4 Avon, CA Refinery, piping of fractionator tower 
5 13 Pennsylvania, USA Process vessel 
71 Pasaden., USA 
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Table 2: Toxic Release Accidents 
Date Chemical Type Amount Fatalities Injuries Location Equipment Released (Tonne) 
1914 chlorine Toxic release 7 0 Chrome, N. J. Rail tank car 
1917 chlorine Toxic release 17 I Wyandotte, MI Storage tank 
1920 chlorine Toxic release 0.066 3 Niagara Falls, N. Y. Cylinder 
1925 chlorine Toxic release 0.066 2 De Noya, Oklahoma Cylinder 
1926 chlorine Toxic release 25 19 St. Auban, Prance Storage tank 
1928 chlorine Toxic release 2 0 Asbokan, N. Y. Rail tank car 
1928 Phosgen Toxic release 10 10 200 Hamburge, Germany Storage tank 
1929 chlorine Toxic release 22.5 1 Syracuse, N. Y. Storage tank 
1930 HP Toxic release 63 Luttich, Belgium Fuel plant 
1934 chlorine Toxic release 14.5 I Niagara Falls, N.Y. Rail tank car 
1935 chlorine Toxic release 27.5 0 Griffith, Ind. Rail tank car 
1936 chlorine Toxic release 3 I J ohnsonburg, Pa. Rail tank car 
1939 chlorine Toxic release 25 60 Zarnesti, Roumania Storage tank 
1940 chlorine Toxic release 8 3 Mjodalen, Norway Rail tank car 
1944 chlorine Toxic release 0.045 0 208 Brooklyn, NY Cylinder 
1947 chlorine Toxic release 30 19 Rauma, Finland Storage tank 
1947 chlorine Toxic release 16.3 0 0 Chicago,IL Rail tank car 
1947 chlorine Toxic release 0.066 2 0 Natrium, West Va. Cylinder 
1949 chlorine Toxic release 5 0 Freeport, Tex. Pipeline 
1949 TcnD Toxic release 0 228 Nitro, wv. Reactor 
1950 chlorine Toxic release 0.5 0 BilIingham, U. K. Rail tank car 
1950 H2S Toxic release large quantities 22 320 Poza Rice, Mexico Plant 
1952 chlorine Toxic release 15 7 0 Wilsum, Germany Storage tank 
1952 Ammonia Toxic release 15 15 20 Storage tank 
1953 TCnD Toxic release 0 55 Ludwigschafen, Process 
Germany 
1954 chlorine Toxic release 0.066 Montreal, Canada Cylinder 
1955 chlorine Toxic release ? Runcorn, UK 
1956 chlorine Toxic release 2.7 0 Lake Charles, La. connecting pipework 
1957 chlorine Toxic release 2.50 0 Runcorn, U. K. Rail tank car 
1957 chlorine Toxic release 8 Nitro, WV Chlorination vessel 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
potential/atalities due to chemical hazards. 
xviii 
Appendix A Table 2 
1961 chlorine Toxic release 27.5 1 114 La Barre, Louisiana Rail tank car 
1961 chlorine T oxle release 12 0 Billingham, U. K. Pipeline 
1961 chlorine Toxic release 0 17 Morganza. LA 
1962 chlorine Toxic release 27.5 0 89 Cornwall, Ontario Rail tank car 
1962 H2S Toxic release 1 USA Plant 
1963 chlorine Toxic release 8 0 0 Brandtsville, Pa. Rail tank car 
1963 chlorine Toxic release 0 430+ Philadelphia, PA Rail tank car 
1963 Ammonia Toxic release 2 0 20 Liverpool, UK road tanker 
1963 TCDD Toxic release 0.0002 8 14 Amesterdam, Holland Process 
1964 chlorine Toxic release 0 Mobile, AL Pipeline 
1965 chlorine Toxic release Baton Rouge, LA Tankship 
1966 chlorine Toxic release 7 0 La Spezia, Italy Rail tank car 
1966 chlorine Toxic release 0.227 0 0 California, USA Pipeline 
1966 H2S Toxic release 2 50 USA Plant 
1966 HCL Toxic release 0 23 Deer Park, Tx. 
1967 chlorine Toxic release 50 0 Newton, Alabama Rail tank car 
1967 chlorine Toxic release 5 Bankstown, Australia 
1968 Ammonia Toxic release 15 5 20 Lievin. France Rail tank car 
1968 H2S Toxic release 1 60 Godorf, Germany Plant 
1968 TCnD Toxic release 0 79 Bolsover, Derbyshire Reactor 
1968 S02 Toxic release 3 2 Frankfurt, Germany Process 
1969 chlorine Toxic release 2 0 Cleveland, Ohio container 
1969 Ammonia Toxic release 64 9 53 Crete, Nebraska Rail tank car 
1969 Phosgen Toxic release 0 2 LaPorte, Tx 
1969 H2S Toxic release 3 6 Texas City, Tx. 
1969 VCM Toxic release 1 Glendora, MS Rail tank car 
1970 chlorine Toxic release 2 Q Javle, Sweden Pipeline 
1970 Ammonia Toxic release 145 0 3 BI.ir, Neb. Storage tank 
1970 Ammonia Toxic release 75 0 I Belle, W. Virginia Rail tank car 
1970 H2S Toxic release 5 Q USA 
1971 Ammonia Toxic release 570 0 0 Floral, Ark. Pipeline 
1971 Cyclohexane Toxic release 33.5 0 0 Pensacola, Fa. Process 
1971 Methyl promide Toxic release 4 Gretna, FL road tanker 
1972 S02 Toxic release 0 50 Hamburg, Germany Process 
1973 chlorine Toxic release 15.5 0 Loos, B. C. Rail tank car 
1973 Ammonia Toxic release 38 18 65 Potchefstroom, S.Afric. Storage tank 
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1973 Ammonia Toxic release 210 0 2 McPherson, KS Pipeline 
1974 chlorine Toxic release Omaha,NE Chlorine vaporizer 
1974 Ammonia Toxic release 350 0 4 Hutchinson, Kansas Pipeline 
1974 Phosgen Toxic release 0 Krefeld, Germany Process 
1974 TCDD Toxic release 0 6 Krefeld, Germany 
1974 HCL Toxic release 1.64 Chicago, III Storage tank 
1975 chlorine Toxic release 30 4 176 Niagar. Falls, NY Rail tank car 
1975 Ammonia Toxic release 50 0 0 Texas City, TX Pipeline 
1975 H2S Toxic release I 2 Ingolstade, Germany Repair 
1976 chlorine Toxic release 90 0 3 Baton Rouge, Louisiana Storage tank 
1976 chlorine Toxic release 0 0 UK Scrubber 
1976 Ammonia Toxic release 52 0 IS Glen Ellyn, Illinois Rail tank car 
1976 Ammonia Toxic release 500 0 Enid, Oklahoma Pipeline 
1976 Ammonia Toxic release 19 6 178 Houston, TX road tanker 
1976 Ammonia Toxic release 21 30 Pasacabolo, Columbia Fertiliser plant 
1976 Ammonia Toxic release 180 2 2 Landskrona, Sweden Loading terminal 
1976 TCDD Toxic release 0.003 0 Seveso, Italy Process 
1976 CO2 Toxic release Haltern, FRG Storage tank 
1976 Arsenic Toxic release 
compounds 
30 Manfredonia, Italy Absorption column 
1976 Acrylonitrile Toxic release 10 0 0 Rijmond 
1977 chlorine Toxic release 10 Baton Rouge, LA Chemical works 
1977 Ammonia Toxic release 40 2 46 Pensacola, FL Rail tank car 
1977 Ammonia Toxic release 2 102 Cuernaveca) Mexico Pipeline 
1977 Ammonia Toxic release 3 18 Thorganby, UK Pipeline 
1977 H2S Toxic release 2 0 Alberta, Canada Blow -out at well 
1977 HF Toxic release 18 0 Lunen, Germany 
1978 chlorine Toxic release 50 8 114 Youngstown, FL Rail tank car 
1978 H2S Toxic release 8 29 Chicago,IL Loading terminal 
1978 S02 Toxic release 30 0 Duisberg, Germany 
1978 S03 Toxic release 100 Baltimore, MD 
1979 chlorine Toxic release Bayonne, NJ Rail tank car 
1979 chlorine Toxic release 75 0 Mississauga. Ontario Rail tank car 
1979 chlorine Toxic release Rafnes, Norway Chemical plant 
1979 H2S Toxic release Burghausen, FRG Chemical plant 
1979 Acrylonitrile Toxic release 0 Netherland storage tank 
Using historic accident data to estimate the xx 
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1980 chlorine Toxic release 
1980 Ammonia Toxic release 
1981 chlorine Toxic release 
1981 Ammonia Toxic release 
1981 Ammonia Toxic release 
1982 chlorine Toxic release 
1982 CO Toxic release 
1983 Cyc10hexane Toxic release 
1983 Nitric acid Toxic release 
1984 MIC Toxic release 
1985 Ammonia Toxic release 
1987 chlorine Toxic release 
1987 Ammonia Toxic release 
1987 H2S Toxic release 
1987 Pyridine Toxic release 
1989 Ammonia Toxic release 
1989 Ammonia Toxic release 
1990 Ammonia Toxic release 
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20000-30000 1b 0 
20 4000 
4 
450 
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0.015 0 
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Table 2 
280 Montana, Mexico Rail tank car 
28 Mexico City, Mexico Loading terminal 
1000 San Luis Potosi, Mexico Rail tank car 
30 Minnesota Storage tank 
Enos, Indiana Rail tank car 
15 West Virginia, USA Pipeline 
Moselle River, France Pipeline 
0 Virginia, USA cooler 
Denver, CO Rail tank car 
Bhopa1, India Storage tank 
23 San Antonia, Texas Storage tank 
Kotka, Finland Storage tank 
12 Teeside, UK Stack 
7 Stuttgart, Germany Repair 
0 Sehweizerhalle, 
Switzerland 
Jonova, Lithuania Storage tank 
5 Billingham, UK Pump 
374 Matanzas. Cuba Rail tank car 
xxi 
Appendix A Table3 
Table 3: Fire & explosion accidents with available mass of chemicals 
Amount 
Date Chemical Type Released Fatalities Injuries Location Equipment 
(Tonne) 
1921 Hydrogen Explosion 6.9 1 Hull, UK Airship 
1943 Butane Vapour cloud fire 16.5 5 >25 Los Angeles, Calif 
1944 LNG Fire & explosion 3000 128 300 Cleveland, OH Storage tank 
1948 Dimethyl ether Vapour cloud explosion 33 245 2500 Ludwigshafen,Germany Rail tank car 
1949 Propane, butane Vapour cloud explosion 1.6 5 Detroit, IL Catalytic cracker 
1950 Styrene, latex, butadiene Explosion 0 0 Midland, MI Reactor 
1954 Acrolein Internal explosion 19 0 Institute, WV Rail tank car, 
polymerization 
1955 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0 Freeport, TX Polyethylene plant 
1956 Butylene Vapour cloud explosion 10 0 Baton Rouge, LA Alkylation unit 
1956 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 2.5 0 North Tonawanda, NY Polyethylene plant 
1959 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 18 23 78 Meldrin, GA Rail tank car 
1960 benzene,mononitrobenzene Detonation 6.6 15 60 Kingsport, TN Nitrobenzene plant 
,nitric acid, water 
1961 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 18 1 5 Freeport, TX Cyclohexane plant, 
valve failure 
1962 Ethylene oxide Internal explosion, VCE 16 I 19 Bradenburg, Kentucky reactor 
1962 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 14.3 10 75 Berlin, NY Road tanker 
1962 Propane Fire 1.1 1 115 Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia Storage vessel 
1962 Organic peroxides Explosion 20 4 4 Norwich, CT Transport tank 
1963 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.9 0 7 Plaquemine, L.A Ethylene plant 
1964 Vinyl chloride mono mer VEEB 68 7 40 Attleboro, MA Reactor 
1964 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.2 2 Orange, TX HP Polyethylene line 
1965 Ethyl chloride Vapour cloud explosion 19.3 0 0 Baton Rouge, LA Reactor 
1966 Propane BLEVE 200 18 6 Feyzin, France Storage vessel 
1966 Polystyrene Explosion 32 11 10 LaSalle, Quebec reactor 
1966 Methane Vapour cloud explosion 0.5 3 83 Raunheim, FRG Ethylene unit 
1966 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 0.45 3 Scotts Bluff, LA Reactor 
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1966 Ethylene Explosion OJ 3 83 Germany Compressor, pipework 
1967 Isobutylene Vapour cloud explosion 46 7 13 Lake Charles, LA Pipeline 
1968 Light HCs Vapour cloud explosion 140 2 85 Pemis, Netherlands Slop tanks 
1969 Hydrogen, naphtha Vapour cloud explosion 23 0 Fawley, UK Hydroformer 
1969 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 3,6 2 23 Wilton, UK Oxidation plant 
1969 LPG BLEVE 63 2 976 Laurel. Mississipi Rail tank car 
1970 Propane Fire 4 2 Hull, UK 
1970 CIOHC Vapour cloud explosion 114 0 40 Linden, NJ, Refinery reactor 
1970 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 29 0 10 Port Hudson, MO, USA Pipeline 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 3,6 0 21 Baton Rouge, LA Rail tank car 
1971 Vinyl Chloride monomer BLEVE 165 50 Houston, TX Rail tank car 
1971 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 12 I 6 Houston, TX Butadiene plant 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.45 4 60 Longview, TX Polyethylene plant 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion I 3 6 Texas, USA Reactor 
1972 Propylene Vapour cloud explosion 53.5 I 230 East St. Louis, IL Rail tank car 
1972 Propane Fire ball 9 2 5 Lynchburge, V A Road tanker 
1973 LNG Fire 70 8 21 Austin, Tx, Pipeline 
1973 Hexane, propylene Explosion 4 4 Goi, Japan reactor 
1973 Propane BLEVE 45 13 95 Kingman,AZ Rail tank car 
1973 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion 4.2 I 16 Noatsu. Japan Vinyl chloride plant 
1973 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 19 9 37 St-Amand-Ies-Eaux, Road tanker 
France 
1973 Distillate Explosion 0.61 3 29 Sheffield, UK Tank 
1974 Butane Fire ball 2 0 Aberdeen, U. K. Road tanker 
1974 Isoprene Vapour cloud explosion 7.6 2 10 Beaumont, TX Isoprene plant 
1974 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion 110 7 Climax, TX Rail tank car 
1974 lsobutane Vapour cloud explosion 69 7 152 Decatur,IL Rail tank car 
1974 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 1.8 0 Fawley, UK Polyethylene plant 
1974 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 25 28 104 FIixborough, UK Caprolactam plant 
1974 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 75 235 Houston, TX Rail tank car 
1974 Butane Vapour cloud explosion 2190 0 24 Petal, Mississippi USA storage 
1974 LPG BLEVE 10 4 6 West St Paul, MN Storage vessel 
1975 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 2.5 6 13 Antwerp, Belgium Polyethylene plant 
1975 Propylene Vapour cloud explosion 5.5 14 107 Beek, Netherlands Petrochemicals plant 
1975 LPG Fire ball 18.2 17 34 Eagle Pass, TX Road tanker 
1975 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 37.5 2 Rosendaal, Netherlands Line leak 
Using historic accident data (0 estimate the xxiii 
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1975 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 0.3 0 Watson, CA Tank failure 
1976 LPG BLEVE 80 2 22 Belt, Mt Rail tank car 
1976 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 13 7 Lake Charles, La Refinery 
1976 Trichlorphenol reaction Internal explosion 0.002 0 Seveso Reactor 
mixture, including TCDD 
1976 Propylene Fire 18 2 0 New Jersey 
1977 Acrylonitrile Explosion 400 0 0 Antwerp, Belgium Storage tank 
1977 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 300 3 Baytown, TX Tanker 
1977 Sodium chlorate Explosion 68 0 13 Braehead, Renfrew, UK Warehouse 
1977 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 68.2 0 I Dallas, TX. Rail tank car 
1977 LPG Fire ball 70 2 9 Goldonna, LA Rail tank car 
1977 LPG Fire 23,000 7 87 Umm Said, Qatar LPG refrigrated tank 
1978 LPG Fire & Explosion 20.5 4 0 Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia Gas pipeline 
1978 LPG Fire ball 435 3 2 Donnellson, lA Pipeline 
1978 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 0.25 0 Immingham, UK heat reboller 
1978 Vinyl Chloride monomer Fire ball 110 0 2 Lewisville, AR Rail tank car 
1978 Propylene Vapour cloud fire 23.5 216 200 San Carlos, Spain Road tanker 
1978 Butane Vapour cloud fire 36.4 lOO 220 Xilatopic, Mexico Road tanker 
1979 Crude oil Explosion 95,000 52 Istanbul, Turkey Oil tanker 
1979 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 3.1 0 Texas City, TX. Alkylation unit 
1979 Crude oil Fire 40,000 50 Banter Bay, Eire crude tanker 
1980 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 0.11 0 Enschede, Netherlands propane tank 
1980 Hexane, propylene (mix) Vapour cloud explosion 12.7 5 25 New castie, DE Polypropylene plant 
1981 Syngas Vapour cloud explosion 12 6 Czechoslovakia Ammonia plant 
(catchpot) 
1981 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 15 2 Gothenburge, Sweden Pipeline 
1982 Ethylene Explosion 2.9 0 6 Edmonton, Alberta, Compressor 
Canada 
1983 light Crude oil Fire 25,000 0 20 Milford Haven, UK Storage tank 
1984 LPG Vapour cloud fire 6000 650 6400 Mexico city, Mexico LPG storage tank 
1984 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 0.03 2 Sarnia, ant. Benzene plant 
1986 Pesticides, etc. Fire, pollution 1200 0 Schweizerhalle, Basel, Warehouse 
Switzerland 
1987 LPG releaselBLEVE 20 23 Queensland, Australia Rail tanker 
1988 Cyclohexane Explosion 5 0 0 Melbourne, Australia Terntinal, unloading 
1988 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 9 7 Louisiana, USA fluid catalytic 
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1988 Ethylene dichloride, vinyl 
Chloride 
1989 Ammonia 
1989 [sobutane 
1990 LPG 
1990 Propane 
1992 Propane, butane 
1994 Styrene, ethylene 
dibromide, 
1994 cyclohexane. butadiene 
1998 LNG 
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Vapour cloud explosion 55 
Fire & explosion 7000 
Vapour cloud explosion 37.8 
Vapour cloud fire 5.6 
Fire and explosion 18 
Explosion 10 
Explosion 328 
127 
Fire 10 
Table3 
cracking 
7 13 Rafnes, Norway VC plant 
7 55 Jonova. Lithuania Ammonia storage 
23 314 Pasadena, TX PolyethyIene plant 
63 100 Bangkok, Thailand Road tanker 
6 Candanos, Spain Road tanker 
6 12 Marseilles, France catalytic cracker 
3 0 Belpre, Ohio reaction vessel 
0 
2 Longford, Victoria, 
xxv 
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Table 4: Process Fire and Explosion Accidents 
Amount 
Date Chemical Type Released Fatalities Injuries Locatiou Equipment 
(Tonne) 
1949 Propane, butane Vapour cloud explosion 1.6 5 Detroit,IL Catalytic cracker (refinery) 
1950 Styrene. latex, butadiene Explosion I 0 0 Midland, MI Reactor 
1955 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 1 0 Freeport, TX Polyethylene plant 
1956 Butylene Vapour cloud explosion 10 0 Baton Rouge, LA Alkylation unit 
1956 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 2.5 0 North Tonawanda, NY Polyethylene plant 
1960 benzene,mononitrobenzene.ni Detonation 6.6 15 60 Kingspor!, TN Nitrobenzene plant, process 
tric acid, water 
1961 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 18 I 5 Freepar!, TX Cyclohexane plant, valve 
failure 
1962 Ethylene oxide Internal explosion, VCE 16 1 19 Bradenburg, Kentucky Reactor 
1963 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.9 0 7 Plaquemine, L.A Ethylene plant 
1964 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.2 2 Orange, TX HP Polyethylene line 
1964 Vinyl chloride manomer VEEB 68 7 40 Attleboro, MA Reactor 
1965 Ethyl chloride Vapour cloud explosion 19.3 0 Baton Rouge, LA Reactor 
1966 Methane Vapour cloud explosion 0.5 3 83 Raunheim, FRG Ethylene unit 
1966 Polystyrene Explosion 32 11 10 LaSalle, Quebec reactor 
1966 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 0.45 3 Scotts Bluff, LA Reactor 
1966 Ethylene Explosion 0.3 3 83 Germany Compressor, pipework 
1969 Hydrogen, naphtha Vapour cloud explosion 23 0 Fawley, UK Hydroformer 
1969 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 3.6 2 23 Wilton, UK Oxidation plant 
1970 ClOHC Vapour cloud explosion 114 0 40 Linden, N.J. Refinery reactor 
1971 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 12 1 6 Houston, TX Butadiene plant 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.45 4 60 Longview, TX HP Polyethylene line 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 1 3 6 Texas, USA reactor 
1973 Hexane, propylene Explosion 4 4 Goi, Japan reactor 
1973 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion 4.2 1 16 Noatsu, Japan Vinyl chloride plant 
1974 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 25 28 104 Flixborough, UK Caprolactam plant 
1974 Isoprene(>CS HC) Vapour cloud explosion 7.6 2 10 Beaumon!, TX Isoprene plant 
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1974 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 
1975 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 
1975 Propylene Vapour cloud explosion 
1975 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 
1976 Trichlorphenol reaction Internal explosion 
mixture, including TCDD** 
1976 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 
1078 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 
1979 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 
1980 Hexane( propylene) erase Vapour cloud explosion 
propylene 
1981 Syngas Vapour cloud explosion 
1982 Ethylene Explosion 
1984 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 
1988 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 
1988 Ethylene dichloride, vinyl Vapour cloud explosion 
Chloride 
1989 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 
1992 Propane, butane Explosion 
1994 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
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1.8 0 
37,5 2 
5,5 14 
2,5 6 
0.002 0 
13 7 
0.25 0 
3.1 0 
12.7 5 
12 6 
2.0 0 
0.03 2 
9 7 
55 7 
37.8 23 
6 
3 
Table 4 
Fawley, UK Polyethylene plant 
Rosendaal, Netherlands Line leak 
107 Beek, Netherlands Naphtha cracker column 
13 Antwerp, Belgium Polyethylene plant 
Seveso Reactor 
Lake Charles, La Refinery 
Immingham, UK Heat reboiler 
Texas City, TX. Alkylation unit 
25 New castle, DE Blow-out of plug valve 
Czechoslovakia Ammonia plant 
Alberta, Canada Compressor 
Samia,Ont. Benzene plant 
48 Louisiana, USA fluid catalytic cracking 
13 Rafnes, Norway VC plant 
314 Pasadena, TX Polyethylene plant 
12 Marseilles, France catalytic cracker 
0 Ohio reaction vessel 
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Table 5: Storage Fire and Explosion Accidents 
Date Chemical Type 
1944 LNG Fire & explosion 
1962 Propane Fjre 
1962 Organic peroxides Explosion 
1966 Propane BLEVE 
1968 Light HCs «CIO) Vapour cloud explosion 
1973 Distillate Explosion 
1974 Butane Vapour cloud explosion 
1974 LPG BLEVE 
1975 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 
1977 Acrylonitrile Explosion 
1977 Sodium chlorate Explosion 
1977 LPG Fire 
1980 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 
1983 light Crude oil Fire 
1984 LPG Vapour cloud fire 
1986 Pesticides, etc. 
1988 Cyc10hexane 
1989 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
potential fatalities due fo chemical hazards. 
Amount Released 
(Tonne) 
3000 
1.1 
20 
200 
140 
0.61 
2190 
10 
0.3 
400 
68 
23,000 
0.11 
25,000 
6000 
1200 
Table 5 
Fatalities Injuries Location Equipment 
128 300 Cleveland, OH Storage tank 
I 115 Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia Storage vessel 
4 4 Norwich, CT Transport tank 
18 6 Feyzin, France Storage vessel 
2 85 Pernis, Netherlands Slop-oil tank, refinery 
3 29 Sheffield, UK Tank 
0 24 Petal, Mississippi USA storage 
4 6 West St Paul, MN Storage vessel 
0 Watson, CA Crack in tank 
0 0 Antwerp, Belgium Storage tank 
0 13 Braehead, Renfrew, UK Warehouse 
7 87 Umm Said, Qatar LPG storage tank 
0 Enschede, Netherlands Propane tank 
0 20 Milford Haven, UK Storage tank 
650 6400 Mexico city, Mexico Storage 
0 Schweizerhalle, Basel, Switzerland Warehouse 
0 0 Melbourne, Australia Terminal, Unloading 
Lithuania Ammonia 
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Table 6: Fire and Explosion Transport Accidents 
Date Chemical Type Amouut Released Fatalities Injuries Location Equipment (Tonne) 
1948 Dimethyl ether Vapour cloud explosion 33 245 2500 Ludwigshafen,Germany Rail tank car 
1954 Acrolein Internal explosion 19 0 Institute, WV Rail tank car, 
polymerization 
1959 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 18 23 78 Meldrin, GA Rail tank car 
1962 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 14.3 10 75 Berlin, NY Road tanker 
1967 Isobutylene Vapour cloud explosion 46 7 13 Lake Charles, LA Pipeline 
1969 LPG BLEVE 63 2 33 Laurel, Mississipi Rail tank car 
1970 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 29 0 10 Port Hudson, MO, USA Pipeline 
1970 Propane BLEVE 75 O? 66 Crescent City, IL Rail tank car 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 3.6 0 21 Baton Rouge, LA Rail tank car 
1971 Vinyl Chloride monamer BLEVE 165 50 Houston, TX Rail tank car 
1972 Propylene Vapour cloud explosion 53.5 1 230 East SI. Louis, IL Rail tank car 
1972 Propane Fire ball 9 2 5 L ynchburge, V A Road tanker 
1973 LNG Fire 70 8 21 Austin, Tx. Pipeline 
1973 Propane BLEVE 45 13 95 Kingman, AZ Rail tank car 
1973 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 19 9 37 St-Amand-Ies-Eaux, Road tanker 
France 
1974 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion 110 7 Climax, TX Rail tank car 
1974 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 69 7 152 Decatur,IL Rail tank car 
1974 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 75 235 Houston, TX Rail tank car 
1974 Butane Fire baJl 2 0 Aberdeen, U. K. Road tanker 
1975 LPG Fire ball 18.2 17 34 Eagle Pass, TX Road tanker 
1976 LPG BLEVE 80 2 22 Belt, Mt RaiI tank car 
1977 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 300 3 Bay town, TX Oil tanker 
1977 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 68.2 0 DaJlas, TX. Rail tank car 
1977 LPG Fire ball 70 2 9 Goldonna, LA Rail tank car 
1978 LPG Fire & Explosion 20.5) 4 0 Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia Gas pipeline 
1978 LPG Fire ball 435 3 2 Donnellson, lA Pipeline 
1978 Vinyl Chloride monomer Fire ball 110 0 2 Lewisville, AR Rail tank car 
1978 Propylene Vapour cloud fire 23.5 216 200 San Carlos, Spain Road tanker 
1978 Butane Vapour cloud fire 36.4 100 220 Xii atopic, Mexico Road tanker 
1979 Crude oil Explosion 95,000 52 Istanbul, Turkey Oil tanker 
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1979 Crude oil 
1981 Propane 
1987 LPG 
1990 LPG 
1990 
Fire 
Vapour cloud explosion 
releaselBLEVE 
Vapour cloud fire 
FIre and 
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40,000 
15 
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5.6 
18 
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Table 6 
50 Banter Bay, Eire crude tanker 
2 Gothenburge, Sweden Pipeline 
23 Queensland, Australia Rail tanker 
63 100 Bangkok, Thailand Road tanker 
6 Road tanker 
xxx 
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Table7: Fire & explosion accidents (caused one or more fatalities) 
Amount 
Date Chemical Type Released Fatalities Injuries Location Equipment 
(Tonne) 
1921 Hydrogen Explosion 6.9 HuB, UK Airship 
1943 Butane Vapour cloud fire 16.5 5 >25 Los Angeles, Calif 
1944 LNG Fire & explosion 3000 128 300 Cleveland, OH Storage tank 
1948 Dimethyl ether Vapour cloud explosion 33 245 2500 Ludwigshafen,Germany Rail tank car 
1949 Propane, butane Vapour cloud explosion 1.6 5 Detroit,IL Catalytic cracker 
1959 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 18 23 78 Meldrin, GA Rail tank car 
1960 benzene,mononitrobenzene, Detonation 6.6 15 60 Kingsport, TN Nitrobenzene plant 
nitric acid, water 
1961 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 18 5 Freeport, TX Cyclohexane plant, valve 
failure 
1962 Ethylene oxide Internal explosion, VCE 16 19 Bradenburg, Kentucky reactor 
1962 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 14.3 IO 75 Berlin, NY Road tanker 
1962 Propane Fire l.l I 115 Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia Storage vessel 
1962 Organic peroxides Explosion 20 4 4 Norwich, CT Transport tank 
1964 Vinyl chloride monomer VEEB 68 7 40 Attleboro, MA Reactor 
1964 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.2 2 Orange, TX HP Polyethylene line 
1966 Propane BLEVE 200 18 6 Feyzin, France Storage vessel 
1966 Polystyrene Explosion 32 11 10 LaSalle, Quebec reactor 
1966 Methane Vapour cloud explosion 0.5 3 83 Raunheim, FRG Ethylene unit 
1966 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 0.45 3 Scotts Bluff, LA Reactor 
1966 Ethylene Explosion 0.3 3 83 Germany Compressor, pipe work 
1967 Isobutylene Vapour cloud explosion 46 7 13 Lake Charles, LA Pipeline 
1968 Light HCs Vapour cloud explosion 140 2 85 Pernis, Netherlands Slop tanks 
1969 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 3.6 2 23 Wilton, UK Oxidation plant 
1969 LPG BLEVE 63 2 976 Laurel, Mississipi Rail tank car 
1970 Propane Fire 4 2 Hull, UK 
1971 Vinyl Chloride monomer BLEVE 165 50 Houston, TX Rail tank car 
1971 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 12 1 6 Houston, TX Butadiene plant 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.45 4 60 Longview, TX Polyethylene plant 
Using historic accident data to estimate the xxxi 
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1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion I 3 6 Texas, USA Reactor 
1972 Propylene Vapour cloud explosion 53.5 1 230 East St. Louis, IL Rail tank car 
1972 Propane Fire ball 9 2 5 L ynchburge, V A Road tanker 
1973 LNG Fire 70 8 21 Austin, Tx. Pipeline 
1973 Hexane, propylene Explosion 4 4 Goi, Japan reactor 
1973 Propane BLEVE 45 13 95 Kingman, AZ Rail tank car 
1973 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion 4.2 1 16 Noatsu, Japan Vinyl chloride plant 
1973 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 19 9 37 St-Amand-les-Eaux, France Road tanker 
1973 Distillate Explosion 0.61 3 29 Sheffield, UK Tank 
1974 Isoprene Vapour cloud explosion 7.6 2 10 Beaumont, TX Isoprene plant 
1974 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion 110 7 Climax, TX Rail tank car 
1974 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 69 7 152 Decatur,IL Rail tank car 
1974 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 25 28 104 Flixborough, UK Caprolactam plant 
1974 Butadiene Vapour cloud explosion 75 I 235 Houston, TX Rail tank car 
1974 LPG BLEVE 10 4 6 West SI Paul, MN Storage vessel 
1975 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 2.5 6 13 Antwerp, Belgium Polyethylene plant 
1975 Propylene Vapour cloud explosion 5.5 14 107 Beek, Netherlands Petrochemicals plant 
1975 LPG Fire ball l8.2 17 34 Eagle Pass, TX Road tanker 
1975 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 37.5 2 Rosendaal, Netherlands Line leak 
1976 LPG BLEVE 80 2 22 Belt, Mt Rail tank car 
1976 lsobutane Vapour cloud explosion 13 7 Lake Charles, La Refinery 
1976 Propylene Fire 18 2 0 New Jersey 
1977 Gasoline Vapour cloud explosion 300 3 Bay town, TX Tanker 
1977 LPG Fire ball 70 2 9 Goldonna, LA Rail tank car 
1977 LPG Fire 23,000 7 87 Umm Said, Qatar LPG storage tank 
1978 LPG Fire & Explosion 20.5 4 0 Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia Gas pipeline 
1978 LPG Fire ball 435 3 2 Donnellson, lA Pipeline 
1978 Propylene Vapour cloud fire 23.5 216 200 San Carlos, Spain Road tanker 
1978 Butane Vapour cloud fire 36.4 100 220 Xilatopic, Mexico Road tanker 
1979 Crude oil Explosion 95,000 52 Istanbul, Turkey Oil tanker 
1979 Crude oil Fire 40,000 50 Banter Bay, Eire crude tanker 
1980 Hexane, propylene Vapour cloud explosion 12.7 5 25 New castle, DE Polypropylene plant 
1981 Syngas Vapour cloud explosion 12 6 Czechoslovakia Ammonia plant (catchpol) 
1981 Propane Vapour cloud explosion l5 I 2 Gothenburge, Sweden Pipeline 
1984 LPG Vapour cloud fire 6000 650 6400 Mexico city, Mexico Terminal (storage) 
1984 Hydrogen Vapour cloud explosion 0.03 2 Sarni., Ont. Benzene plant 
1987 LPG releaselBLEVE 20 23 Queensland, Australia Rail tanker 
Using historic accident data to estimate the 
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1988 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 
1988 Vinyl Chloride monomer Vapour cloud explosion 
1989 Ammonia Fire & explosion 
1989 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 
1990 LPG Vapour cloud fire 
1990 Propane Fire and explosion 
1992 Propane, butane Explosion 
1994 Styrene. ethylene dibromide. Explosion 
1998 LNG Fire 
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7000 
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5.6 
18 
10 
328 
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Table 7 
7 Louisiana. USA fluid catalytic cracking 
7 13 Rafnes. Norway VC plant 
7 55 Jonova. Lithuania Ammonia storage 
23 314 Pasadena. TX Polyethylene plant 
63 lOO Bangkok. Thailand Road tanker 
6 Candanos. Spain Road tanker 
6 12 Marseilles, France catalytic cracker 
3 0 Belpre. Ohio reaction vessel 
2 Australia 
xxxiii 
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Table 8: Hydrocarbons fire & explosion accidents (caused one or more fatalities) 
Date Chemical Type Amount Fatalities Injuries Location Equipment 
1943 Butane Vapour cloud fire 16.5 5 > 25 Los Angeles, Calif 
1944 LNG Fire & explosion 3,000 128 300 Cleveland, OH Storage tank 
1949 Propane, butane Vapour cloud explosion 1.6 5 Detroit,IL Catalytic cracker 
1959 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 18 23 78 Meldrin, GA Rail tank car 
1961 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 18 5 Freeport, TX Cyclohexane plant, 
valve failure 
1962 LPG Vapour cloud explosion 14.3 \0 75 Berlin, NY Road tanker 
1962 Propane Fire 1.1 li5 Ras Tanura, Saudi Storage vessel 
Arabia 
1964 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.2 2 Orange, TX HP Polyethylene line 
1966 Propane BLEVE 200 18 6 Feyzin, France Storage vessel 
1966 Methane Vapour cloud explosion 0.5 3 83 Raunheim, FRG Ethylene unit 
1966 Ethylene Explosion 0.3 3 83 Germany Compressor, pipework 
1967 Isobutylene Vapour cloud explosion 46 7 13 Lake Charles, LA Pipeline 
1968 Light HCs Vapour cloud explosion 140 2 85 Pemis, Netherlands Slop tanks 
1969 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 3.6 2 23 Wilton, UK Oxidation plant 
1969 LPG BLEVE 63 2 976 Laurel, Mississipi Rail tank car 
1970 Propane Fire 4 2 Hull, UK 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 0.45 4 60 Longview, TX Polyethylene plant 
1971 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion I 3 6 Texas, USA Reactor 
1972 Propylene Vapour cloud explosion 53.5 230 East SI. Louis, IL Rail tank car 
1972 Propane Fire ball 9 2 5 Lynchburge, V A Road tanker 
1973 LNG Fire 70 8 21 Austin, Tx. Pipeline 
1973 Hexane, propylene Explosion 4 4 Goi, Japan reactor 
1973 Propane BLEVE 45 \3 95 Kingman, AZ Rail tank car 
1973 Propane Vapour cloud explosion 19 9 37 St-Amand-Ies-Eaux, Road tanker 
France 
1974 Isoprene Vapour cloud explosion 7.6 2 \0 Beaumont, TX Isoprene plant 
1974 Isobutane Vapour cloud explosion 69 7 152 Decatur,IL Rail tank car 
1974 Cyclohexane Vapour cloud explosion 25 28 104 Flixborough, UK Caprolactam plant 
1974 LPG BLEVE 10 4 6 West St Paul, MN Storage vessel 
1975 Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 2.5 6 13 Antwerp, Belgium Polyethylene plant 
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1975 Propylene 
1975 LPG 
1975 Gasoline 
1976 LPG 
1976 Isobutane 
1976 Propylene 
1977 Gasoline 
1977 LPG 
1977 LPG 
1978 LPG 
1978 LPG 
1978 Propylene 
1978 Butane 
1979 Crude oil 
1979 Crude oil 
1980 Hexane, propylene 
1981 Propane 
1984 LPG 
1987 LPG 
1988 Propane 
1989 Isobutane 
1990 LPG 
1990 Propane 
1992 Propane, butane 
1998 LNG 
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Table 8 
14 107 Beek, Netherlands Petrochemicals plant 
17 34 Eagle Pass, TX Road tanker 
2 Rosendaal, Netherlands line leak 
2 22 Belt, Mt Rail tank car 
7 Lake Charles, La Refinery 
2 0 New Jersey 
3 Bay town, TX Tanker 
2 9 Goldonna, LA Rail tank car 
7 87 Umrn Said, Qatar LPG storage tank 
4 0 Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia Gas pipeline 
3 2 DonneUson, lA Pipeline 
216 200 San Carlos, Spain Road tanker 
100 220 Xilatopic, Mexico Road tanker 
52 Istanbul, Turkey Oil tanker 
50 Bantry Bay, Eire Crude tanker 
5 25 New castle, DE Polypropylene plant 
I 2 Gothenburge, Sweden Pipeline 
650 6400 Mexico city. Mexico LPG storage tank 
23 Queensland, Australia Rail tanker 
7 Louisiana, USA fluid catalytic cracking 
23 314 Pasadena, TX Polyethylene plant 
63 100 Bangkok, Thailand Road tanker 
6 Candanos, Spain Road tanker 
6 12 Marseilles, France catalytic cracker 
2 Longford, Victoria, Gas processing plant 
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Figure 1: Display of Visual Basic Programme for Inherent Safety Index (Compindex) 
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Compindex VB code 
The following is the Visual Basic Code used for the above programme. 
Sub InsertInventoryO 
sInventory = InputBoxC"Please Enter Inventory Value") 
WorksheetsC"sheet6").CellsC7, 3) = sInventory 
Compindex 
sInventory = W orkbooksC" compindex I.xls"). W orksheetsC" sheet6") .rangeC"C7") 
Select Case sInventory 
Case 0.1 To 250 
Score = I 
Case 251 To 2500 
Score = 2 
Case 2501 To 7000 
Score = 3 
Case 7001 To 16000 
Score = 4 
Case 16001 To 26000 
Score = 5 
Case 26001 To 38000 
Score = 6 
Case 38001 To 50000 
Score = 7 
Case 50001 To 65000 
Score = 8 
Case 65001 To 80000 
Score = 9 
Case 80001 To 100000 
Score = 10 
End Select 
WorksheetsC"sheet6").CellsC7, 4) = Score 
End Sub 
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Sub InsertTemperatureO 
sTemperature = InputBox("Please Enter Temperature") 
Worksheets("sheet6").CeIls(12, 3) = sTemperature 
'This program calculate the Temperature score of chemical roots 
sTemperature = 
W orkbooks(" compindex I.xls "). W orksheets(" sheet6").range("C 12 ") 
Select Case sTemperature 
Case Is < -25 
Score = 10 
Case -25 To -9 
Score = 3 
Case -10 To 9 
Score = I 
Case IOTa 29 
Score = 0 
Case 30 To 99 
Score = I 
Case 100 To 199 
Score = 2 
Case 200 To 299 
Score = 3 
Case 300 To 399 
Score=4 
Case 400 To 499 
Score = 5 
Case 500 To 599 
Score = 6 
Case 600 To 699 
Score = 7 
Case 700 To 799 
Score = 8 
Case 800 To 899 
Score = 9 
Case Is >= 900 
Score = 10 
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End Select 
Worksheets("sheet6").Cells(12, 4) = Score 
End Sub 
Sub InsertPressureO 
sPressure = InputBox("Please Enter Pressure Value") 
Worksheets("sheet6").CeIls(12, 6) = sPressure 
Compindex 
sPressure = W orkbooks(" compindex l.xls "). W orksheets(" sheet6 ").range("FI2 ") 
Select Case sPressure 
Case 0 To 90 
Score = 1 
Case 91 To 140 
Score = 2 
Case 141 To 250 
Score = 3 
Case 251 To 420 
Score=4 
Case 421 To 700 
Score = 5 
Case 701 To 1400 
Score = 6 
Case 1401 To 3400 
Score = 7 
Case 3401 To 4800 
Score = 8 
Case 4801 To 6000 
Score = 9 
Case 6001 To 8000 
Score = 10 
End Select 
Worksheets("sheet6").Cells(12, 7) = Score 
End Sub 
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Sub InsertYieldO 
syield = InputBox("Please Enter yield percentage") 
Worksheets("sheet6").Cells(l2, 9) = syield 
syield = Workbooks("compindexl.xls").Worksheets("sheet6").range("112") 
Select Case syield 
Case Is = 100 
Score = 0 
Case 90 To 99 
Score = I 
Case 80To 89 
Score = 2 
Case 70 To 79 
Score = 3 
Case 60 To 69 
Score =4 
Case 50 To 59 
Score = 5 
Case 40 To 49 
Score = 6 
Case 30 To 39 
Score = 7 
Case 20 To 29 
Score = 8 
Case 10 To 19 
Score = 9 
Case 0 To 10 
Score = 10 
End Select 
Worksheets("sheet6").Cells(12, 10) = Score 
End Sub 
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Sub InsertExplosivenessO 
sExplosiveness '" InputBox("Please Enter Explosiveness (S)") 
Worksheets("sheet6").Cells(7. 9) = sExplosiveness 
sExplosiveness = 
W orkbooks(" compindex I.xls "). W orksheets(" sheet6").range("I7 ") 
Select Case sExplosiveness 
CaseOTo9 
Score = 1 
Case 10 To 19 
Score = 2 
Case 20 To 29 
Score = 3 
Case 30To 39 
Score", 4 
Case 40 To 49 
Score = 5 
Case 50 To 59 
Score = 6 
Case 60 To 69 
Score = 7 
Case 70 To 79 
Score = 8 
Case 80 To 89 
Score = 9 
Case 90 To 100 
Score = 10 
End Select 
Worksheets("sheet6").Cells(7. 10) = Score 
End Sub 
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Sub InsertToxicityO 
STLV = InputBox("Please Enter TLV Value (ppm)") 
Worksheets("sheet6").Cells(7, 12) = STLV 
STL V = Workbooks("compindex l.xls").Worksheets("sheet6").range("L 7") 
Select Case STL V 
Case Is < 0.001 
Score = 8 
Case 0.001 To 0.009 
Score = 7 
Case om To 0.09 
Score = 6 
Case 0.1 To 0.9 
Score = 5 
Case 1 To 9 
Score = 4 
Case 10 To 99 
Score = 3 
Case 100 To 999 
Score = 2 
Case 1000 To 9999 
Score = 1 
Case Is >= 10000 
Score = 0 
End Select 
Worksheets("sheet6").Cells(7, 13) = Score 
End Sub 
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